Saturday, February 6, 2010

The Code of Conduct Bill for MPs: Some reflections

Parliament scan
The Code of Conduct Bill for MPs: Some reflections
M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury*
Published in the Daily Star, Law and Our Rights, February 06, 2010
Available Online: http://thedailystar.net/law/2010/02/01/index.htm

THE Bangladeshi brand of parliamentary democracy is a species peculiar in itself. During the first two decades (1971-1991) of our history, parliament as an institution suffered a total inattention. In the next two decades (1991-2010) it has been able to draw some focus though not much for its role play. Absence, causal presence, irregular attendance and regular boycott have drastically reduced its capability. It has developed a credibility crisis as well. In an ingenious bid to make politics 'difficult for the politicians', peoples with questionable disposition found their place in politics and parliament en masse. And hence the allegations of misusing the duty free car import facility, telephone, medical, travel, dwelling and entertainment allowances do not surprise us any more. Recently added to these is the allegation of misappropriation of AC, refrigerator, furniture and even chal-dal-noon-tel from parliament cafeteria. Outside the parliament, patronizing the terrorists is a rule rather than an exception. Though there are some rules of conduct in the Rules of Procedure to make the Members behave within the House, absence of a full pledged Code of Conduct controlling both the indoor and outdoor activities has contributed to damage the collective image of the Parliament. Given the situation, the recently tabled Private Member Bill proposing a Code of Conduct for MPs shows us a stream in the desert.
A skim through the Code of Conduct Bill
The Bill is based on a fundamental assertion that great honor of representation burdens the MPs with the great obligation to keep-up to people's expectation. The statement of objects and reasons of the Bill underscores the truism that spirit of democracy should first be implanted in the MPs themselves, if they are to establish the democratic and constitutional rights of the people. And hence the Bill aims at enabling the MPs to keep strict to their duties by setting examples before the nation.
Ethical position of the MPs - Section 3 of the Bill enumerates the intrinsic qualities a Member of Parliament is required to possess. These include humanity, commitment towards the independence, sanctity and sovereignty of Bangladesh, profound belief in the equality of all irrespective of sex, religion, race, color etc, rational and constructive outlook, allegiance to the spirit of the liberation war, noninvolvement in any anti social activity and commitment towards the establishment of rule of law.
Duties of the MPs - Discharging parliamentary responsibilities as per the Rules of Procedure would be the core duty of the Members of Parliament. In doing so they shall play an active role in representing the people with commitment, in lawmaking and in ensuring the accountability of the executive (Section 4(1)(i)). They shall upheld the law in keeping with the trust the people deposited with them (Section 4(1)(ii)). They shall discharge their parliamentary and public duties without taking into account any material and financial gains (Section 4(1)(iv)).
Basic principles of conduct - The Bill lays down some behavioral norms which the Members of Parliament shall follow in discharging their duties. Section 4(2)(a)-(g) delineate the principles of selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. The Members shall declare personal interests and take steps to resolve any conflict of interest in a way that protects the public interest. There shall be openness regarding their decisions and actions. They must give reasons behind their decisions and may restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands. They shall take decisions solely in terms of the public interest and not to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their family or friends. They shall not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organizations that might influence the performance of duties.
Additionally section 5(f),(g),(h) and (i) require them to refrain from recommending, influencing or changing the accepted rules of appointment in or promotion to or transfer from any public or private posts. They should also refrain from exerting personal or party influence in public procurement and approval or execution of public projects. Most importantly, as representative of the people they must refrain, in home or abroad, from doing all such things which may lower the image of Bangladesh as a sovereign country.
Section 6 embodies the 'No Paid Advocacy rule'. A Member of Parliament shall not make the public interest subordinate to any individual, coterie or party interest and must not vote on any bill or motion, or ask any question in the House or a committee, or promote any matter, in return for payment or any other material benefit.
Section 7 restricts the acceptance of gifts that may pose a conflict of interest or influence them in the exercise of their duties. They have to declare gifts exceeding 5000 taka to Ethics Committee to be formed under this Code and in 'appropriate cases', to submit the gifts or donations to the exchequer.
Section 8 provides that they shall utilize public properties and privileges as per law. Perhaps keeping in mind the In no circumstances the parliamentary privileges shall be used for income generating purposes.
Section 9 provides that subject to the Right to Information Act and any other law for the time being in force, Members must not knowingly and improperly use official information obtained in confidence in the course of their parliamentary duties, for the private benefit.
Section 10 requires the Members of Parliament to reflect democratic, progressive, tolerant, material and rational opinion in their speech and over all conduct.
In Section 11, the Members are prohibited to mislead the Parliament or the people consciously by their statement or speech. Even if one unwillingly makes any mistake, he/she 'must' correct the records on his/her own accord. Section 12 of the Bill reiterates what is said in Rule 270 of the Rules of procedure. A Member of Parliament is required to show respect, courtesy and civility towards other Members of Parliament.
Conflict of interest and financial statement - Section 5 of the proposed Bill reinforces the Rule 188(2) of the Rules of Procedures in a larger plane by requiring the Members to publish in the prescribed from their conflicting interests (Section 5(b)), wealth and income along with that of their family members before the first session of parliament ends to be updated on yearly basis. These statements shall be subject to the scrutiny of Ethics Committee which shall be empowered to publish any one if it thinks fit (Section 5(d)). They are also to arrange their private affairs so as to prevent real, potential or apparent conflicts of interests (Section 5(b)). To resolve the conflict of interests they may seek necessary guidance from the Ethics Committee (Section 5(c)).
Ethics committee - A Nine (9) Member Committee headed by the Speaker (Section 13(2)) with proportionate representation of the political parties shall be formed (Section 13(3)) to oversee the enforcement of the Code of Conduct. The Committee may inquire into the allegations brought by any individual (Section 13(5)). Any incident covered by the electronic and print media may suo moto be inquired into (Section 13(6)). A show-cause notice will be served on the accused MP and if his response is found satisfactory, the Committee may discard the issue. If the response doesn't satisfy the Committee, it shall refer the issue to the House with recommendations for punitive measures (Sections 13(7) and 14(2)).
Some gaps to be filled up
In spite of embodying so many progressive features, the Bill in its present form bears every risk of becoming a mere paper tiger unless some important issues are addressed sincerely and vigorously.
First, while framing a law regulating the conduct of MPs, we must not overlook the essential difference between a Code of Conduct and a Code of Ethics though they are often used interchangeably. This Bill also has mixed them up. A Code of Ethics identifies those ethical values within a particular culture, time and place that are regarded as the foundation of a profession or institution. Such a Code is usually aspirational rather than prescriptive. How to bring issues like fairness, accountability, faith in democracy, justness within the four walls of legal language to make them strictly enforceable? A Code of Conduct, on the other hand, is usually more focused on the core functions of the profession or organization, involving a sanction against violation. Bribery, corruption and conflict of interest etc can easily be subsumed under a law. So a Code of Conduct consisting of so many ethical principles, as it is the case with this Bill, would be a net with loopholes.
Secondly, even the core justiciable issues finding place in the Bill may be seen by the public only as window-dressing if the proposed Ethics Committee is not reconsidered. Similar Codes of Conduct failed to improved things in UK and US. The Ethics Committee consisting proportional representation of the political parties will surely take partisan stance by dividing along party lines.
Rather a parliamentary officer, like the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards in UK or Jurisconsult in Canada, may be assigned with the administration of the Code, while the enforcement shall rest with the Ethics Committee. The Commissioner shall have the duty to receive and investigate complaints concerning the Code, from parliamentarians and members of the public. On the basis of the recommendation of the Commissioner, ultimate sanctioning power shall be exercised by the Ethics Committee. To prevent the Committee from vitiating the recommendation, it may be provided that the Committee would ratify a report or reject it only on procedural grounds or because salient evidence has not been properly considered. In effect, the Committee shall operate as an appellate forum, charged with ensuring that procedural guarantees and natural justice have been observed. To attract vigorous public attraction, the report of the Commissioner must be made public before it is deliberated in the Committee. Moreover, to attract concrete punitive consequences for the Member found guilty, a breach of the Code should constitute misconduct and a breach of the privileges of Parliament.
Thirdly, while the Code requires the declaration of interests, it is slippery on the issue of specifying the specific interests that are required to be declared and registered. A concrete list may be inserted in the Bill defining the financial and non-financial interests which are always relevant and therefore must be registered.
Fourthly, best of the options shall be to introduce the Bill the House afresh as a Government Bill to do justice to the long felt demand for a binding Code of Conduct.
Conclusion
There is no denying that simply adopting a Code of Conduct would not cause a sea change in the situation. Perhaps it would not mark any difference at all. While even the ballot box fails to prevent troublemakers entering the Parliament, what a mere Code can do? Yet isn't it significant that at least one of the Members of Parliament have realized the magnitude of the credibility crisis the Parliamentarians face today? For now let us congratulate the MP responsible for the Bill and demand the approval of the Bill with necessary adaptations in the House.

*The writer is Senior Lecturer, Department of Law, Northern University Bangladesh (NUB), Dhaka (The Author is grateful to the honorable MP Mr. Saber Hossain Chowdhury for making a copy of the Bill available).

Sunday, January 24, 2010

Internet access: A fundamental right?


Internet access: A fundamental right?



M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury*

Published in the Daily Star, Law and Our Rights, January 23, 2010. Available online:

Are peoples' fundamental human rights being violated when they don't have access to the internet? This question brings an important opportunity to think afresh on our traditional understanding of human rights. Internet access may be understood as a contemporary form of the right to self-expression. It may also be understood as part of basic access to public services in an increasingly digitized world. Add to it the increased quality of life that comes with the huge jump in access to cultural and logistic information. The Council of Europe is moving decisively towards the 'universal right to internet access.' Finland has become the first, and surely not the last, country to make access to internet a legal right. In Switzerland the law on Universal Service grants every Swiss the right to get a broadband connection of 0.6 Mbps and the provider has to fulfil this obligation even if you're in a hut somewhere in the Alps! Just couples of months ago, the Constitutional Council of France termed access to internet a human right.

The Council of Europe efforts

In Council of Europe the 'Telecoms Reform Package' was presented to the European Parliament in November 2007. The debates on the Telecoms Package led to an extremely strong recognition of the access to internet as a fundamental right. In the first reading of the Package during September 2008 a number of amendments (known as Amendment 138) were carried (573 votes for and 74 against). It upheld the user's rights by making a judicial authority, in preference of an adminsitrative authority, the highest instance deciding on sanctions against him. But as the French representatives demanded the withdrawal of Amendment 138, the renumbered Amendment 46 was propsoed on the basis of an offered compromise. In the second reading, on 5 May 2009, a clear majority (407 votes for and 57 against) adopted the Amendment 46 again making it illegal to disconnect the internet users on the ground of suspected copyright violations until they are proven guilty in court. It recognised, notably in accordance with Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on Freedom of Expression and Information, that internet access is part of fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression and access to information. The Telecoms Package is now waiting its third reading and pressure is mounting upon the European Parliament to guarantee a free, open and innovative Internet.

The French Constituional Conucil bolsters the move

On 13 May, 2009 the French National Assembly passed the Creation and Internet Law, also called the Three-Strikes Law, as a key plank to deal with illegal file-sharing over internet. Section 5 of the Statute introduced the HADOPI (High Authority for the Diffusion of works and the Protection of copyright on the Internet) within the framework of the Intellectual Property Code which would act as intermediary between rights holder organizations and ISPs (Internet Service Providers) and would pass on the allegations from the right holders with a request to the ISPs to warn or sanction their users. Section 10 empowers the HADOPI to order the taking of all measures necessary to prevent or put an end to such infringement of copyright or a related right. Section 11 inserts into the Intellectual Property Code provisions which define the duty to monitor access to the internet to determine the cases in which internet access has been used in a manner infringing copyright of another. Under the law, pirates would be given three emailed warnings (Three Strikes) before having their access to the net cancelled or suspended. Suspension may be for a period of two months to one year accompanied by the impossibility for the subscriber to enter into any other contract with any other operator for access to internet.

There had been considerable public debate about the status of the HADOPI - whether it was a court with a legal authority to sanction internet subscribers. It was alleged that the law created an internet Big Brother who would hit innocent people whose web connections were being used by others, such as children, employees or people illegally hooking into their wi-fi. In June 2009, a reference was made to the Conseil Constitutionel to review the law. The parties making the referral contended that by giving an administrative authority the power to impose penalties in the form of withholding access to the internet, Parliament infringed the fundamental right of freedom of expression and communication (Para 11 of the Council's Judgment, Available Online: www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/2009_580dc.pdf).

Referring to Article 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 the Council opined that the free communication of ideas and opinions protected by the founding fathers of the French Republic continues to serve a purpose in today's Information Society. Given the generalized development of public online communication services and 'the importance of these for participation in democracy', the Council held that the right to free coomunication of ideas and opinions implies freedom to access internet (Para 12).

As to the question whether HADOPI was a court, the Council made it clear that it would be merely a public administrative authority and would not have the legal powers of a court. Considering the importance of 'the right of any person to exercise his right to express himself and communicate freely' the Council held that only a court had the authority to switch off a person's web connection and the Parliament was not at liberty to vest an administrative authority with such powers (Para 16). In the name of fighting the infringement of copyright grossly disproportionate restriction on the right of free communication and freedom to speak, write and publish may not be imposed (Para 15).

Finland makes a big push to the internet access 'right'

Finland is one of the most wired countries in the world. About 95 percent of the population has some sort of Internet acces. On October 14, 2009 the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications announced a Decree on the Minimum Rate of a Functional Internet Access as a Universal Service (732/2009). As per the law, the minimum rate of downstream traffic of a functional internet access is 1 Mbps (Section 1(1) of the Decree). However, the average minimum rate of 750 Kbps in a measuring period of 24 hours and 500 Kbps in any 4-hour measuring period shall do (Section 1(2)). Every Finn shall have this right guaranteed by 1 July 2010 (Section 2(2)). The legal implication of this 'legal right' is that specific operators are enforced to provide specific level of service for all consumers at a reasonable price. The move by Finland is aimed at bringing web access to rural areas, where geographic challenges have limited access until now. The 1 Mbps mandate, however, is simply an intermediary step, the country is aiming for speeds of 100 Mbps for all by 2015.

Right to internet access: Possible objections and a reply

Though the notion of internet as a basic right is gaining momentum, forcefully advocating it in an overhelmingly capitalist world still runs every risk of being termed 'asinine' and 'UN-believable'. The Scandinavian-style welfare decision of Finland sounds 'Obamish' to many. They doubt whether internet access is a 'right' or a 'nice-to-have'. Some fear more governmental intruision through such 'Robin Hood' socialism whereby the government steals from the rich (internet service providers) and gives to the poor (under-privileged users). Some other even recall Jefferson: 'A government big enough to give you anything you want is big enough to take everything you have.' However, if you look from a developing county's point of view it will not be too tough to locate the 'concern' of the cynics. A large number of 'e-citizens' arround the West have asked the question: Who is going to pay for the 'right to internet access'? A serious question indeed.

Well, there may be some interpretational side effects of the primary goal of universal right to internet access. Firstly, government guarantees that no one can deny you access to broadband service as long as you're willing to pay for it. Second, those who want broadband and can pay for it must do so while those who want it but demonstrates inability to pay will have it provided to them. This would be more akin to everyone having a right to defense counsel if charged with a crime. If you can afford it, you hire your own attorney. If you can't the government provides an attorney for you. And third, government provides the service to everyone and taxes the people through some means (direct tax, fees on services, etc).
I think no one shall dislike the first option. As to the second and third, it may be argued whether it makes sense for the government to subsidize access to broadband. So let us ask some questions and answer them ourselves. How much were and are spent on rural electrification to get power to the farmers so that we reach the targeted food production? A 'knowledge economy' requires Internet access in the same way the agricultural economy requires electricity. How much were and are spent in those government-funded fire services or police protection or public education and a hundreds other services that we enjoy? So why not a little bit in technology? Isn't it far cheaper for the government to provide basic broadband access to everyone than to provide printed versions of every form to all its citizens? Isn't it far better to spend on the universal access to internet than to spend in bailing out the purveyors of the capital market? The point to emphasize is offering information access to all citizens to bridge the gap between the have's and the have not's. Those who have it are at an advantage to those who do not. There are so many things you are excluded from without Internet access.

Conclusion

The Finnish government or the French Constituional Council is simply laying down examples that should be followed by every country that wants to participate in a 21st Century 'knowledge economy'. Yes someone has to pay and it will cost a lot of money but the benefits are huge. Adding the idea fundamental right to low-cost internet service is the only next logical step for modern, enlightened societies. While surfing through the net, I've noticed one Cory Doctorow predicting: 'In five years, a UN convention will enshrine network access as a human right. In ten years, we won't understand how anyone thought it wasn't a human right!'


*The writer is Senior Lecturer, Department of Law, Northern University Bangladesh (NUB), Dhaka.

Sunday, December 27, 2009

Separation of judiciary: The journey continues


Reviewing the views
Separation of judiciary: The journey continues
M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury

Published in the Daily Star, Law and Our Rights, December 26, 2009; Available Online: http://thedailystar.net/law/2009/12/04/views.htm


1. In Bangladesh Masder Hossain episode of the till-birth struggle for separation of judiciary is over, theoretically at least. And I see a sort of complacency in all fronts with the fact that by now we've got a Judicial Service Commission which so far have done excellent in injecting a herd of promising young minds in the Judiciary. The overall performance of these fresh bloods has created a good reason to be hopeful. The rate of disposal, efficiency and quality of judicial activism is rather excellent. However complacency may seem to be indifference, if you have noticed the 'grudging' acknowledgment of the fait accompli of 'Independent Judiciary' on the part of the executive. What has the Executive not done so far to make the separation a meaningless one?

2. Just take the example of the Secretary of the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affaires. A meeting of the Secretaries of the Ministry of Finance and Law, Additional Secretary and Joint Secretary of the Cabinet Division and Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Law was held on January 6, 1997. The meeting recommended for creation of a separate Legislative Drafting Wing in the Ministry of Law to enhance the quality of legal drafting. The meeting observed that an officer of the Legislative Drafting Wing, if found to be otherwise qualified, may be eligible for the appointment in the post of Secretary of the Ministry of Law.
This, however, was not included in the Legislative Drafting Officer (Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affaires) Recruitment Rules, 1998 promulgated by the President in exercise of the power granted under Article 133 of the Constitution in consultation with Public Service Commission as is required by Article 140(2). The rules clearly specified that the highest post in the Wing shall be Additional Secretary (Drafting) and lowest being the Assistant Secretary (Drafting).
An officer from the Judicial Service Cadre was given option to join the Legislative Drafting wing on condition that once the option is taken for a post it cannot be revoked. Mr Habibul Awal exercised the option, left the judicial service, got early promotion, gained seniority over his contemporary colleagues and enjoyed an uninterrupted stay in Dhaka. Ultimately by way of promotion he reached the position of Additional Secretary of Legislative Drafting Wing.


3. The Senior Service Pool Order 1979 reserved 50% of the posts of Deputy Secretary or above in the Ministry of Law for the Judicial Officers, which was subsequently enhanced to 75% in 1983. In 1989 the Senior Service Pool Order, 1979 was repealed. The 75% rule however was retained.
Later on the President in consultation with the Supreme Court promulgated a Policy (Nitimala) in 2001 providing guidelines for and eligibility of officers from the Judicial Service to be appointed as Joint Secretary or Additional Secretary or Secretary-in-charge or Secretary. Rule 3 of that Nitimala again confirmed the 75% rule. It provided that the appointment to these posts shall made from the officers belonging to the 'Judicial Wing' of the Ministry.
Thereafter on 11/6/2002 another notification was issued by the Government promulgating Rules for Promotion of the Deputy Secretary, Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary and the Secretary of the Government, 2002. Rule 5 of it also confirmed the 75% rule. Rules of 2002, however, did not expressly mention that Secretary of the Ministry of Law should be from the Judicial Wing.
In 2007 Dr. Shahdin Malik moved the High Court Division challenging the 75% rule on the basis of a doctrinaire view of separation of power [12 MLR (HC) 368]. He challenged the practice of deputation of Judicial Service officers in the Ministry of Law. In light of the change of plot after November 1, 2007, the judges, the officers belonging to the independent judicial service must not serve the Executive in the Ministry in any form whatsoever. This, to him, will be tempering with the spirit of Separation of power, Masdser Hossain verdict as well as the Constitution. So any Nitimala or Bidhimala permitting the deputation should be considered void after the separation of Judiciary in 2007.
Interesting to note that this was a challenge to the Nithimala 2001 which the Government depended with full force and success [Para 73 12 MLR (HC) 368]. Justice A B M Khairul Huq unequivocally confirmed that still the Nitimala 2001 has the 'force of law' specially when the Judicial Service (Posting, Promotion, Leave, Control, Discipline and other terms of services) Rules 2006 and its amended version of 2007 have kept the scope of deputation alive. The Appellate Division also has confirmed this.


4. Md. Ashraf Ali Khan Lodi was a District and Sessions Judge of Chittagong. He was appointed as Joint Secretary on deputation to the Judicial Wing of the Ministry of Law in consultation with the Supreme Court in 2002. By June 2007, he was about to retire from the Secretary of the Ministry. Now the Caretaker government appointed Mr. Habibul Awal, Additional Secretary of the Drafting Wing, as the Secretary-in-Charge. Mr. Aftab Uddin, an Advocate of the Supreme Court challenged the appointment being contrary to all the rules and policies of appointment to that post. What the government did was rather thundering.
The Nitimala 2001 was repealed during the hearing of the Rule before the court of Justice Shah Abu Nayeem Mominur Rahman. Now the Government claims that the Nitimala 2001 is violative of the Constitution and against the judgment passed in Masder Hossain case [13 MLR (HC) 105, Para 15]. The Court declared the appointment void which is ultimately upheld by the Appellate Division.


5. You shall see some pious arguments against Judges holding executive posts like Secretary of the Ministry of Law especially when the Judiciary is 'separate'. What is overlooked in those arguments is that the lower judiciary is still a ward in the hands of the Ministry of Law, the 'appropriate authority' now-a-days. A Secretary of the Ministry has the Damocles' Sword which affords enough both in terms of will and power to dictate over the judges and the judiciary. The Supreme Court is given a consultative status at best. You can easily contemplate the fate of a 'consultation' outcome, while the Executive can lavishly afford flouting a judgment of the Highest Court.
At this stage of the write-up Bangabandhu knocks at the door of our memory. While propagating the historic Six-point in 1966, Bangabandhu once asked the Pakistani junta: 'Does it not put you to shame that every bit of reasonable demand of East Pakistan has got to be secured from you at tremendous cost and after bitter struggle as if snatched from unwilling foreign rulers as reluctant concessions?'
The separation of judiciary, if you call it a separation at all, has become a 'reluctant concession' on the part of the 'unwilling' executive, which we attained after a 'bitter struggle'. Probably we need to pay a 'tremendous cost' to purchase true judicial independence. Bangabandhu is fortune bound to remain at the heart of every just struggle for freedom.
The writer is Senior Lecturer, Department of Law, Northern University Bangladesh (NUB), Dhaka.

Saturday, October 3, 2009

Does Inconsistency with ‘Fundamental Principles of State Policy’ Invalidate a Law?


Does Inconsistency with ‘Fundamental Principles of State Policy’ Invalidate a Law?


M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury

Published in the BRAC University Journal Vol 5 No 1 pages 71-75

ABSTRACT

There is a struggle throughout the world on the issue of justiciability of socio-economic rights. It is forcefully argued that socio-economic rights should be given the same status as that of civil political rights. Ensuring the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights has been considered a prime issue in this regard. In Bangladesh, Part II of the Constitution embodies the socio-economic rights as “Fundamental Principles of State Policy” whereas “Fundamental Rights” consisting of Civil Political rights find place in Part III. Article 8(2) of the Constitution makes the Principles and thereby the socio-economic rights judicially non-enforceable. This provision came under judicial consideration in Kudrat-e-Elahi v. Bangladesh case. The Appellate Division relied on non-enforceability criteria (in article 8(2)) to hold that a law cannot be repealed only on the ground of inconsistency with fundamental principles. This article attempts to submit the opposite.


Keywords: Civil Political Rights, Economic Social Rights, Fundamental Principles of State Policy, Fundamental Rights, Judicial enforcement.


I. INTRODUCTION

The Constitution of Bangladesh (1972) creates a dichotomy between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural right by making the former enforceable by the court and the latter non-enforceable.
Economic, social and cultural rights are included in Part II of the Constitution as “fundamental principles of state policy” (articles 8 to 25). These include the equal rights of women, principles of ownership, provision of basic necessities of life including food, clothing, shelter, education and medical care, and worker’s rights. Article 8(2) explicitly states that these principles are not judicially enforceable. It reads as follows:
“The principles set out in this part shall be fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh, shall be applied by the state in making of laws, shall be a guide to the interpretation of the constitution and of the other laws of Bangladesh, and shall form the basis of the work of the state and of its citizens, but shall not be judicially enforceable.”
Part III of the Constitution embodies the ‘fundamental rights’, encompassing mainly civil and political rights (articles 26 to 47). Unlike Part II, the rights in Part III are justiciable. Citizens have the right to approach the High Court Division to redress any infringement of the rights (article 44). Again the Constitution provides that laws inconsistent with the rights shall be void to the extent of such inconsistency (article 26) there being no such provision regarding the principles in part II.
The status of the fundamental principles of state policy (FPSP) within the fabric of the constitution has come under judicial scrutiny in Kudrat-E-Elahi Panir and Others v Bangladesh 44DLR (AD) 319 where the appellants relying on article 7 of the Constitution tried to convince the court that a law inconsistent with any of the FPSP is void. Article 7 deals with the supremacy of the Constitution, and sub section 2 provides that “if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void”. To negative the contention, the Court interpreted article 7(2) along with article 8(2) in a pessimistic approach. This article is an attempt to prove into the worth of such non-liberal literal interpretation of the constitution and intends to submit that the constitution doesn’t bar repelling a law conflicting with any of the ESC rights placed in Part II.


II. STATUS OF THE PRINCIPLES UNDER JUDICIAL SCRUTINY


The above mentioned case concerned a challenge to Ordinance No. XXXVII of 1991 (that subsequently became Act No. II of 1992) which abolished the elected Upazila Parishads (the third tier of the local government) and vested in the government all rights, powers, authorities and privileges of the dissolved Upazilla Parishads. The appellants, some chairmen of dissolved Upazilla Parishads, unsuccessfully challenged the law in the High Court Division and therafter obtaining leave to appeal appeared before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh.
The Ordinance was challenged on two grounds. First, it violates article 59 of the constitution. Article 59 provides that local government in every administrative unit shall be entrusted to bodies composed of elected representative of the people. Article 152(1) of the Constitution defines administrative unit as ‘a district or other area designated by law for the purposes of article 59’. The court rejected the contention holding that though all the local government institutions must conform to article 59, the Upazilla was never designated to be an administrative unit for the purpose of article 59. Hence the abolition of Upazilla didn’t attract the mischief of article 59 (Kamal Mustafa, 1994:131).
Second, the appellants argued that the Ordinance being inconsistent with articles 9 and 11 runs against the spirit of the Constitution and becomes void by the operation of article 7(2). Article 9 emphasises on maintaining democratically elected local government institutions. The State shall encourage local government institutions ‘composed of representatives of the areas concerned’ with special representation given to peasants, workers and women. Article 11 affirms the democratic nature of the state, in which fundamental human rights and freedoms and respect for the dignity and worth of the human person are guaranteed and the effective participation of people through their ‘elected representatives’ in administration at all levels is ensured.
In the main judgement Ahmed Shahabuddin CJ held that articles 9 and 11 being located in Part II of the constitution are not judicially enforceable. If the State does not or cannot implement these principles the Court cannot compel the state to do so and other such fundamental principles also stand on the same footing (para 22 p. 331).
Kamal J concurring with Shahabuddin CJ based his reasoning on the following two points:
First, while there is a specific provision in the Constitution dealing with laws that are inconsistent with civil and political rights (article 26), there is no specific provision on laws that are inconsistent with fundamental principles of state policy. To him the omission is deliberate and calculated because provisions analogous to article 26 could have been inserted in part II as well.
Second, under article 7(2), any law that is inconsistent with the Constitution shall be void to the extent of the inconsistency. Kamal J observed that the Constitution itself in article 8(2) recognises that fundamental principles of state policy are not laws but “principles” that have to be applied by the state when making laws. And to equate “principles” with “laws” is to go against the law of the Constitution itself (para 84 p. 346). So article 7(2) cannot be interpreted to mean that if any other law is inconsistent with the “principles” mentioned in part II then that law to the extent of the inconsistency will be void (para 85 p. 346). He fears that such interpretation would bring “the Fundamental Principles of State Policy at par with Fundamental Rights in so far as voidability is concerned (para 85 p. 346).”
Interestingly, though the court declined to strike down the Ordinance for inconsistency with fundamental principles of state policy, it used articles 9 and 11 as touchstone to interpret article 59 to hold that designating administrative units and forming elected local governments are the constitutional obligations of the state. Accordingly it ordered the Government to designate all the local government areas as administrative unit within four months and then to replace all non-elected persons by elected representatives within six months from the date of the judgment (Judgment on July 30 1992). Unfortunately the order is yet to be executed.


III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT

Though the case concerns only with the people’s right to participation, it has a direct impact on the enjoyment of other socio-economic rights as well. The judgement shall facilitate the State in passing laws detrimental to people’s right to basic necessaries of life including food, clothing, treatment, housing and education as all those rights are placed in part II of the constitution. Hence, the observations of the court as regards the validity of law contrary to the state principles in Kudrat-E-Elahi require consideration.
Firstly, the interpretation of article 7(2) offered by Kamal J fails to follow the proper tune of the article, as a plain reading of the article leads one to a different conclusion. Article 7(2) declares the Constitution to be the supreme law of the Republic and further proceeds to say that if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. It is not disputed that “principles” are not “law” in the ordinary sense and it is obvious that ‘principles’ may not supersede the ‘law’. But the term “this Constitution” in article 7(2) includes both the ‘laws’ and ‘principles’ embodied in it. Moreover, the principles in Part II are not principles of ordinary weight or principles of any particular organ of the state, of any public corporation promulgated under its plenary or delegated legislative power. They are ‘constitutional principles’ and article 8(2) itself requires the state to apply these principles when making laws.
Secondly, it may be asked whether article 8(2), by making the provisions of part II unenforceable by the court, has vested the legislature with power to flout these provisions by enacting laws in violation of these provisions. Logically article 8(2) cannot be interpreted as superseding article 7(2) on the yardstick of which all laws enacted by the legislature has to be tested [Huda AKMS, 1997:281]. What is meant by unenforceability is that the directive principles can’t be enforced by and through judicial process to compel the state to carry them out, if it can’t do. This is not to say that it can throw them to the winds, and can enact laws openly in opposition to them. A court can unambiguously declare a law unconstitutional as being manifestly opposed to the fundamental principle of state policy (Jain Kagzi Mc, 2004:938).
Thirdly, the article 8(2) has five parts – the principles:
• shall be fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh;
• shall be applied by the State in making of laws;
• shall be a guide to the interpretation of the Constitution and other laws of Bangladesh;
• shall form the basis of the work of the State and its citizens; and
• shall not be judicially enforceable.
It seems that while declining to nullify a law on the ground of inconsistency with the principles and using the principles only as an interpretative tool, judiciary is ready to enforce the fifth and third criteria respectively and not the other three criteria set out in article 8(2). It may be asked whether article 8(2) binds the judiciary only and leaves the executive and legislature out of its ambit.
Fourthly, by invoking the phrase ‘shall not be judicially enforceable’, Ahmed Shahabuddin CJ held that if the state ‘does not or cannot’ implement the principles, the court cannot compel. What is missing in this argument is that though the court cannot compel progression, it can always pin down retrogression. In this regard Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in Anwar Hossain v Bangladesh 1989 BLD(Spl) 1 has stated that:
“Though the directive principles are not enforceable by any court, the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the Governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the state to apply these principles in making laws. It is a protected Article (article 8- author) in our Constitution and the legislature cannot amend this Article without referendum. This alone shows that the executive cannot flout the directive principles. The endeavour of the Government must be to realise these aims and not to whittle them down (para 53 p 61).”
Lastly, the fear of fundamental principles becoming at par with fundamental rights is not a substantiated one. Conversely, the tune is somewhat opposite in the constitution of Bangladesh. The constitution has discarded the supremacy of rights doctrine by inserting article 47(1) (Ahmed Naim 1994:91). Article 47(1) provides that no law shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridge any of the rights guaranteed by Part III which is declared to be enacted to give effect to any of the fundamental principles of state policy set out in Part II. As regards the relative strength of rights and principles, it is pertinent to consult the Indian jurisprudence.


IV. COMPARATIVE CASE LAW FROM INDIA

The Indian Constitution is similar to that of Bangladesh in this regard as socio-economic rights are included as directive principles of state policy. In the constitution of India a detailed list of human rights has been incorporated in the form of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles under Part III and Part IV of the constitution respectively. Despite the classification of the rights and principles, there has been, in practice dynamic interaction between these two parts, which gradually enhanced the status of the principles (Prasad Anirud 1976:85).
Initially the Indian Supreme Court in State of Madras v Champkam Dorairajan AIR 1951 SC 226, 525, MH Quareshi v State of Bihar AIR 1958 SC 731 and Re Kerala Education Bill AIR 1958 SC 956 took the stand that directive principles have to conform to and run subsidiary to the chapter on fundamental rights.
However, in Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 the court held that what is fundamental in the governance of the country cannot be less significant than what is significant in the life of the individual and so rights and principles supplement each other. Mathew J constituting the majority in that case said: considerations of justice, of the common good, or "the general welfare in a democratic society" might require abridging or taking away of the Fundamental Rights (para 1760).
Subsequently the 42nd amendment to the Indian Constitution in 1976 tightened the link between the ‘principles’ and ‘rights’ by including the word ‘socialist’ in the preamble and by amending article 31C to confer primacy of a principle over fundamental rights.
Inclusion of the word ‘socialist’ in the preamble to describe the nature of the statehood of India affirmed and established that Indian’s is a socialist constitution striking a balance between the individual liberty and the social interest (Ahmed, Naim 1994:94).
Article 31C, however, was struck down in Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789 on the ground that giving absolute primacy to one part over the other disturbs the harmony of the constitution and ipso facto destroys the basic structure of the constitution (Chandrachud CJ, para 22, 64). Bhagwati J (dissenting), however, maintained that if a law is enacted for the purpose of giving effect to a Directive Principle and it imposes a restriction on a Fundamental Right, it would be difficult to condemn such restriction as unreasonable or not in public interest (para 329 F-H and 330 A-F). Later in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co v Bharat Coking Coal Ltd AIR1982 SC 239 the Court affirmed Bhagwati’s dissenting opinion.
The Indian literature can be a source of inspiration for Bangladeshi courts. Since the scheme of the Constitution of Bangladesh relating to the rights and principles is the same as in the Indian Constitution, the same position should obtain under our constitutional dispensation (Islam Mahmudul 2002:56). Moreover whereas the Indian Constitution describes Part IV as “Directive Principles of State Policy”, the Bangladeshi one describes Part II as “Fundamental Principles of State Policy” which may be claimed to be calculated and deliberate. Keeping in mind that the Indian Supreme Court never shrugged its shoulders where it was called upon to give effect to principles (Mehta, PL & Verma N 1994:21), our judiciary is expected to be more enthusiastic than its Indian counter part.


V. CONCLUSION


Fundamental principles are incapable of judicial enforcement only in the sense that the order, time, place and mode of fulfilling the policies should be left with the executive. At the same time the executive should not be allowed to defy the Constitution by allowing them to flout, ignore, disregard and defeat the fundamental principles of state policy in making laws. Any sort of retrogression is constitutionally unacceptable. An interpretation of the constitution that allows repelling laws inconsistent with the fundamental principles will be in template harmony with the vision and mission of the Constitution enshrined in the preamble.

REFERENCES

[1] Kamal. Mustafa: Bangladesh Constitution: Trends and Issues, 2nd ed., pp. 176. University of Dhaka, (1994)

[2] Huda. AKMS: The Constitution of Bangladesh Vol1, pp. 554. Rita Court. Chittagong. (1997)

[3] Jain. Kagzi Mc: The Constitution of India, Vol2, 4th Edition, India Law House. (2004)

[4] Ahmed. Naim: Public Interest Litigation Constitutional Issues and Remedies, pp. 190. BLAST, Dhaka (1994)

[5] Prasad. Anirud: “Human Rights and Socio-Economic justice: A Study with special reference to India” in Civil and Military Law Journal, Vol12 pp. 84-93 (1976)

[6] Islam. Mahmudul, Constitutional Laws of Bangladesh, 2nd ed., pp. 848. Mullick Brothers, Dhaka (2002)

[7] Mehta. PL and Verma Neena: Human Rights under the Indian Constitution: (The Philosophy and Judicial Gerrymandering), pp.187. Eastern Book Corporation. (1999)

Thursday, October 1, 2009

Determining the Province of Judicial Review: A Re-evaluation

Determining the province of Judicial Review: A re-evaluation of ‘Basic Structure’ of the Constitution of Bangladesh
Dr. M. Jafar Ullah Talukder*
M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury**

Published in the Metropolitan University Journal (Vol 2 Issue 2), a peer reviewed journal.
To download the pdf version from Metropolitan University website click: http://www.metrouni.edu.bd/webMetro/Journal/vol2/Writing14.pdf

Abstract
The fascinating doctrine of Basic Structure resides in the nitty-gritty of the highly sophisticated debate on the scope of constitution amending power. It has become a vibrant tool of judicial activism to protect the constitutional edifice faced with the invincible parliamentary super majority from ruination. The substance of the claim is that there are certain structural pillars of the Constitution which cannot be dismantled by parliament in the name of amendment. It was planted strappingly in the judicial culture of Bangladesh by Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh 1989 BLD (Spl) 1. Though since Anwar Hossain it has got a confident practical acceptance, a plain reading of Article 142 of the Constitution puts the doctrine into the fogginess of controversy, incongruity and inapplicability in certain cases. This article aims at outlining the clarified range of the reach of the doctrine as well as the flat standard of its identification to shun the duskiness rotating round the contents of the notion.



1. Introduction
The celebrated doctrine of Basic Structure is the most outstanding constitutional ‘invention’ of the Indian Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati (His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v State of Kerala and another 1973 (4) SCC 225ff). The gist of the dictum is that parliament could not use its amending powers to 'damage', 'emasculate', 'destroy', 'abrogate', 'change' or 'alter' the 'basic structure' or framework of the Constitution.
Since then the premise of this proposition has become a cause celebre (Hossain and Omar, Coup d' etat) in some newer Commonwealth countries especially in South Asia. In Bangladesh it was given a thriving trial by the Appellate Division in Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v. Bangladesh 1989 BLD (Spl) 1. A majority of 3:1 of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court struck down the Constitution (Eighth) Amendment Act, 1988 establishing six permanent Benches of the High Court Division outside Dhaka on the charge of being violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. While scrutinizing the Anwar Hossain case three most striking constitutional implications of it become noticeable.
First, the Judiciary has got a free hand in defining basic structure making the concept a fluctuating one and hence bad. Second, the judiciary has got a final say over the power of the parliament to amend the constitution. Third and the most sweeping one is that judiciary will thereby not only trump over the ‘will of the people’ expressed through an elected legislature, but also the 'absolute will' of the people in case of amendments effected through referendum.
Against this backdrop, even though feeling deeply associated with the platitude that a democracy likes ours is vulnerable to its own representatives due to ‘excessive adventures with power’ coupled with uncertain political consciousness and illiteracy of the people (Sethi 41), this paper argues:
First, that the plea of inherent limitation on the power of amendment is not plausible as it makes certain provisions of the Constitution (which again are to be determined by the court on case to case basis) virtually fixed for ever;
Second, that though mere parliamentary amendments (effected through two thirds majority in the House) may be subjected to judicial oversight, amendment effected through referendum (Article 142 (1A)) must not be; and
Third, the judicial oversight on parliamentary amendment again should be circumscribed by fixing or expanding, if necessary, the list of basic structures in Article 142 (1A) of the Constitution so that the basic structure does not become a matter of continuing uncertainty.
Before the assertions are presented with justifications and replies to possible objections, we start with a brief account of the constitutional provision regulating the amendment procedure.

2. Amending process of the Constitution
The Parliament is given the legislative power in Article 65 while the procedure of amending the constitution is prescribed in Article 142 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh. An amendment to the constitution may be made through a Bill passed in the parliament by the votes of not less then two thirds of the total members of the Parliament. There is however, clause (1A) inserted in Article 142 by the Second Proclamation Order No IV of 1978. This clause provided for referendum in excess of two thirds majority in cases where the amending Bill intended to amend the preamble, any of the Articles 8, 48, 56, 58, 80, 92A and 142. The President shall refer the Bill to referendum before his assent his given. This again was amended by the Act No XXVIII of 1991 which omitted Articles 58, 80 and 92A from the list.

3. Is there anything unamendable in the Constitution?
In Anwar Hossain the Court emphasized on the inherent limitation on the power of amendment. It was assumed that amending power is a limited power, by express provsions or necessary implications. Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed made a difference between ‘adoption of a new constitution’ and ‘the derivative power of amending the constitution’ and having regard to the term ‘amendment’ took the view that amendment of the Constitution does not mean its abrogation or destruction or a change resulting in the loss of its identity and character (Para 378).
The contention that ‘amendment’ does not mean fundamental change resulting in the losing of identity may be disputed at least on three grounds. First, if the fundamental character of a constitution can never be changed, should it not mean that a particular generation is governing the future from the grave particularly when ‘this Constitution does not contain any provision to repeal or replace the constitution’ (B H Chowdhury J in Anwar Hossain para 256)? Secondly, the presence of Article 142 (1A) along with the absence of provision for ‘replacing or repealing’ the constitution makes it clear that there is no other way to effect change, either trivial or drastic, in the Constitution except the Article 142 procedure. There is no provision for establishing a Constituent Assembly to overhaul the Constitution if necessity arises.
Thirdly, our constitution is ‘the solemn expression of the will of the people’ (Article 7). Now think of a situation when the people of Bangladesh think of a completely new version of it with fundamental changes in the philosophy and structure of the Constitution. Any such effort will not be tenable under the scheme of Basic Structure of the present Constitution as there are some basic features which according to Anwar Hossain are not amendable in any case (Para 255). Should we construe the intention of the framers of the Constitution in this way? An unamendable constitution is the worst tyranny of time. So the argument of inherent limitation is a misnomer to establish that there are some provisions which can never be changed. Constitution is particularly hard to amend but not unamendable.

4. Judicial Review of Constitutional Amendment
On judicial review of constitutional amendments, some poses an outright rejection of the concept, while some other asserts a sweeping claim of such power. However, we are not willing to generalize the formulation in that way. Taking cognizance of the nature and modes of amendment, our stance on judicial review of constitutional amendment is distinct for two types of amendments which we call parliamentary amendment and popular amendment.

4.1. Amendment made by the Parliament alone
While judicial review of laws passed by parliament is marked as a precursor of constitutional supremacy, judicial review of the constitutional amendments is seen with both ‘reverence and suspicion’ (Kamal 139). There are arguments disputing the judicial review of parliamentary amendment. First, some argue that Judiciary should protect the Constitution as it is and check that ordinary laws do not violate the Constitution. The Judiciary should not define how the constitution should be which, it is argued, the ‘basic structure’ purports to ensure. If the Court ventures into this path, that would be tantamount to Judicial Supremacy or 'government by the court' (Hossain and Omar, Constituionalism).
Secondly, amendment of the constitution being a political question should remain out of judicial review (Hossain and Omar, Constitutionalism). Thirdly, the amending power of parliament (constituent power) is distinct from its plenary legislative power. The power of amendment is not dealt with in the Part which deals with composition, powers and functions of Parliament and Article 65 is not applicable in case of amendment of the Constitution under Article 142 (Islam 404). In exercising its constituent power the Parliament is responsible to electorate only and hence judicial review of constituent action should be barred (ATM Afzal J in Anwar Hossain Para 530).
It is submitted that all the arguments lack strong foundation and are rebuttable. Firstly, it is one of the salient features of ‘Constitutional Supremacy’ that amendment of the constitution is particularly rigid and cumbersome. There are many ways to ensure this. Requirement of two thirds majority for constitutional amendment is only one of them. Judiciary as a guardian of the Constitution should have a say in constitutional amendment. This is nothing but another sign of rigidity of the Constitution. Once elected, the parliamentarians do not inherit a blanket power to do everything they wish until they are de-elected in the next election (Hoque). This argument is extremely relevant. This if not ensured will make the constitution a plaything in the hands of the majority party ridden parliament and thus will give birth to ‘Parliamentary Supremacy’ which also is surely not contemplated by the framers of the constitution.
As to the second point, it is not disputed that amendment may be the result of political agenda or policy determination. But is this not the case with almost every law passed by a particular parliament? Does law making by a particular ruling party not reflect its political ideology and convenience? So if political question is not evoked in ordinary legislation why should it be preached only for constitutional amendments? Moreover the doctrine of political question is not applicable at least in parliamentary amendments due to Article 7 which implies the concept of limited government. Nobody can transgress the limit by asserting the doctrine of political question (Islam 311). The Appellate Division in Special Reference no 1 of 1995, 47 DLR (AD) 111 observed that:
‘There is no magic in the phrase ‘political question’. While maintaining judicial restraint the Court is the ultimate arbiter in deciding whether it is appropriate in a particular case to take upon itself the task of undertaking a pronouncement on an issue which may be dubbed as a political question.’
Thirdly, the proposition that the parliament’s power of amendment is a constituent power and as such is not subject to judicial review also seems no more to hold the field. In Anwar Hossain case while wrongly conceding the difference between the constituent power and legislative power, the Court wrongly emphasized on ‘inherent limitation’ on the power of amendment to hold it to be subject of judicial review. Despite agreeing with the obiter dicta, we submit that the plea of amendment being a constituent power better suits in another place which we address later. That ‘inherent limitation’ lacks substance is already shown. Rather there is a far better approach to bring parliamentary constitutional amendment under judicial review which was mistakenly rejected in Anwar Hossain.
It was argued in Anwar Hossain case that an Act of Parliament amending the constitution will be ‘any other law’ within the meaning of Article 7 to attract the operation of the provision ‘if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution and other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void’ (Article 7(2)). This was rejected simply on the ground that an amendment is passed in the exercise of constituent power.
But later in Kudrat-e-Elahi v. Bangladesh, 44 DLR (AD) 319 Mustafa Kamal J held to the contrary, “This Constitution taken as a whole is a law, albeit the supreme law and by ‘any other law’ and ‘that other law’ the Constitution refers to the definition of Law in Article 152(1), including a Constitutional Amendment (Para 84). Under Article 152 (1) "law" means any Act, ordinance, order rule, regulation, bye-law, notification or other legal instrument, and any custom or usage having the force of law in Bangladesh. This was again confirmed in BIMW Ltd v Government of Bangladesh and Ors 14 BLT (Special Issue) 2006 widely known as The Moon Cinema case (Page 54). Moreover, if we compare Article 7 with Article 26 it is seen that while the latter was amended by the Third Amendment to mean that it does not hit Article 142, the former was not amended to such effect (Islam 403). So an amendment under Article 142 is very well hit by Article 7.
In fact judicial review of parliamentary amendments has become a regular practice in Bangladesh. The Tenth Amendment was challenged in Dr. Ahmed Hossain v. Bangladesh 44 DLR (AD) 109, 110 and Fazle Rabbi v. Election Commission 44 DLR 14. The Thirteenth Amendment was challenged in Mashihur Rahman v. Bangladesh 1997 BLD 55. The Fifth Amendment was challenged in The Moon Cinema Case. All the challenges were decided on merit and no question regarding the propriety of judicial review was raised.

4.2. Amendments made through referendum
While launching Basic Structure, the Appellate Division did not make any distinction between amendment made by two thirds majority in the House and amendment effected by the House plus referendum. This is very much important in the sense that though the 8th Amendment was not effected through a referendum, the pronouncement of the Court at least theoretically runs the risk of affecting a popular amendment.
Only one of the judges, B H Chowdhury J made reference to the Martial Law Amendment of Article 142 rendering the Preamble and some other provision unamendable without referendum to the people (Para 256). He made that reference only to establish that the constitution itself recognizes something as ‘Basic’ over which the majority was pondering. Yet by analogy of the phrase ‘unamendable without referendum to the people’ we may presume B H Chowdhury J to acknowledge that these ‘basic principles’ are amendable by the people.
But there is a tendency to camouflage the Article 142 (1A) as whole in the basic structure talk. It is evident when Mahmudul Islam, a pro basic structure scholar, criticizes even the elusive reference made by B H Chowdhury. To him such a reference is misleading. As basic structure is an issue of original dispensation, it cannot depend on the interpretation of an amended provision (Islam 394). But total camouflage of Article 142 (1A) or its spirit in Basic Structure discourse will not be logically correct. A distinct approach to amendments under 142 (1A) procedure is warranted at least on three grounds:
First, even from the perspective of ‘originalism’ (the ‘romantic theory’ of literature wherein, the meaning intended by the author of a text is privileged and is placed above all the contesting meanings that are argued) it is well evident that while the concept of limited government in Article 7, upon which Anwar Hossain resides, is intended for the different functionaries of the state, the constitution being the expression of their will, the people’s right to amend any provision of the constitution by way of addition, alteration, substitution or repeal is unlimited.
Secondly, the plea of amending power to be a constituent power mentioned in the previous section nicely fits with popular amendment under Article 142 (1A). It is curious to note that while amending the Constitution it is not the Parliament who exercises the constituent power. Article 142 of the constitution merely lays down the amending procedure. It does not confer upon the parliament the power to amend the Constitution. The amending power of parliament arises from other provision of the Constitution (Article 65) which gives it the power to make laws i.e., plenary legislative power (Subba Rao CJ in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643).
Rather a plain look on the Preamble of the Constitution will locate the constituent power elsewhere. The Preamble imposes a sacred duty upon the people of Bangladesh to safeguard, protect and defend the constitution and maintain its supremacy ‘as the embodiment of the will of the people of Bangladesh’ (A.B.M Kahirul Haque J in Moon Cinema Case Page 42). The ‘constituent power’ is here with the people of Bangladesh (Chowdhury 114). The Parliament did not and does not give us the Constitution. It is we, the People of Bangladesh who ‘adopt, enact and give to ourselves’ the Constitution. So the constituent power resides exclusively in people. The parliament’s constituent power, if it has any, is merely derivative because ‘all powers in the Republic belong to the people, and their exercise on behalf of the people shall be effected only under, and by the authority of, this Constitution’ (Article 7(1)). The logical conclusion that follows is that amendment made by referendum, being not hit by Article 7 and being in the exercise of constituent power, is not subject to judicial review; whereas amendment made by Parliament in the exercise of derivative power is subject to judicial review.
Thirdly, distinct approach to popular amendment will answer also to the controversy regarding the Twelfth Amendment. The Appellate Division argued that the past amendments altering the basic structures of our constitution provides no grounds for such amendments to be made in future (Para 213). The Twelfth Amendment turned the Presidential form of government into a Prime Ministerial one. The Presidential form of government was a basic structure of the Constitution then. Though the Prime Ministerial from of government was the result of democratic revolution of the three alliances (Islam 407), it would stand void as per Anwar Hossain. But how far it sounds rational to invalidate the Twelfth Amendment?

4.2.1 Addressing the Validity of Article 142 (1A) itself
While advocating the specialized treatment for Article 142 (1A) we should not forget that there is a well founded doubt on the validity of Martial Law Amendment introducing Article 142 (1A) (Islam 394). It was substantiated in Moon Cinema where the High Court Division declared the Martial Law Amendment in Article 142 void (Page 238). A.B.M. Khairul Haque J opened the Pandora’s Box of anfractuous debate (Karzon and Al Faruque 192) observing:
“Addition of clause (1A) was craftily made. In the one hand the President and the Chief Martial Law Administrator was not only merrily making all the amendments in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh according to his own whims and caprices by his order…….... but at the same time, made provision in Article 142 itself in such a manner so that the amended provisions cannot be changed even by the two thirds majority members of the parliament short of a referendum. In short by executive Order of one person, amendment of the Constitution can be made at any time and in any manner but even the two thirds majority of the representative of the people cannot further amend it. We are simply charmed by the sheer hierocracy of the whole process” (Page 199).
The decision is stayed by the Appellate Division on appeal which is pending now. Keeping in mind that Moon Cinema is a matter sub judice, we humbly submit that we cannot altogether disregard the philosophy of Article 142 (1A). One of the main intentions behind clause (1A) was to check constitutional amendments like Fourth Amendment whereby a democratic constitution took an autocratic complexion. The Fourth Amendment is widely accused to destroy the Basic Structure of the Constitution without taking fresh mandate from the people on the new standing of the majority party. Article 142 (1A) was presumably intended to compel the majority party in the Parliament to seek popular verdict before such a drastic change in future. The force and rationale of that philosophy seems not to be very weak.
Moreover, in Moon Cinema the High Court Division’s apathy to the Fourth Amendment is evident. Though it refused to condone the Martial Law amendment of any of the provsions of the original Constitution, the Court was ready to condone the amendments deleting the various provision of the Fourth Amendment (Page 242). In this regard, the position of Article 142 (1A) is interesting. It was not in the original constitution and it did not delete any provision of the Fourth Amendment. But certainly it deleted the scope of any such Fourth Amendment in future without popular mandate. Now the burden of determining the exact constitutional status of Article 142 (1A) is on the Appellate Division. The Apex court may either accept or reject the High Court Division rationale. But it is possible to cure the gangrene by a democratic amendment re enacting the present Article 142 (1A) which is needed also for another purpose discussed below.

5. Delimitation of Basic Structures
Accepting the Judicial Review of parliamentary amendment dos not relieve us of another important attack on Anwar Hossain. It is the issue of there being innumerable and controversial basic structures. In Anwar Hossain Shahabuddin Ahmed J gave a list of eight basic features of the Constitution (Para 377). Mohammad Habibur Rahman J added another one to the list (Para 443). Badrul Haider Chowdhury J found twenty one unique features out which some were basic which he did not identify (Kamal 100). In India more than half of the provisions of the Indian Constitution are declared to be basic and the list is still open (Uddin 31). This never ending and ever expanding list of basic structures is creating nothing but confusion and inconsistent application. Two instances below should suffice to establish the fact.
In the aftermath of the Babri Mosque incident the Indian Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1 justified the dismissal of the BJP led governments in Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh on the ground of failure to uphold the ‘secular’ character, which was considered to be a basic feature, of the Indian Constitution and President’s Rule was imposed there. Now, strange result may follow if someone in India approaches the Court for dismissal of a particular government on account of its capitalist policy being opposed to ‘socialism’, another basic feature of the Indian Constitution.
In the cases of Zafar Ali Shah v. General Parvez Musharraf PLD 2000 SC 869 and Wasim Sajjad v. Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 233 the Pakistan Supreme Court conceded the Martial Law Administrator’s power to amend the constitution (Islam 393) as if democratic governance was not a basic structure of the Pakistani Constitution. At the same time it held that the Martial Law Administrator couldn’t destroy the basic structures of the Constitution. How curious an application of basic structure! Does there remain anything basic while a usurper makes the constitution subservient to his will?
So it is necessary to ensure certainty in list of basic structure so that parliament will not be in a fix regarding the scope of amending power (Uddin 31). Presently Article 142 (1A) provides a short list of issues amendment of which requires referendum in addition to a two third majority in the floor. To delimit the infinity of basic structures, Article 142 (1A) of the Constitution may be amended, if we think the present list to be too short, to include some other features like constitutional supremacy (art.7), elected local government (art.59), no taxation without parliamentary approval (art.83), judicial review (art.102), judicial independence (Article 22), independence of the Election Commission (art.119) in list. Doing this will require a referendum. This if done in the form of renovation, will serve two purposes in the same journey. It may solve the validity crisis of Article 142 (1A) as well as confirm that what is basic for a political entity (i.e., the state) should be determined by the political opinion of the people not by the judges. The people will certify that these are the basic structures of the constitution amendment of which would require the Parliament to seek popular approval.
Importantly, this codification shall not foreclose the list of basics for all the time to come. If any new principle emerges in future which might then appear to be ‘basic’ the Legislature along with the Populace shall have the option to add that in the Constitutional list through referendum. This will mitigate the fear of changes in the power equation between the parliament and the judiciary in favour of the latter (Bhanu 110). In regular Parliamentary amendments by two third majority in the House, the Supreme Court shall, if challenged, see whether the particular amendment conforms to the basics enumerated in Article 142 (1A) or not.

6. Conclusion
One of the majority judges in Anwar Hossain, M H Rahman J stood out in marked contrast to the views held by other judges (Kamal 109). To invalidate the 8th Amendment he stressed on its being opposed to the philosophy enshrined in the Preamble. He argued that when the Parliament cannot by itself amend the Preamble, it cannot indirectly amend it by amending the provision of the constitution to impair or destroy the fundamental aim of our society (Para 338). This is a unique feature. The insinuation of M H Rahman J is that so far as the basic provisions like Preamble, Articles 8, 48, 56, and 142 remains intact in the Constitution, there cannot be any amendment contrary to those provisions. If Parliament wishes to amend these, it may do so by seeking popular verdict.
We think this should be an appropriate approach to address legislative madness to temper with constitutional fabric. That is to say that while the Parliament is amending any provision of the constitution, such amendment is subject to judicial scrutiny to ensure its conformity with the basic provisions enumerated in Article 142 (1A). This is the true implication of Article 7 of the Constitution which prime facie speaks of ‘Constitutional Supremacy’ but on the ultimate analysis personifies ‘Supremacy of the People’ when it declares ‘This Constitution is, as the solemn expression of the will of the people, the supreme law of the Republic.’ The Constitution is supreme so far as it expresses the will of the people. All the supremacies - Parliamentary, Judicial or Constitutional – must give way to the Supremacy of the People. Let the people determine the basic structures of the Constitution and let them alter anything which they think no more to be basic. Hence, any amendment effected through referendum must be beyond any sort of judicial scrutiny while amendment passed in the floor of the Parliament must pass the test of constitutionally fixed basic structure.







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Kamal, Mustafa. Bangladesh Constitution Trends and Issues. Dhaka: University of Dhaka, 1999.
Karzon, Sheikh Hafizur and Al Faruque, Abdullah. “Martial Law Regimes: Critically Situating the Validity of the Fifth and Seventh Amendments.” Bangladesh Journal of Law, 2.2 (1998): 152-192.

Sethi Anuranjan. “Basic Structure Doctrine Some Reflections”. Social Science Research Network. 12 July. 2008

Uddin, Md Moin. 2005: “Debates on Constitutional Amendment and Dilemma of the Doctrine of Basic Structure.” Law Vision. University of Chittagong. 2004-05: 28-31.
* Dr. M Jafar Ullah Talukder is an Assistant Professor, Department of Law, University of Chittagong
** M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury is a Lecturer in the Department of Law, University of Information Technology and Sciences (UITS), Chittagong.

Judging the 'Doctrine of Necessity': Lessons from Pakistan

Judging the 'Doctrine of Necessity': Lessons from Pakistan
M Jashim Ali Chowdhury

Published in the New Nation, Law and Justice, August 9, 2008

Avaialable online http://nation.ittefaq.com/issues/2008/08/09/news0428.htm

(Earlier this article was published in the 60 DLR (2008) July Issue, Journal Section at pp. 25-28)



Article 7 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh embodies what is known as the Doctrine of 'Constitutional Supremacy'. It is the declaration that the people are the repository of all powers and their exercise on behalf of the people shall be effected only under, and by the authority of, the Constitution (Article 7(I)]. The Constitution is the solemn expression of the will of the people, the supreme law of the Republic, and if any other law inconsistent with this Constitution shall be void to the extent of the inconsistency (Article 7(2)].
Unfortunately, in Bangladesh we could not follow the dictum of Article 7 always, whether willingly or unwillingly. The Constitution was manipulated and tailored to suit the ruler who happens to be on [he throne. It is aptly pointed out by Mr Justice Habibur Rahman that the Constitution has experienced evulsions and kinds of reformation in situ. Far reaching and radical changes had been introduced in the Constitution both during the time when it was functioning and during the time when it is not allowed to function." [Barrister Amirul Islam, "Status of an usurper; a challenge to the Constitutional Supremacy and Constitutional Continuity in Bangladesh", Chittagong University Journal of Law, Vol. 2 1997 pp .. 1-30 at p4]

Now in Bangladesh we are experiencing a regime the constitutional status of which is not clear at least beyond all reasonable shadow of doubt. It has been termed as a 'government of necessity'. Yet to some others it is an extra-constitutional, if not unconstitutional government. Gross and reckless violation of the Constitution by the Iajuddin Government from the very beginning of its life led the nation to January 11 Government. Burdened with the herculean job of politico-social reform the government had to take some drastic measures which are claimed by some not to be within its constitutional mandate. The plea of necessity has been emphasised strongly in response. It is in this context that 1 feel interested to review the existing literature on the Doctrine of Necessity basically with reference to Pakistan.

Doctrine of Necessity as applied by courts

The doctrine of state necessity had furnished common law courts with the "framework to validate extra-constitutional acts of lawful regimes. It has been frequently used by courts during the American Civil War in a series of cases e.g., Texas vs While 14 US (7 Wall) 700 (1868), Horn vs Lockhart 84 US (17 Wall) 570 (J 873): Thorington vs Smith 75 US (8 Wall) I (1868).

The Supreme Court of Pakistan started using the doctrine to uphold unconstitutional usurpation of power.

In Nusrat Bhutlo vs Chief of Army Staff, [1977 PLD (SC) 657) the Court examined the "total milieu" of the circumstances in which the extra-constitutional assumption of power occurred to determine the new regime's validity. Quoting extensively from General Zia-ul Haq's speech, the Court highlighted the general's professed commitment to hold elections and restore democracy at an early date. Before the decision the Army declared an indefinite postponement of the elections originally scheduled for October, 1977, in order to initiate and complete a process of accountability of the deposed regime for alleged abuse of power. This postponement did not dilute the then Chief Justice's confidence in the regimes commitment to restore democratic rule, and he legalised the accountability process by terming it necessary.

In Malik Ghulam Jilani vs Province of Punjab {PLD 1979 Lahore 564J the appointment of General Zia as President of Pakistan was called into question. It was held by the Lahore High Court that the appointment promoted the good of the people and was valid. At page 586 of the report it was held as follows:

"The imposition of Martial Law ………stands validated on

the doctrine of necessity and ttttt this principle would apply to the appointment of President also for which, in the present situation, there is no guidance in the Constitution. Resort to extra-constitutional measures is not only justified but is necessary."

In Zafar Ali Shah vs General Parvez Musharraf (PLD 2000 (SC) 869] the Pakistani Supreme Court again noted, "There was no remedy provided in the Constitution to meet the situation like the present one with which the country was confronted, therefore, constitutional deviation made by the Chief of the Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf for the welfare of the people rather than abrogating the Constitution or imposing Martial Law by means of an extra constitutional measure is validated for a transitional period on ground of State necessity and on the principle confidence in the regime's commitment to restore democratic rule, and he legalised the accountability process by terming it necessary.

In Malik Ghulam Jilani vs Province of Punjab PLD 1979 Lahore 564J the appointment of General Zia as President of Pakistan was called into question. It was held by the Lahore High Court that the appointment promoted the good of the people and was valid. At page 586 of the report it was held as follows:

"The imposition of Martial Law ……..stands validated on the doctrine of necessity and ttttt this principle would apply to the appointment of President also for which, in the present situation, there is no guidance in the Constitution. Resort to extra-constitutional measures is not only justified but is necessary."

In Zafar Ali Shah vs General Parvez Musharraf (PLD 2000 (SC) 869] the Pakistani Supreme Court again noted, "There was no remedy provided in the Constitution to meet the situation like the present one with which the. country was confronted, therefore, constitutional deviation made by the Chief of the Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf for the welfare of the people rather than abrogating the Constitution or. imposing Martial Law by means of an extra constitutional measure is validated for a transitional period on ground of State necessity and on the principle that it is in public interest to accord legal recognition to the present regime with a view to achieving his declared objectives and that it is in the interest of the Community that order be preserved."

The legality of any extra-constitutional government has not been considered in Bangladesh until the High Court Division ruled on the 29th of August, 2005 that the 5th and 7th Amendments of the Bangladesh Constitution was illegal, an assumption of powers by Moshta que, Sayem, Zia and Ershad are un lawful. The judges said 'the violation of the Constitution was a gray legal wrong and remains so for a time to come. it cannot be legitimised.' The court, however, observed that due to the necessity of t e state, 'such a legal wrong can e condoned In certain circumstances'.

Scope of 'Necessity'

There is no fixed standard of determining necessity. Necessity has been claimed to prevail when ever and wherever it seemed convenient. Pakistani Courts invoked plea of necessity even to validate any 'work towards the achievement of the declared objectives' of a de facto regime. After the decision in Begum Nusrat Bhutto's case, Mr Justice Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain, Acting Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court was also appointed as the Acting Chief Election Commissioner. The appointment was challenged in the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto vs State (PLD 1978 SC 40]. The Court observed as follows:

"The reason underlying tttt is that once an 'extra Constitutional action or intervention is validated on the ground of State or civil necessity, then, as a logical corollary it follows that the new Regime or Administration must be permitted, in the public interest, not only to run the day-to-day affairs of the country, but also to work towards the achievement of the objectives on the basis of which its intervention has earned validation."

However, in Asma Jilani relying upon Lord Pearce's dissent in the Privy Council decision in Madzimbamutu the Court pronounced a catalogue of four independent grounds of "condonation" of acts of an illegal usurper regime; (I) all transactions which are past and closed, for, {sic] no useful purpose can be served by reopening them, (2) all acts and legislative measures which are in accordance with, or could have been made under, the abrogated Constitution or the previous legal order, (3) all acts which tend to advance or promote the good of the people, (4) all acts required to be done for the ordinary orderly running of the State. [Asma Jilani Asma Ji/ani vs Government of Punjab. 1972 PLD (SC) at 206]

Who determines 'necessity'?
The burden of determining necessity being a question of fact primarily resides with the executive. This has been the case as is shown historically. Very often it is shown to be based on mere subjective satisfaction and sweet will of a usurper. Usurper's personal appraisal of the situation led him to believe in the necessity of extra-constitutionalism. From Iskander Mirza to Pervez Musharraf, the excuse was more or less the same-"It is said that the Constitution is sacred. But more sacred than the Constitution or anything else is the country and welfare and happiness of its people." [Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan: A Study of the Martial Law Administration 214-15 (1967) Let us take the case of Pervez Musharraf.

* On 12th October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, Chief of Anny Staff and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, through an extra-constitutional measure took over the government and the affairs of the country.

* On the 20th of June, 2001, the Chief Executive issued Chief Executive's Order No. 3 of 2001 and the Preamble to the said Order read:

"Whereas it is expedient to provide for succession to the office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and for matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto; Now, therefore, t.. .the Chief Executive of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is pleased to make and promulgate the said Order".

* On 9th April 2002, the Chief Executive and the President of Pakistan issued Chief Executive's Order No. 12 of 2002. The Preamble to the Referendum Order, inter alia, provides as: under.

It is imperative to consolidate the measures taken by the Chief Executive of Pakistan for the reconstruction of the institution of state for establishing genuine and sustainable democracy and it is in the supreme national interest to obtain a democratic mandate from the people of Pakistan through referendum for General Pervez Musharraf to continue to be the President of Pakistan."

Musharraf took over the charge of the government since "at that juncture the institutions of State stood seriously weakened and the democratic and moral authority of the government of the day stood gravely eroded.' He dismissed his President because he thought it 'convenient' and so he was 'pleased' to take the charge of the President until his successor enters upon the office (Nobody knows when his successor will enter the office). The Zafar Ali Shah court thought it necessary to allow Musharraf three years to return to democracy. But he thought it more necessary to continue in power to return to 'genuine and sustainable democracy'. Truly, 'necessity knows no bounds'.

Should the Judiciary have a say in this regard?
There are opposing views regarding this.

The first proposition relies basically on the coercive aspect of law. Court should not say anything about an alleged necessity as the Court does not possess the necessary coercive mechanism to enforce its appraisal. Moreover, there is inherent danger in daring to explore such adventure during a dictator's reign as is shown in Nusrat Bhutto. In Nusrat Bhutto, the court observed that the power of judicial review was available to it to examine the legality or otherwise of the actions of the government, and particularly the· Court would also see whether the necessity continued to exist or not. The response to this finding was that Provisional Constitution Order, 1981 was promulgated ousting the power and jurisdiction of the Superior Courts to judicially review actions of the Martial Law regime.

On the other hand, some strongly believe that a de facto regime cannot be given de jure status through any constitutional engineering [Barrister Amirul Islam, op cit at p. 16]. To them in a constitutional democracy, the Supreme Court is the guardian not only of the Constitution, but also of constitutional ethics and social values:

This view emphasises on "moral reading" of the Constitution rather than on mere constitutional textualism. (Ridwanul Hoque, "On coup d'etat, constitutionalism, and the need to break the subtle bondage with alien legal thought A reply to Omar and Hossain", published in the Daily Star, Law and Our Rights, October 29. 2005]

Yet some others suggest the court to follow a middle course. They strongly suggest that this being a 'political question' should be out of the court's purview.

They believe that "the Court will, thus, travel unwittingly into the political arena and subject itself more readily to the charges of encroaching upon policy making. The 'political thicket' objection sticks more easily in such circumstances. [Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari vs Pakistan, PLD 1999 (SC) 57]

Again, designation of this as non-justiciable political question will insulate the courts from turbulent politics, deny the usurpers judicially pronounced validity and legitimacy, and facilitate the survival of the courts and the rule of law. (Mahmud, Tayyab, "Jurisprudence of Successful Treason : Coup d'etat & Common Law", Communternational Law Journal, Vol. 27, (1994) at p. 53].

The Constitution is what people put in it. Any action under the label of Necessity can never be legitimate if it makes its way only through a series of extra-constitutional measures against the will of the people. Governments whether transient, extra-constitutional or unconstitutional are always subject to judicial and popular judgment. To quote Dr. Farooq Hasan (Counsel for the petitioner in Qazi Hussain Ahmed vs General Pervez Musharraf, Constitution Petition No. /5 of 2002). 'its actions, whether executive or legislative, are always capable of being tested qua or de hors the Constitution. It has a fiduciary relationship in the discharge of functions of the State and no court of equity or of law can allow a trustee to gobble up the property of the trust and use it for his own benefit on fake and flimsy pretexts.' If the principle of 'Salus populi suprema lex' can provide legitimacy, it can take it away.


M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury is a Lecturer in the Department of Law, University of Information Technology and Sciences (UITS), Chittagong.

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