Tuesday, November 19, 2024

The Agenda and Dilemmas of Constitutional Reform in Bangladesh


The Agenda and Dilemmas of Constitutional Reform in Bangladesh


by M Jashim Ali Chowdhury, 18 November 2024
Idea International, Constitutionnet, Voices from the Field Report


After protests that led to the fall of an authoritarian government, Bangladesh’s current interim government has established ten reform commissions, including one on the constitution. The Constitution Reform Commission faces the daunting challenge of setting an agenda while navigating multiple dilemmas of mandate, inclusivity and sustainability. The country’s constitution has already experienced a rollercoaster ride through various amendments, and its ideological pillars—democracy, socialism, secularism, and nationalism—have been intensely contested. Further, the parliamentary structure of government has enabled a form of prime ministerial dictatorship, while the country’s political parties have remained non-democratic and temperamentally authoritarian, with little sign of willingness to evolve. How the Commission addresses these issues will be critical as Bangladesh faces another defining moment in its constitutional journey – writes M Jashim Ali Chowdhury


Quota reform protest in Bangladesh with a sign reading "Not quotas, merit!" 
(photo credit: Rayhan9d via Wikimedia Commons)


Introduction

Bangladesh’s constitutional journey has been a tumultuous one, marked by profound ideological shifts, political upheavals, and a series of amendments that have both shaped and distorted its foundational principles. Since gaining independence in 1971, the country has grappled with defining its constitutional identity amid extreme political contestation.

The 1972 Bangladesh Constitution — celebrated by some as ‘the best and most eloquent instance of . . . [the people’s] self-expression as a nation’ — adopted a Westminster parliamentary system. It was based on four foundational pillars of nationalism, secularism, democracy and socialism. However, in 1975, it was radically transformed into a national party-led presidential system, soon to be overthrown by a coup leading to military rule. Subsequent military regimes amended the constitution drastically, re-introducing multi-party politics but retaining the presidential system, removing references to socialism and secularism, and shifting from Bangalee nationalism—which emphasized the Bengali ethnic and linguistic identity—towards a Bangladeshi nationalism and Islamic values. In 1982, another military coup led to the reimposition of martial law. Though parliamentary democracy was restored in 1991, it failed to stabilize the political landscape due to mutual distrust among the ruling and opposition parties, suppression of intra-party dissent and parliamentary opposition, violent street agitation, election rigging, and back-door conspiracies for ascending or clinging to power, which eventually became the norm.

The introduction of a non-party caretaker government system in 1996 aimed to ensure fair elections. However, it was later manipulated and ultimately repealed in 2011, leading to legitimacy crises in subsequent elections marred by allegations of misconduct. In 2024, widespread protests—initially sparked by demands for reform of civil service quotas— culminated in the fall of the authoritarian Awami League (AL) government.

An “interim” government, endorsed by protest leaders, first established six reform commissions focusing on the judiciary, bureaucracy, police, electoral system, anti-corruption, and most prominently, the constitution. Later, the government formed four more reform commissions on health care, mass media, and labour and women’s rights. Among the ten commissions, the Constitutional Reform Commission faces the most significant dilemmas stemming from Bangladesh’s decades-long political contestation around constitutional ideals and design. Central to these challenges is the ongoing battle around the constitutional ideals of secularism, socialism, and nationalism, which have perpetuated divisions within society. The Commission must also find a workable and sustainable balance in the constitutional design that has often been blamed for giving rise to authoritarianism.


What Reforms are on the Table?
Bangladesh’s Constitution of 1972 was modelled on a UK-style parliamentary system combined with a US-style “strong form” of judicial review that allows the Supreme Court to test the constitutionality of legislation. The President acts as a ceremonial head of state bound by the Prime Minister’s advice. The Prime Minister, the leader of the majority party, is accountable to the parliament. However, a paradoxical provision—Article 70—forces MPs to vote strictly on the party line or lose their parliamentary seats. Though the framers of the Constitution defended it as a stabilising measure against the frequent fall of governments, the provision has allegedly taken partisan whipping to an extreme level, paving the way for a prime ministerial dictatorship. Though the judicial branch has been granted substantial independence in the Constitution, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh has been severely politicised, while the subordinate courts are controlled by the executive branch. The Election Commission and other integrity institutions have also been subordinated to the government.

During the civil service quota reform movement, the student protesters had no other reform agenda. Most of the reform demands were voiced by civil society groups calling for transparency, accountability and orderly transfer of powers during the AL regime’s sixteen-year-long rule. After the fall of the AL government on 5 August 2024, student protesters accelerated their push for constitutional reform. Alongside calls for adopting an entirely new constitution, there are proposals for reducing the prime minister’s powers and balancing them with those of the president, term limits for the prime minister, establishing a bicameral legislature, and even changing the parliamentary system to presidential.

Currently, AL, arguably the country’s largest political party, is not expected—and perhaps not welcome—to submit any proposal. The second of the Big Two—the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—published a 31-point reform agenda in 2023, which resonates with issues such as depoliticizing appointments in the higher judiciary, election commission, and other accountability institutions; creating a bicameral legislature; introducing a two-term limit for the prime minister; restoring the election-time caretaker government; and reviving Bangladeshi nationalism. The Jamaat Islami (JI), the third-largest party and arguably the chief beneficiary of this regime change, has come out with its own 10-point reform proposal, including a shift to a proportional representation (PR) system rather than the current first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. It has been argued that the PR system may ensure fairer and more credible representation in the parliament and government, as the FPTP system often disproportionately benefits the Big Two—AL and BNP. Interestingly the JI has remained silent about the fate of the foundational pillars of the Constitution, particularly secularism.


"Parties being the chief constitutional actors, any constitutional reform that does not require the political parties to be internally democratic is likely to fall flat . . ."


The BNP and JI’s reform proposals are also silent on the daunting task of professionalizing the bureaucracy and making it accountable to the legislature. Another conspicuous omission in the conversation is internal reform within the political parties themselves. Parties being the chief constitutional actors, any constitutional reform that does not require the political parties to be internally democratic is likely to fall flat once the patriarchal party leaders take the reins of power in the future. In the past, Bangladeshi political parties have almost universally abused their constitutional amendment powers for their partisan and coterie interests.


The Dilemmas
The Constitution Reform Commission faces at least four major dilemmas. The first one is whether to reform the existing constitution or adopt a new one. As Professor Ngoc Son Bui outlines, arguments to replace a constitution may stem more from ideological inclination than a genuine need for structural realignment. Understandably, the student protest leaders' enthusiasm for replacing the 1972 Constitution appears to arise from their doubts about its foundational principles. If the student leaders’ zeal for constitutional replacement is acted upon, it will surely reopen the old wounds of the ideological battle. Despite the AL’s fall, there remains deep societal reverence for the liberation war and its ideals. Currently, there are no serious demands from the political parties to write a new constitution. Instead, opposition to the idea of constitutional replacement and the demand for transferring power to the people’s elected representatives are growing. It appears that the opportunity cost of making a new constitution could be higher than the protest leaders anticipate. Unchained from over 50 years of Bangladesh Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence, a new constitution will risk further replacement, particularly if the AL comes back to power, which is not at all impossible. Opening the door to frequent constitutional replacements may make the foundation of constitutionalism shaky—particularly risky for societies as divided as Bangladesh.


"As seen in 1972, excluding the Islamist and conservative forces from the constitution-making process left a deep participation gap, undermining the constitution’s longer-term endurance."


The second challenge for the Commission centers on participation and inclusivity, again originating from the ousted AL regime and its huge social base. How can the Commission achieve a reform acceptable to all while simply ignoring the AL? As seen in 1972, excluding the Islamist and conservative forces from the constitution-making process left a deep participation gap, undermining the constitution’s longer-term endurance. Ironically, the same seems to be the case this time. A relatively pragmatic approach could be to show ‘an optimal level of constitutional deference’ to ideologically contested issues and focus on the 1972 Constitution's design flaws only. However, there are signs that the student leaders might not be interested in this. Therefore, the reform initiative carries a visible Achilles’ heel.

The third question for the Commission is how to materialise the reforms. There is a perception that the Commission’s eight members—primarily practicing lawyers and legal academics connected with a single Bangladeshi university, the University of Dhaka—and the chairperson, who is on deputation from a U.S. university, lack the representativeness needed to dictate something as significant as the constitution of a country. Considering that the 1972 Constitution was drafted and adopted by a democratically elected 469-member Constituent Assembly, a strong argument can be made that this reform commission does not have the democratic mandate to replace or amend it. It has been proposed that any constitutional reform or replacement in Bangladesh must be pursued through democratic and participatory processes such as a constituent assembly, elected parliament or referendum. Although the interim government has declared that it will take the Commission’s proposals to the political parties (excluding the AL and its allies) and consult them before finalising the reform packages, it is not clear when and how the reform will be executed. The BNP has demanded that the Commission simply prepare a set of recommendations and leave the reforms to an elected parliament. While this strategy might facilitate some sort of political compromise between the parties, the student protesters and the interim government do not seem to be very enthusiastic about this idea. Moreover, uncertainty persists over which political parties or coalitions may come to power through the next election and how the interim government would negotiate with them. The most uncertain is the tenure of the interim government and when the election would be held.

"[T]here are some legitimate questions looming around the interim government’s own commitment to the reforms that it advocates . . ."


Fourthly, there are some legitimate questions looming around the interim government’s own commitment to the reforms that it advocates. Pending the work and recommendations of the reform commissions on the judiciary, electoral system, anti-corruption, police, public administration, and mass media, the government has sent some acting Supreme Court judges into forced leave and appointed new ones seemingly for political reasons, constituted a Search Committee under an AL-made law for appointing a new Election Commission, dismissed trainee police officers in controversial ways, forced the entire public service commission and anti-corruption commission to resign and reconstituted those with individuals of its own choosing. The government’s decision to cancel the accreditation of around sixty journalists has drawn protest from international press freedom bodies. All these actions raise critical questions about the government’s sincerity regarding its reform commitments and could potentially shake the moral base of those reforms in future.

Conclusion

Bangladesh is one of the world’s busiest laboratories of constitutional experiments. Fifty-three years into its constitutional beginning, the country has seen different types of governments: parliamentary government with one-party dominance (1972-75), a one-party presidential government (1975), rule by several military governments (1975-90), several election-time non-party caretaker governments (1991, 1996 and 2001), several parliamentary governments in a competitive multi-party system (1991-96, 1996-2001, 2001-06, 2009-13), a military-backed government (2007-08), a long stretch of one-party monopoly (2009-24) and currently, an extra-constitutional “interim” government (2024). The seemingly never-ending cycle of political instability illustrates how difficult the burdens of the Constitutional Reform Commission are—both in terms of its mandate and the sustainability of its efforts. The Commission must navigate these historical wounds, balance its seemingly ominous reform agenda, and overcome the dilemmas if it is to forge a path toward a more stable and inclusive constitutional order. With the critical challenges identified above, only the future can answer what it brings and how it sustains.

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury PhD is Lecturer in Law at the University of Hull, United Kingdom.

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Suggested citation: M Jashim Ali Chowdhury, ‘The Agenda and Dilemmas of Constitutional Reform in Bangladesh’, ConstitutionNet, International IDEA, 18 November 2024, https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/agenda-and-dilemmas-constitutional-reform-bangladesh

Friday, November 15, 2024

In defence of the original constitution

[In October and November 2024, Sifat Tasneem and I wrote a three-part series on Lawyer'sClub[dot]com calling the attempt to abrogate the 1972 Constitution suicidal. In the third part (2 November 2024), we specifically presented our arguments for constitutional stability and continuity. The English version of that part is published today (15 November 2024) on the editorial page of the Daily Observer newspaper. We welcome your interest in this issue.]

In defence of the original constitution

Dr M Jashim Ali Chowdhury & Sifat Tasnim*

Published in the Daily Observer. Friday, 15 November 2024


On the eve of its 52nd anniversary, Bangladesh's original Constitution faces an existential threat. Debate is intense whether we amend or abrogate it. Multifaceted arguments and narratives are being offered for its abolition and replacement. Given the context, it is very important that all sides of the debate are aired and heard with equal emphasise. In this piece, we argue that the idea of a new constitution will do more harm than good to the country. We have several reasons to do so.

First, the proponents of the "New Constitution" argue that no fundamental changes can be made by amending the current Constitution for some of its stumbling blocks - the basic structures. However, it is not abundantly clear which potential reforms would likely offend the basic structures of the 1972 Constitution, the prominent of which are democracy, judicial independence, separation of powers, rule of law, accountable governance, etc. It has been hypothetically argued that reforms like bicameral parliament and a federal- presidential system might be invalidated by the Supreme Court citing the unitary character of the original Constitution (Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v Bangladesh 1989 BLD (Spl) 1). While the uncertainty and fluidity around the Bangladesh Supreme Court's basic structure doctrine (BSD) is not unheard, reinstating the Referendum Clause in Article 142 should provide a democratic check on judicial fluidity with the BSD. So far, there is no single precedent of invalidating constitutional amendments made through the referendum process. Rather, Justice Habibur Rahman pointed out, in Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v Bangladesh, that had the 8th Amendment (1988) gone through a Referendum, the outcome of that case would have been different. Moreover, if the BSD is the main hesitation, it must not be forgotten that a new constitution as a whole is not immune from the BSD-inspired judicial challenge, particularly when the current Constitution includes an eternity clause (article 7B) and a sedition clause (article 7A).

Next, it is argued that the 1972 Constitution cannot be amended due to its unamendability clause (article 7B). However, a sensible approach to the 7B hurdle is to challenge it vis-a-vis the 1972 Constitution's basic structure. If the Constitution itself is abrogated, instead of challenging the article 7B, there is a risk that the reformers may later be accused under article 7A (offence of sedition). The pragmatic strategy should be to process the constitutional reforms through the existing processes and safeguards rather than falling into the article 7A's trap.

The third argument is quite revolutionary. It is said that radical changes must come through the exercise of the constituent power, not the amendment power. This argument is unlikely to be supported by established constitutional theories. In comparative constitutional studies, there is extensive literature on constitutional renewal, dismemberment, and revolutionary constitutionalism which acknowledge that the constituent power (the power of the people to write the constitution) can also be exercised while amending constitutions.

Periodic fresh starts with constitutions usually undermine their long-term viability. A durable, continuous, and long-lived constitution may not be perfect, but it acquires an internal resilience rooted in its established jurisprudence. With that strength, judges and lawyers resist unconstitutional and abusive amendments. While some undemocratic amendments may not be immediately challenged due to political circumstances (such as the abolition of the caretaker government in 2011), they are bound to be challenged in the future (which is being done now). Even if some amendments are never challenged (such as the Fourth Amendment of 1975), they are bound to be lost in the historical process. Common sense tells us, you should not uproot the great banyan to sow the new saplings, until you really have to.

Now, if Bangladesh is to venture their paths, it risks sliding towardsrecurringphases of constitutional replacements in the future. The "New Constitution" will likely carry a constant existential threat in the short and long run. It will likely prove an easier task for the later regimes to abolish or replace it rather than going through thetroublesome path of amendments and judicial reviews. It'salways easier to draft a new Constitution and ask the judges of the court to take fresh oaths under that.

We acknowledge that there are some valid criticisms of the 1972 Constitution, but its greatest strength perhaps is its structural design - the parliamentary form of government, endorsed by a political consensus in 1992. It has withstood 53 years-long politics of assassinations, coups, military rule, authoritarian party government, abusive amendments, and experiments.

If comparative constitutional history is a lesson - the more the constitutional replacement, the less constitutions thrive. In South Asia, the Constitution of Pakistan was written thrice - 1956, 1962, and 1973. Afghanistan's Constitution was also written three times - in 1923, 1964, and 2004. In 2021, the Taliban simply withered the 2004 Constitution away. Sri Lanka had two - 1972 and 1978. Myanmar had three - 1947, 1974, and 2008. Myanmar military junta ruled the country without a Constitution for twenty years - from 1988 to 2008. Despite several fresh starts, Pakistan and Myanmar could not escape the grip of the military establishment. Myanmar and Sri Lanka endure the fiercest civil wars, due to their constitutional instability around ethnic power-sharing arrangements. Sri Lanka's replacement of the parliamentary system with a presidential system has created constant tension between the President and the Prime Minister causing constitutional breakdown on multiple occasions.

Now, if Bangladesh is to venture their paths, it risks sliding towards recurring phases of constitutional replacements in the future. The "New Constitution" will likely carry a constant existential threat in the short and long run. It will likely prove an easier task for the later regimes to abolish or replace it rather than going through the troublesome path of amendments and judicial reviews. It's always easier to draft a new Constitution and ask the judges of the court to take fresh oaths under that.

Historically speaking, the 4th amendment of 1975 was a "new" Constitution in all its means and purposes - a "second revolution" they called it. Still, the promoters of that amendment did not say that they were replacing the 1972 Constitution. The constitutional reforms during 1976-79 defaced the 1972 Constitution unrecognizably. Still, they called those amendments rather than replacement. The 12th Amendment of 1992 caused fundamental realignment of governance structure. Still, no political party demanded a new constitution at that time. Former Chief Justice Mustafa Kamal called it the completion of a "full constitutional cycle ". The 15th Amendment of 2011 is another major structural and ideological realignment. Again, nobody called it a rewriting of the Constitution. We believe that those tendencies were not mere historical coincidences. At every moment of our constitutional transitions, the proponents of change valued the importance of constitutional continuity and endurance. It is because of this constitutional conservatism that Bangladesh has turned around again and again with its own identity and stood with in sharp contrast with countries struggling with the very idea of Constitution.

*Dr M Jashim Ali Chowdhury, Lecturer in Law, University of Hull, UK and Sifat Tasnim, Student of Law, Bangladesh Maritime University.



āύāϤুāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻŦিāϤāϰ্āĻ•: āϏাংāĻŦিāϧাāύিāĻ• āϧাāϰাāĻŦাāĻšিāĻ•āϤা āĻ“ āϏ্āĻĨা⧟িāϤ্āĻŦেāϰ āĻĒ্āϰāĻļ্āύ



āύāϤুāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻŦিāϤāϰ্āĻ•: āϏাংāĻŦিāϧাāύিāĻ• āϧাāϰাāĻŦাāĻšিāĻ•āϤা āĻ“ āϏ্āĻĨা⧟িāϤ্āĻŦেāϰ āĻĒ্āϰāĻļ্āύ


āĻĄ āĻāĻŽ āϜāϏিāĻŽ āφāϞী āϚৌāϧুāϰী
āĻĒ্āϰāĻ­াāώāĻ• āφāχāύ āĻŦিāĻ­াāĻ—, āχāωāύিāĻ­াāϰ্āϏিāϟি āĻ…āĻŦ āĻšাāϞ, āϝুāĻ•্āϤāϰাāϜ্āϝ

āϏিāĻĢাāϤ āϤাāϏāύীāĻŽ
āφāχāύ āĻļিāĻ•্āώাāϰ্āĻĨী, āĻŦাংāϞাāĻĻেāĻļ āĻŽেāϰিāϟাāχāĻŽ āχāωāύিāĻ­াāϰ্āϏিāϟি


āϏাāĻ•্āώাā§ŽāĻ•াāϰ / āĻŽāϤাāĻŽāϤ ⧍ āύāĻ­েāĻŽ্āĻŦāϰ, ⧍ā§Ļ⧍ā§Ē































āĻĄ āĻāĻŽ āϜāϏিāĻŽ āφāϞী āϚৌāϧুāϰী āĻ“ āϏিāĻĢাāϤ āϤাāϏāύীāĻŽ: ā§Ģ āĻ…āĻ—াāϏ্āϟেāϰ āĻĒāϰ āĻšāϤে āĻāĻ–āύ āĻĒāϰ্āϝāύ্āϤ āĻĻেāĻļেāϰ āĻŦিāĻ­িāύ্āύ āĻĒāϤ্āϰ-āĻĒāϤ্āϰিāĻ•া, āϏāĻ­া-āϏেāĻŽিāύাāϰ, āϟāĻ• āĻļো-āϤে ⧧⧝⧭⧍ āĻāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻŦাāϤিāϞেāϰ āĻĒāĻ•্āώে āϝāϤ āϝুāĻ•্āϤি āĻāϏেāĻ›ে āϏেāĻ—ুāϞো āϏāĻŦāĻ—ুāϞোāĻ•ে āφāĻŽāϰা āĻāĻ• āϜা⧟āĻ—া⧟ āĻ•āϰাāϰ āϚেāώ্āϟা āĻ•āϰেāĻ›ি। āϝুāĻ•্āϤিāĻ—ুāϞো āĻŽোāϟাāĻŽুāϟি āĻĻুāχ āĻĻাāĻ—েāϰ। āĻāĻ•āĻĻিāĻ•ে ⧧⧝⧭⧍ āĻāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻĒ্āϰāϪ⧟āύ āĻĒ্āϰāĻ•্āϰি⧟াāϰ āĻŦেāĻļ āĻ•িāĻ›ু “āĻ—āϞāĻĻ” āĻāϰ āĻ•āĻĨা āĻŦāϞা āĻšāϚ্āĻ›ে।

āĻ…āύ্āϝāĻĻিāĻ•ে ⧧⧝⧭⧍ āĻāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āĻŦিāĻ­িāύ্āύ āĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āϏুāύিāϰ্āĻĻিāώ্āϟ āĻŦা āĻ…āύিāϰ্āĻĻিāώ্āϟ āĻ…āύেāĻ• “āϤ্āϰুāϟি”āϰ āĻ•āĻĨা āĻŦāϞা āĻšāϚ্āĻ›ে। āϤিāύ āĻĒāϰ্āĻŦেāϰ āĻ āϞেāĻ–াāϰ āĻĒ্āϰāĻĨāĻŽ āĻĒāϰ্āĻŦে āφāĻŽāϰা āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻĒ্āϰāϪ⧟āύেāϰ “āĻ—āϞāĻĻ” āϝেāĻ—ুāϞো āϚিāĻš্āύিāϤ āĻ•āϰা āĻšāϚ্āĻ›ে āϏেāĻ—ুāϞো āĻŦিāĻŦেāϚāύা āĻ•āϰেāĻ›ি। āĻĻ্āĻŦিāϤী⧟ āĻĒāϰ্āĻŦে āφāĻŽāϰা “āϤ্āϰুāϟি” āĻ—ুāϞো āωāĻĒāϏ্āĻĨাāĻĒāύ āĻ•āϰে āφāϞোāϚāύা āĻ•āϰাāϰ āϚেāώ্āϟা āĻ•āϰেāĻ›ি। āĻāχ āϤৃāϤী⧟ āĻ“ āĻļেāώ āĻĒāϰ্āĻŦāϟিāϤে āφāĻŽāϰা āϤুāϞে āϧāϰāĻŦো āĻ•েāύ āύāϤুāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āϧাāϰāĻŖাāϟি āĻĻেāĻļেāϰ āĻ­াāϞোāϰ āϚে⧟ে āĻ•্āώāϤি āĻŦেāĻļি āĻ•āϰāĻŦে।

āĻĒ্āϰāĻĨāĻŽāϤ, ⧧⧝⧭⧍ āĻāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āĻ…āύেāĻ• āϏāĻŽাāϞোāϚāύা āφāĻ›ে। āĻ•িāύ্āϤু āĻāϟিāϰ āϏāĻŦāϚে⧟ে āĻŦ⧜ āĻļāĻ•্āϤি āĻšāϚ্āĻ›ে, āĻāϟিāϰ āϏ্āϟ্āϰাāĻ•āϚাāϰাāϞ āĻĄিāϜাāχāύ (āĻ•াāĻ াāĻŽোāĻ—āϤ āĻŦিāύ্āϝাāϏ) āϝেāϟি āĻŦেāĻļ āĻļāĻ•্āϤিāĻļাāϞী āĻāĻŦং āϝাāϰ āϜোāϰে āĻāϟি ā§Ģā§Š āĻŦāĻ›āϰ āϧāϰে āĻšāϤ্āϝা, āĻ•্āϝু, āϏেāύাāĻļাāϏāύ āĻ“ āϚāϰāĻŽ āϰাāϜāύৈāϤিāĻ• āĻ…āϚāϞাāĻŦāϏ্āĻĨা āĻāĻŦং āĻ•াāϜেāϰ-āĻ…āĻ•াāϜেāϰ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύেāϰ āĻā§œ-āĻাāĻĒ্āϟা āϏ⧟ে āϟিāĻ•ে āĻ—েāĻ›ে। āϤুāϞāύাāĻŽূāϞāĻ• āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āχāϤিāĻšাāϏে āĻāϟি āĻāĻ•āϟি āĻĒ্āϰāϤিāώ্āĻ িāϤ āϏāϤ্āϝ āϝে, āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻŦাāϤিāϞ āĻ•āϰা āĻŦা āύāϤুāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āύে⧟াāϰ āϏংāĻ–্āϝা⧟ āĻāĻ—ি⧟ে āĻĨাāĻ•া āϰাāώ্āϟ্āϰāĻ—ুāϞোāχ āĻ•āĻŽ āϏ্āĻĨিāϤিāĻļীāϞ āĻšā§Ÿ।

āĻĻāĻ•্āώিāĻŖ āĻāĻļি⧟া⧟ āĻĒাāĻ•িāϏ্āϤাāύেāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ ⧧⧝ā§Ģā§Ŧ, ⧧⧝ā§Ŧ⧍ āĻāĻŦং ā§§ā§¯ā§­ā§Š āϏাāϞে āϤিāύāĻŦাāϰ āύāϤুāύ āĻ•āϰে āϞেāĻ–া āĻšā§ŸেāĻ›ে। āφāĻĢāĻ—াāύিāϏ্āϤাāύেāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύāĻ“ āϤিāύāĻŦাāϰ āύāϤুāύ āĻ•āϰে āϞেāĻ–া āĻšā§ŸেāĻ›ে – ā§§ā§¯ā§¨ā§Š, ⧧⧝ā§Ŧā§Ē āĻāĻŦং ⧍ā§Ļā§Ļā§Ē āĻ। āĻļ্āϰীāϞংāĻ•া⧟ ⧧⧝⧭⧍ āĻāĻŦং ā§§ā§¯ā§­ā§Ž āϏাāϞে āĻĻুāϟি āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϞেāĻ–া āĻšā§Ÿ।āĻŽা⧟াāύāĻŽাāϰে ⧧⧝ā§Ēā§­, ⧧⧝⧭ā§Ē āĻāĻŦং ⧍ā§Ļā§Ļā§ŽāĻ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϞেāĻ–া āĻšā§ŸেāĻ›ে। āĻĻেāĻļāϟিāϤে ā§§ā§¯ā§Žā§Ž āĻšāϤে ⧍ā§Ļā§Ļā§Ž āϏāĻŽā§ŸāĻ•াāϞে āĻ•োāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύāχ āĻ›িāϞো āύা।

āĻ āϚাāϰāϟি āĻĻেāĻļেāϰ āĻ•োāύāϟিāχ āϏাংāĻŦিāϧাāύিāĻ•āϤাāϰ āϜāύ্āϝ āϏুāĻĒ্āϰāϏিāĻĻ্āϧ āύ⧟। āĻĒাāĻ•িāϏ্āϤাāύ āϏেāύা āĻļাāϏāύেāϰ āĻ—্āϰাāϏ āĻĨেāĻ•ে āϰāĻ•্āώা āĻĒা⧟āύি। āφāĻĢāĻ—াāύিāϏ্āϤাāύেāϰ ⧍ā§Ļā§Ļā§Ē āϏাāϞেāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύāϟি ⧍ā§Ļ⧍⧧ āϏাāϞে āϤাāϞেāĻŦাāύ āϏāϰāĻ•াāϰ āĻ›ুঁ⧜ে āĻĢেāϞেāĻ›ে। āĻĻেāĻļāϟিāϤে āĻāĻ–āύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻŦāϞে āĻ•োāύ āĻĻāϞিāϞ āύেāχ। āĻĒ্āϰাāĻĻেāĻļিāĻ• āϏ্āĻŦা⧟āϤ্āĻŦāĻļাāϏāύ āĻ“ āϤাāĻŽিāϞ-āϏিংāĻšāϞāĻŦিāϰোāϧেāϰ āϜেāϰে āĻļ্āϰীāϞংāĻ•াāϰ ⧧⧝⧭⧍ āĻāϰ āϏংāϏāĻĻী⧟ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻĢেāϞে āĻĻি⧟ে ā§§ā§¯ā§­ā§Ž āϏাāϞে āϰাāώ্āϟ্āϰāĻĒāϤিāĻļাāϏিāϤ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āύে⧟া āĻšā§Ÿ। āĻāϰāĻĒāϰ āĻĒāϰāχ āĻĻেāĻļāϟি āϰāĻ•্āϤāĻ•্āώ⧟ী āĻ—ৃāĻšāϝুāĻĻ্āϧেāϰ āĻŽুāĻ–ে āĻĒāϰে। āĻāϰāĻĒāϰ āϰাāώ্āϟ্āϰāĻĒāϤি āĻ“ āĻĒ্āϰāϧাāύāĻŽāύ্āϤ্āϰীāϰ āĻ•্āώāĻŽāϤাāϰ āĻ•্āϰāĻŽাāĻ—āϤ āϟাāύাāĻĒ⧜েāύে āĻāϰ āϏাংāĻŦিāϧাāύিāĻ• āĻ•াāĻ াāĻŽো āĻ­āĻ™্āĻ—ুāϰāχ āĻĨেāĻ•ে āĻ—েāĻ›ে। āĻŽা⧟াāύāĻŽাāϰ āϏāĻŽ্āĻ­āĻŦāϤ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύāĻšীāύ āϏেāύা āĻ“ āϜাāϤিāĻ—āϤ āύৈāϰাāϜ্āϝেāϰ āϭ⧟াāĻŦāĻšāϤāĻŽ āωāĻĻাāĻšāϰāĻŖ।

āĻŦাংāϞাāĻĻেāĻļে ⧍ā§Ļ⧍ā§Ē āϏাāϞে āĻāϏে āϏāĻŽā§Ÿ āĻ“ āϏুāϝোāĻ—েāϰ āϜোāϰে āύূāϤāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϞেāĻ–াāϰ āϏংāϏ্āĻ•ৃāϤি āϚাāϞু āĻšā§Ÿে āĻ—েāϞে āϏেāϟি āĻ­āĻŦিāώ্āϝāϤেāĻŦাāϰāĻŦাāϰ āύāϤুāύ āĻ•āϰে āϞেāĻ–াāϰ āĻĒāĻĨ āĻ–ুāϞে āĻĻিāϤে āĻĒাāϰে। āφāĻ—েāϰ āĻĒāϰ্āĻŦāĻ—ুāϞোāϤে āφāĻŽāϰা āĻŦāϞেāĻ›ি, āϏুāύিāϰ্āĻĻিāώ্āϟ āĻšিāϏাāĻŦ āύিāĻ•াāĻļ āύা āĻ•āϰে āĻŦা āύা āĻĻি⧟ে āĻĸাāϞাāĻ“āĻ­াāĻŦে āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āύāϤুāύ āĻ•āϰে āϞিāĻ–āϤে āĻŦāϞাāϰ āϜিāĻ—িāϰāϟা ⧧⧝⧭⧧ āĻāϰ āĻŽāĻšাāύ āĻŽুāĻ•্āϤিāϝুāĻĻ্āϧেāϰ ā§Šā§Ļ āϞāĻ•্āώ āĻļāĻšীāĻĻেāϰ āϰāĻ•্āϤেāϰ āωāĻĒāϰ āĻ—ā§œে āωāĻ া ⧧⧝⧭⧍ āĻāϰ āĻ—āĻŖāĻĒāϰিāώāĻĻ āĻāĻŦং āĻŽূāϞ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻĒ্āϰāĻŖেāϤাāĻĻেāϰ āĻĒ্āϰāϤি, āϤাঁāĻĻেāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϞেāĻ–াāϰ āĻ…āϧিāĻ•াāϰ āĻāĻŦং āĻŽূāϞ্āϝāĻŦোāϧāϜāύিāϤ āĻ…āĻŦāϏ্āĻĨাāύāĻ—ুāϞোāϰ āĻĒ্āϰāϤি āĻāĻ•āϧāϰāĻŖেāϰ āĻšিংāϏা, āφāĻ•্āϰোāĻļāĻŦাāĻŦিāϤৃāώ্āĻŖাāϤা⧜িāϤāĻŦāϞে āĻĒ্āϰāϤী⧟āĻŽাāύ āĻšāϤে āĻĒাāϰে।

āϏেāĻ•্āώেāϤ্āϰে āφāϞোāϚ্āϝ “āύāϤুāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ” āĻĻীāϰ্āϘāĻŽে⧟াāĻĻে āĻ…āϏ্āϤ্āĻŦিāϤ্āĻŦেāϰ āϏংāĻ•āϟে āĻĒ⧜āϤে āĻĒাāϰে। āĻĒāϰে āφāϰ āĻ•েāω āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύেāϰ āĻŽāϤো āϜāϟিāϞ āĻ“ āĻাāĻŽেāϞাāĻĒূāϰ্āĻŖ āĻĒāĻĨে āϝাāĻŦেāύ āύা। āϏংāĻļোāϧāύ āĻ•āϰāϞে āφāĻĻাāϞāϤে āĻŦ্āϝাāϏিāĻ• āϏ্āϟ্āϰাāĻ•āϚাāϰেāϰ āĻĒ্āϰāĻļ্āύেāϰ āĻŽুāĻ–ে āĻĒ⧜āϤে āĻšā§Ÿ।āϤাāϰāϚে⧟ে āĻŦāϰং āύāϤুāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϞিāĻ–ে āύি⧟ে āφāĻĻাāϞāϤেāϰ āĻŦিāϚাāϰāĻ•āĻĻেāϰāĻ•েāχ āĻŦāϞা āϝা⧟, āĻāχ āύāϤুāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύāϟা āĻŽাāύাāϰ āĻļāĻĒāĻĨ āύিāύ।

āĻĻ্āĻŦিāϤী⧟āϤ, āĻ…āύেāĻ•ে āĻĻাāĻŦি āĻ•āϰāĻ›েāύ, āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύ āĻ•āϰে āĻŽৌāϞিāĻ• āĻ•োāύ āĻĒāϰিāĻŦāϰ্āϤāύ āφāύা āϝাāĻŦেāύা। āĻ•াāϰāĻŖ āφāĻŽাāĻĻেāϰ āφāĻĻাāϞāϤেāϰ āĻŦ্āϝাāϏিāĻ• āϏ্āϟ্āϰাāĻ•āϚাāϰ āύীāϤিāϰ āĻ•াāϰāĻŖে āĻĒāϰāĻŦāϰ্āϤীāϤে āĻ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύীāĻ•ে āĻŦাāϤিāϞ āĻ•āϰে āĻĻে⧟াāϰ āϏুāϝোāĻ— āĻĨাāĻ•āĻŦে।

āφāĻŽāϰা āĻŽāύে āĻ•āϰি āĻ āϝুāĻ•্āϤিāϟি āĻ…āĻ—āĻ­ীāϰ। āφāĻŽাāĻĻেāϰ āĻ•াāĻ›ে āĻāϟা āĻŦোāϧāĻ—āĻŽ্āϝ āύ⧟, āĻŦāϰ্āϤāĻŽাāύেāϰ āϏংāϏ্āĻ•াāϰ āĻĒ্āϰāϏ্āϤাāĻŦেāϰ āĻ­েāϤāϰ āĻāĻŽāύ āĻ•ি āĻ•ি āφāĻ›ে āϝেāĻ—ুāϞো ⧧⧝⧭⧍ āĻāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āĻŦ্āϝাāϏিāĻ• āϏ্āϟ্āϰাāĻ•āϚাāϰেāϰ āĻĒāϰিāĻĒāύ্āĻĨী āĻšāϤে āĻĒাāϰে āĻŦāϞে āφāĻļāĻ™্āĻ•া āĻ•āϰা āĻšāϚ্āĻ›ে। āĻŦিāĻļেāώāϤ āφāĻ—েāϰ āĻĻুāχ āĻĒāϰ্āĻŦেāϰ āφāϞোāϚāύা⧟ āϝে āϏুāύিāϰ্āĻĻিāώ্āϟ āϤ্āϰুāϟিāĻ—ুāϞো āϚিāĻš্āύিāϤ āĻ•āϰা āĻšā§ŸেāĻ›ে āĻāĻŦং āϏেāĻ—ুāϞোāϰ āϜāύ্āϝ āϝে āϏংāϏ্āĻ•াāϰ āĻĒ্āϰāϏ্āϤাāĻŦāĻ—ুāϞো āĻĻে⧟া āĻšā§ŸেāĻ›ে āϏেāĻ—ুāϞোāϰ āĻ•োāύāϟিāχ ⧧⧝⧭⧍ āĻāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āĻāĻ•েāĻŦাāϰে āĻĒ্āϰāϧাāύāϤāĻŽ āĻŽৌāϞিāĻ• āĻ•াāĻ াāĻŽো “āĻ—āĻŖāϤāύ্āϤ্āϰে”āϰ āϏাāĻĨে āϏংāϘাāϤāĻĒূāϰ্āĻŖ āύ⧟। āφāĻĻাāϞāϤেāϰ āϰা⧟ āĻŽāϤেāχ āĻŦিāϚাāϰ āĻŦিāĻ­াāĻ—েāϰ āϏ্āĻŦাāϧীāύāϤা, āĻ•্āώāĻŽāϤাāϰ āĻĒৃāĻĨāĻ•ীāĻ•āϰāĻŖ āύীāϤি, āφāχāύেāϰ āĻļাāϏāύ, āϜāĻŦাāĻŦāĻĻিāĻšিāϤা ⧧⧝⧭⧍ āĻāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āĻŦ্āϝাāϏিāĻ• āϏ্āϟ্āϰাāĻ•āϚাāϰ। āĻāĻ—ুāϞোāϰ āĻ•োāύāϟিāχ ⧧⧝⧭⧍ āĻāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āϤ্āϰুāϟি āύ⧟, āĻŦāϰং āĻļāĻ•্āϤি।

āĻ…āύেāĻ•ে āĻŦāϞāĻ›েāύ āĻĻুāχ āĻ•āĻ•্āώ āĻŦিāĻļিāώ্āϟ āϏংāϏāĻĻ āĻ•āϰāϤে āĻ—েāϞে (āϝেāϟি āĻ­াāϞো āĻĒ্āϰāϏ্āϤাāĻŦ) āĻŦা āϝুāĻ•্āϤāϰাāώ্āϟ্āϰী⧟ āϧাঁāϚেāϰ āĻĒ্āϰেāϏিāĻĄেāύ্āϏি⧟াāϞ āϏāϰāĻ•াāϰ āĻŦ্āϝāĻŦāϏ্āĻĨা āĻ•āϰāϤে āĻ—েāϞে (āϝেāϟি āωāĻĒāϰেāϰ āĻĻ্āĻŦিāϤী⧟ āĻĒāϰ্āĻŦেāϰ āϏāĻĒ্āϤāĻŽ āϝুāĻ•্āϤিāϤে āĻŦāϞা āĻ•াāϰāĻŖে āĻŦিāĻĒāĻĻāϜāύāĻ•) āĻšā§ŸāϤো āφāĻŽাāĻĻেāϰ āφāĻĻাāϞāϤ āϏেāĻ—ুāϞোāĻ•ে āĻŦ্āϝাāϏিāĻ• āϏ্āϟ্āϰাāĻ•āϚাāϰেāϰ āĻĻোāĻšাāχ āĻĻি⧟ে āĻŦাāϤিāϞ āĻ•āϰে āĻĻেāĻŦেāύ। āϝুāĻ•্āϤিāϟি āϝāĻĨেāώ্āϟ āĻļāĻ•্āϤ āύ⧟। āĻ•াāϰāĻŖ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ ā§§ā§Ē⧍ āĻ…āύুāϚ্āĻ›েāĻĻে āϝে āĻ—āĻŖāĻ­োāϟেāϰ āĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻ›িāϞো āϏেāϟি āĻĒুāύāϰুāϜ্āϜীāĻŦিāϤ āĻšāϞে āĻāĻŦং āĻ—āĻŖāĻ­োāϟেāϰ āĻŽাāϧ্āϝāĻŽে āĻ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύীāĻ—ুāϞো āύিāϰ্āĻŦাāϚিāϤ āϏāϰāĻ•াāϰ āĻ—্āϰāĻšāĻŖ āĻ•āϰে āύিāϞে āφāĻĻাāϞāϤেāϰ āĻŦ্āϝাāϏিāĻ• āϏ্āϟ্āϰাāĻ•āϚাāϰ āϤāϤ্āϤ্āĻŦ āĻĻি⧟ে āĻāĻ—ুāϞোāĻ•ে āĻŦাāϤিāϞ āĻ•āϰাāϰ āϏুāϝোāĻ— āĻĨাāĻ•ে āύা।

āĻŦ্āϝাāϏিāĻ• āϏ্āϟ্āϰাāĻ•āϚাāϰ āϤāϤ্āϤ্āĻŦāϟি āφāĻĻাāϞāϤ āύাāύা āϏāĻŽā§Ÿ āύাāύা āĻ­াāĻŦে āĻŦāϞেāύ āĻāϟি āϏāϤ্āϝ। āĻ•িāύ্āϤু āϜāύāĻ—āĻŖেāϰ āĻ…ংāĻļāĻ—্āϰāĻšāĻŖে āϏāĻŽ্āĻĒাāĻĻিāϤ āĻ•োāύ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύীāĻ•ে āĻŦাāϤিāϞ āĻ•āϰাāϰ āύāϜিāϰ āφāĻŽাāĻĻেāϰ āĻĻেāĻļে āύেāχ। āĻŦিāĻ–্āϝাāϤ āφāύো⧟াāϰ āĻšোāϏেāύ āĻŽাāĻŽāϞা⧟ āĻŦāϰং āĻŦিāϚাāϰāĻĒāϤি āĻšাāĻŦিāĻŦুāϰ āϰāĻšāĻŽাāύ āχāĻ™্āĻ—িāϤ āĻ•āϰেāĻ›িāϞেāύ, ā§ŽāĻŽ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύী āϰেāĻĢাāϰেāύ্āĻĄাāĻŽেāϰ āĻŽাāϧ্āϝāĻŽে āĻšāϞে, āĻ“āχ āĻŽাāĻŽāϞাāϰ āĻĢāϞাāĻĢāϞ āĻ…āύ্āϝ āϰāĻ•āĻŽ āĻšāϤো। āĻŦ্āϝাāϏিāĻ• āϏ্āϟ্āϰাāĻ•āϚাāϰ āϤāϤ্āϤ্āĻŦেāϰ āĻĒ্āϰা⧟োāĻ—িāĻ• āϏāĻŽāϏ্āϝাāϰ āϜāύ্āϝ ⧧⧝⧭⧍ āϏাāϞেāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻŦাāϤিāϞ āĻ•āϰে āύāϤুāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āύিāϞে āφāĻĻাāϞāϤ āϏেāϟিāϰāĻ“ āĻŦ্āϝাāϏিāĻ• āϏ্āϟ্āϰাāĻ•āϚাāϰ āĻ–ুঁāϜāĻŦেāύ।

āϤৃāϤী⧟ āĻāĻ•āϟি āϝুāĻ•্āϤি āĻšāϤে āĻĒাāϰে āĻŦāϰ্āϤāĻŽাāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ ā§­āĻ– āĻ…āύুāϚ্āĻ›āĻĻেāϰ āĻ…āϏংāĻļোāϧāύ āϝোāĻ—্āϝāϤাāϰ āĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āĻ•াāϰāĻŖে āĻāϟি āϏংāĻļোāϧāύ āĻ•āϰা āϝাāĻŦে āύা। āĻāϟিāϰ āωāϤ্āϤāϰ āĻšāϚ্āĻ›ে, ā§­āĻ– āĻ…āύুāϚ্āĻ›েāĻĻāĻ•েāχ āĻŦ্āϝাāϏিāĻ• āϏ্āϟ্āϰাāĻ•āϚাāϰ āĻĒāϰিāĻĒāύ্āĻĨী āĻŦāϞে āϚ্āϝাāϞেāĻž্āϜ āĻ•āϰে āĻŦাāϤিāϞ āĻ•āϰাāύোāϰ āϏুāϝোāĻ— āφāĻ›ে। āϏেāϟি āύা āĻ•āϰে āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύāĻ•েāχ āĻŦাāϤিāϞ āĻ•āϰে āĻĻিāϤে āĻ—েāϞে āĻŦāϰং āĻĒāϰে ā§­āĻ• āĻ…āύুāϚ্āĻ›েāĻĻ (āϰাāώ্āϟ্āϰ āĻĻ্āϰোāĻš)-āϰ āĻ…āĻ­িāϝোāĻ— āϏৃāώ্āϟি āĻšāϤে āĻĒাāϰে। āĻŦāϰ্āϤāĻŽাāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āϏāĻ™্āĻ•āϟāĻ•ে āĻāϰ āĻŽুāĻ–োāĻŽুāĻ–ী āĻšā§Ÿেāχ āĻŽোāĻ•াāĻŦেāϞা āĻ•āϰাāϟা āϏāĻŦāϚে⧟ে āĻ­াāϞো āĻ•ৌāĻļāϞ। āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻĨেāĻ•ে āĻŦেāϰি⧟ে āĻ—ি⧟ে āĻ āϏāĻŽāϏ্āϝাāĻ—ুāϞো āϏāĻŽāϧাāύ āĻ•āϰāϤে āĻ—েāϞে āφāϰো āĻ…āύেāĻ• āύāϤুāύ āϏāĻŽāϏ্āϝাāϰ āϏৃāώ্āϟি āĻšāϤে āĻĒাāϰে।

āϚāϤুāϰ্āĻĨ āϝুāĻ•্āϤিāϟি āĻŦেāĻļ āĻŦিāĻĒ্āϞāĻŦী āϧাঁāϚেāϰ। āĻŦāϞা āĻšāϚ্āĻ›ে āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āĻ–োāϞāύāϞāϚে āĻĒাāϞ্āϟাāϤে āĻšāϞে āϏংāĻļোāϧāύ āĻ•্āώāĻŽāϤা⧟ (Amendment Power) āĻšāĻŦে āύা, āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϞেāĻ–াāϰ āĻ•্āώāĻŽāϤা (Constituent Power) āĻĻি⧟ে āĻ•াāϜāϟা āĻ•āϰāϤে āĻšāĻŦে।āϝুāĻ•্āϤিāϟি āĻĒ্āϰāĻ•ৃāϤ āφāχāύāϜ্āĻžāĻĻেāϰ āϚে⧟ে āĻŦাāĻŽ āϘāϰাāύাāϰ āĻ•āĻŦি āϏাāĻšিāϤ্āϝিāĻ•āϰাāχ āĻŦেāĻļি āĻĻিāϚ্āĻ›েāύ। āϤুāϞāύাāĻŽূāϞāĻ• āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āĻ—āĻŦেāώāĻŖা⧟ āĻ•āύāϏ্āϟিāϟিāωāĻļāύাāϞ āϰিāύিāĻ‰ā§ŸাāϞ, āĻĄিāϜāĻŽেāĻŽ্āĻŦাāϰāĻŽেāύ্āϟ āĻāĻŦং āϰেāĻ­āϞিāωāĻļāύাāϰী āĻ•āύāϏ্āϟিāϟিāωāĻļāύাāϞিāϜāĻŽ āύি⧟ে āĻ…āύেāĻ• āϞেāĻ–াāϞেāĻ–ি āφāĻ›ে। āĻāĻ—ুāϞোāϰ āĻŽুāϞ āĻ•āĻĨা āĻšāϚ্āĻ›ে, āĻ•āύ্āϏāϟিāϟু⧟েāύ্āϟ āĻĒাāĻ“ā§Ÿাāϰ (āϜāύāĻ—āĻŖেāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϞেāĻ–াāϰ āĻ•্āώāĻŽāϤা) āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύেāϰ āĻŽাāϧ্āϝāĻŽেāĻ“ āϚāϰ্āϚা āĻ•āϰা āϝা⧟। āĻĒ্āϰāϤিāϟি āĻŽৌāϞিāĻ• āĻ“ āĻŦ⧜ āĻĒāϰিāĻŦāϰ্āϤāύেāϰ āϜāύ্āϝ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āύāϤুāύ āĻ•āϰে āϞেāĻ–া āĻ…āĻŦāĻļ্āϝāĻ• āύ⧟। āϏāĻŦāϏāĻŽā§Ÿ āύāϤুāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϞেāĻ–া āĻ­াāϞো āĻ•ৌāĻļāϞāĻ“ āύ⧟।

āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϘāύ āϘāύ āĻŦāĻĻāϞাāϞে āĻāϰ āĻĻীāϰ্āϘ āĻŽে⧟াāĻĻে āϟিāĻ•ে āĻĨাāĻ•াāϰ āϏāĻ•্āώāĻŽāϤা āύāώ্āϟ āĻšāϤে āĻĒাāϰে। āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϧাāϰাāĻŦাāĻšিāĻ• āĻāĻŦং āĻĻীāϰ্āϘা⧟ু āĻšāϞেāχ āĻŦেāĻļি āϟিāĻ•ে। āĻ“āχ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύāĻ—ুāϞো āύিāĻ–ুঁāϤ āύা āĻšāϞেāĻ“, āĻ–াāϰাāĻĒ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύ āĻ েāĻ•াāϤে āύা āĻĒাāϰāϞেāĻ“ āϤাঁāĻĻেāϰ āĻāĻ•āϟা āχāύ্āϟাāϰāύাāϞāϰেāϜিāϞি⧟েāύ্āϏ, āĻĒ্āϰāϤিāώ্āĻ িāϤ āϜুāϰিāϏ্āĻĒ্āϰুāĻĄেāύ্āϏ āĻāϰ āĻļেāĻ•ā§œ āĻĨাāĻ•ে। āĻ“āχ āϰেāϜিāϞি⧟েāύ্āϏ āĻ“ āĻļেāĻ•ā§œেāϰ āϜোāϰেāχ āφāĻŽāϰা āĻŦāϞāϤে āĻĒাāϰি āĻ“āχ āĻ“āχ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύী āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻĒāϰিāĻĒāύ্āĻĨী, āĻ“āĻ—ুāϞো āĻŦাāϤিāϞ āĻ•āϰāϤে āĻšāĻŦে। āϰাāϜāύৈāϤিāĻ• āĻĒāϰিāϏ্āĻĨিāϤি āĻ­েāĻĻে āĻ•োāύ āĻ…āĻ—āĻŖāϤাāύ্āϤ্āϰিāĻ• āϏংāĻļোāϧāύী āϤাā§ŽāĻ•্āώāĻŖিāĻ• āϚ্āϝাāϞেāĻž্āϜ āĻ•āϰা āύা āĻ—েāϞেāĻ“ (āϝেāĻŽāύ āϤāϤ্āϤ্āĻŦাāĻŦāϧা⧟āĻ• āϏāϰāĻ•াāϰ āĻŦাāϤিāϞ), āϏāĻŽā§Ÿেāϰ āĻŦিāϚাāϰে āĻāĻ—ুāϞো āφāĻĻাāϞāϤে āϚ্āϝাāϞেāĻž্āϜেāϰ āĻŽুāĻ–ে āĻĒ⧜āϤে āĻŦাāϧ্āϝ। āĻ•োāύ āĻ•োāύ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύী āĻ•āĻ–āύো āϚ্āϝাāϞেāĻž্āϜ āĻ•āϰা āύা āĻšāϞেāĻ“ (āϝেāĻŽāύ āϚāϤুāϰ্āĻĨ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύী) āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āϰাāϜāύৈāϤিāĻ• āĻĒāĻĨ āĻĒāϰিāĻ•্āϰāĻŽা⧟ āĻ“āĻ—ুāϞো āĻšাāϰি⧟ে āϝেāϤে āĻŦাāϧ্āϝ। āĻĒ্āϰ⧟োāϜāύ āĻļুāϧু āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύāĻ•ে āϟিāĻ•ে āĻĨাāĻ•āϤে āĻĻে⧟া āĻāĻŦং āĻļেāĻ•ā§œ āĻ—āϜাāϤে āĻĻে⧟া। āĻļেāĻ•ā§œ āϏāĻš āĻĒ্āϰাāϚীāύ āĻ…āĻļ্āĻŦāĻĨ āωāĻĒ⧜ে āĻĢেāϞে āύāϤুāύ āϚাāϰা āĻ—াāĻ› āϞাāĻ—ি⧟ে āύা āϐāϤিāĻš্āϝ āϰāĻ•্āώা āĻ•āϰা āϝা⧟, āύা āϏāĻŦুāϜ।

āφāĻŽাāĻĻেāϰ āĻĻেāĻļে ā§Ēāϰ্āĻĨ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύীāϰ āĻŽাāϧ্āϝāĻŽে āĻŦāϞāϤে āĻ—েāϞে āĻāĻ•āϟা āύāϤুāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϞেāĻ–া āĻšāϞেāĻ“ āĻ“āχ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύীāϰ āωāĻĻ্āϝোāĻ•্āϤাāϰা āϏেāϟিāĻ•ে āύāϤুāύ āĻ•āϰে āϞেāĻ–া āĻŦāϞেāύāύি। āϏংāĻļোāϧāύ āĻŦāϞেāĻ›েāύ। ⧧⧝⧭ā§Ŧ-⧭⧝ āϏাāϞ āĻĒāϰ্āϝāύ্āϤ āϜি⧟াāϰ āĻ•āϰা āϏাংāĻŦিāϧাāύিāĻ• āϏংāϏ্āĻ•াāϰāĻ—ুāϞো āĻŦāϞāϤে āĻ—েāϞে ⧧⧝⧭⧍ āĻāϰ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻāĻŦং ⧧⧝⧭ā§Ģ āĻāϰ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύীāϰ āϚেāĻšাāϰাāχ āĻĒাāϞ্āϟে āĻĻে⧟। āĻ“āϟাāĻ“ āĻŦāϞāϤে āĻ—েāϞে āĻāĻ• āϧāϰāĻŖেāϰ “āύāϤুāύ āĻ•āϰে āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āϞেāĻ–া”। āϤাāϰāĻĒāϰāĻ“ āϜি⧟া āĻāĻŦং āϤাঁāϰ āĻĻāϞ āĻāϟাāĻ•ে āϏংāĻļোāϧāύ āĻŦāϞেāĻ›েāύ। āύāϤুāύ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āĻŦāϞেāύāύি। ⧧⧝⧝⧍ āϏাāϞেāϰ ⧧⧍-āϤāĻŽ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύীāϰ āĻŽাāϧ্āϝāĻŽে āĻĻেāĻļ āϰাāώ্āϟ্āϰāĻĒāϤিāĻļাāϏিāϤ āϏāϰāĻ•াāϰ āĻĨেāĻ•ে āĻĒ্āϰāϧাāύāĻŽāύ্āϤ্āϰীāĻļাāϏিāϤ āϏāϰāĻ•াāϰে āĻĢেāϰāϤ āϝা⧟। āĻĒ্āϰāϧাāύ āĻŦিāϚাāϰāĻĒāϤি āĻŽোāϏ্āϤāĻĢা āĻ•াāĻŽাāϞ āĻāϟাāĻ•ে āĻāĻ•āϟা “āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύেāϰ āϚāĻ•্āϰāĻĒূāϰāĻŖ” āĻŦāϞে āφāĻ–্āϝা⧟িāϤ āĻ•āϰেāύ। ⧧⧝⧝ā§Ļ āĻāϰ āĻ—āĻŖāĻ…āĻ­্āϝুāϤ্āĻĨাāύেāϰ āĻĒāϰ ⧧⧍-āϤāĻŽ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύী āϰাāώ্āϟ্āϰ āĻ•াāĻ াāĻŽোāϤে āĻŽৌāϞিāĻ• āĻĒāϰিāĻŦāϰ্āϤāύ āφāύে।āϤাāϰāĻĒāϰāĻ“ āĻĻেāĻļেāϰ āĻ•োāύ āϰাāϜāύৈāϤিāĻ• āĻĻāϞ āϏংāĻŦিāϧাāύ āύāϤুāύ āĻ•āϰে āϞেāĻ–াāϰ āĻ•āĻĨা āĻĻাāĻŦি āĻ•āϰেāύāύি। āϤাঁāϰা āϏংāĻļোāϧāύেāϰ āĻ•āĻĨাāχ āĻŦāϞেāĻ›েāύ। ⧍ā§Ļā§§ā§§ āϏাāϞেāϰ ā§§ā§Ģ-āϤāĻŽ āϏংāĻļোāϧāύীāĻ“ āφāϰেāĻ•āϟি āĻŦিāϰাāϟāĻ•া⧟ āĻ•াāĻ াāĻŽোāĻ—āϤ āĻ“ āφāĻĻāϰ্āĻļিāĻ• āĻĒāϰিāĻŦāϰ্āϤāύ। āϏেāĻŦাāϰāĻ“ āĻ•েāω āύāϤুāύ āĻ•āϰে āϞেāĻ–াāϰ āĻ•āĻĨা āĻŦāϞেāύāύি।

āφāĻŽāϰা āĻŦিāĻļ্āĻŦাāϏ āĻ•āϰি, āĻāϏāĻŦ āϘāϟāύা āĻĒāϰāĻŽ্āĻĒāϰা āĻ•েāĻŦāϞ āϐāϤিāĻšাāϏিāĻ• āĻ•াāĻ•āϤাāϞ āύ⧟। āĻĒāϰিāĻŦāϰ্āϤāύেāϰ āĻĒ্āϰāϤিāϟি āĻŦাঁāĻ•েāχ āĻĒāϰিāĻŦāϰ্āϤāύেāϰ āωāĻĻ্āϝোāĻ•্āϤাāϰা āϏাংāĻŦিāϧাāύিāĻ• āϧাāϰাāĻŦাāĻšিāĻ•āϤা āĻ“ āϏ্āĻĨা⧟িāϤ্āĻŦেāϰ āĻ—ুāϰāϤ্āĻŦāĻ•ে āĻ…āϏ্āĻŦীāĻ•াāϰ āĻ•āϰāϤে āĻĒাāϰেāύ āύি। āĻ“āχ āĻ•āύ্āϏāϟিāϟিāĻļāύাāϞ āĻ•āύāϜাāϰāĻ­েāϟিāϜāĻŽেāϰ āϜোāϰেāχ āĻšā§ŸāϤো āĻŦাংāϞাāĻĻেāĻļ āύাāĻŽāĻ• āϰাāώ্āϟ্āϰāϟি āĻŦাāϰ āĻŦাāϰ āύিāϜেāϰ āφāϤ্āύāĻĒāϰিāϚ⧟ āύি⧟ে āϘুāϰে āĻĻাঁ⧜া⧟ āĻāĻŦং āĻĒাāĻ•িāϏ্āϤাāύ, āφāĻĢāĻ—াāύিāϏ্āϤাāύ, āĻļ্āϰীāϞংāĻ•া āĻŦা āĻŽা⧟াāύāĻŽাāϰেāϰ āϚে⧟ে āφāϞাāĻĻা āĻĨাāĻ•ে।

The Failure of Bangladesh's Constitutional Design Dr M Jashim Ali Chowdhury Published in Ngoc Son Bui, Mara Malagodi and Christopher Rob...