Wednesday, November 24, 2021

 


The Antagonistic Style of 

Judicial Review in Bangladesh:

A Good Candidate for the Dialogic Model?

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury

Published in The Journal of Parliamentary and Political Law Vol 15 (3) (2021) 549-574 (Thomson Reuters, Canada)

To request a private copy: 

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356474932_The_Antagonistic_Style_of_Judicial_Review_in_Bangladesh_A_Good_Candidate_for_the_Dialogic_Model_Journal_of_Parliamentary_and_Political_Law_Vol_153_2021_549-574_Thomson_Reuters_Canada 


Abstract

The Dialogic Model of judicial review famously carved out of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, and later endorsed by the UK Human Rights Act 1998, has inspired many judicial review — strong or weak — systems worldwide. This article argues that it has relevance for the ‘antagonistic” strong-form judicial review system of Bangladesh as well. Building upon how the Parliament and judiciary in Bangladesh (un)relate each other, this article argues that Dialogic Model could solve confusions in three particular areas of Bangladeshi judicial review: fundamental right based statute review, fundamental principles based collective rights review, and constitutional amendment review. It is shown that certain areas of judicial review in Bangladesh are subtly dialogic and hence could be potential breeding grounds for broader application of the Model. The Dialogic Model’s own internal dilemmas and objection to its over generalisations also are noted in this article and a case is made why those might not constitute a very big stumbling block on the way of its application in Bangladesh. This has been done through a special consideration of the comparative judicial review regimes of some of Bangladesh’s close commonwealth neighbours in southeast Asia.



Wednesday, October 27, 2021

Judicial Review of "Internal Parliamentary Proceedings": The Dialogic and Non-dialogic Approaches


M Jashim Ali Chowdhury


Published in: 
Comparative Constitutional Law and Administrative Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2021) pp 28-57 

Full Text available at:


Abstract:

This article compares the internal proceedings jurisprudence of the highest courts of the United Kingdom (UK), India, and Bangladesh. Though the Supreme Courts of Bangladesh and India have shown general deference to the debates in parliament, they have shown willingness to lift the veil of those “internal proceedings” that might have constitutional questions involved. It appears that the UK, India, and Bangladesh’s respective models of judicial review and parliament-judiciary relationship influence their internal proceedings jurisprudence. While the Indian and Bangladeshi Supreme Courts’ understandings of the internal proceedings doctrine are conditioned by their self-aggrandised posture of guardianship over the Constitution, the British judiciary’s approach is largely dialogic and conciliatory. Indian and Bangladeshi Supreme Courts’ adversarial approach frequently places them in direct confrontation with the legislative and political branches. While the Indian Supreme Court does not shy away from such confrontation, Bangladesh Supreme Court usually tries to avoid it and, in the process, ends up taking fluctuating and self-contradictory positions in different cases. The author argues that the UK’s dialogic model of judicial review provides for a rather congenial basis for principled judicial consideration of the internal proceedings doctrine.





Saturday, October 16, 2021

Questioning the ‘Westminster’ Attribute of Bangladesh Jatya Sangsad

 

Nirmal Kumar Saha*

M.Jashim Ali Chowdhury**

 

 

The Journal of Law, Islamic University, Kushtia, Bangladesh 

Vol 10 (Special) No 2, Volume Year: 2014-2015 (published in 2021) pp 209-231

For a full-text request please click: 

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354366242_Questioning_The_'Westminster'_attribute_of_Bangladesh_Parliament_Jatya_Sangsad_-_Journal_of_Law_Islamic_University_Kushtia_Bangladesh_Vol_10_Spl_No_2_2014-2015_pp_209-231?_sg=uhktf6-wYPc4Ro3kuMvO6m_oNa4Z3Ha68rs7dFGxXMq9oRXafAbMmtQK67bs2HrywEVPLEiOQc_TkjWmmyVBBagYNRmFPYN1Q4QYdcJq.EcaC3iKiSdLY_e1urCawhXN9-XuoymxrEVpyq-qriSLdNMQtDzxypsROGZVWw1k80YBx_RmoU1pDMZg9WNuqsg

Abstract

The Westminster Parliamentary System is both a tradition and a concept. As a tradition, it represents a loose family of political jurisdictions inheriting their shared institutions and characteristics from the British Parliament based in the Palace of Westminster. As a concept, it is a majoritarian democracy where the majority party harness all the powers and controls over legislation, governance and policymaking. Minority, on the other hand, is assigned with the rule of institutional opposition and opinion building against the ruling party programs, policies and laws.  At independence, Bangladesh chose to carry the British legacy of the Westminster parliamentary system. Whether the system as outlined in the 1972 constitution was purely Westminsterial is not abundantly clear. The executive branch led by the Prime Minister and Cabinet is drawn from the majority party in Parliament and remains answerable to the Parliament. Like the Crown, the President symbolises the ceremonial head of the state. However, the judiciary had an American tune – a separate branch with a constitutionally secured tenure for the judges and a power of judicial review. This study seeks to see how this ‘half-hearted’ blend of separation of power and dynastic party system in an avowedly Westminster system undermined the legislative branch of state by substantially affecting the ‘horizontal accountability of democratic intuitions and ‘vertical accountability of the rulers to the ruled. Assessing the Bangladesh parliament’s mandate and performance as a law-making, accountability and accountable body, the paper explains how it fails the core majoritarian values expected of a typical Westminster parliament. As an incremental response to the deeply rooted institutional and cultural problems surrounding the legislative branch of the Republic, some strategic reforms are needed.









*Associate Professor, Department of Law, University of Chittagong, Email: nirmalksaha@yahoo.com

**PhD Candidate, King’s College London, Email: m.chowdhury@kcl.ac.uk

Wednesday, October 13, 2021




Nirmal Kumar Saha

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury

Published in: Rajshahi University Law Review Vol. XI, Dec. 2020; pp 69-88



Abstract

Parliamentary offices, rules and procedures in Bangladesh are broadly designed in Westminsterial norms and processes. With full recognition of the government’s right to govern and legislate, a Westminster styled parliament exists more as an institution of restraint than as one of obstruction. Parliamentary consideration of and deliberation on legislative proposals are meant to legitimize rather than prevent. Of course, the parliamentary opposition and government backbenchers must be given a right of reasonable debate and critique before they are asked to legitimize. The UK House of Commons has adopted several pro-opposition procedural devices to maximize the restraint aspect of lawmaking. The central argument of this paper is that missing those pro-opposition and backbench devices, the legislative procedure of Bangladesh constitutes a mere legitimation tool for the executive branch.




Thursday, September 30, 2021


CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF THE UNIVERSITIES

M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury*
Sakhawat Sajjat Sejan**

Bangladesh Journal of Law, Vol 19(1), June 2021, pp 33-58

A Pdf copy is available on request from:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/354960440_Constitutionalizing_the_Institutional_Autonomy_and_Academic_Freedom_of_the_Universities_-_Bangladesh_Journal_of_Law_Vol_191_June_2021_pp_33-58


ABSTRACT

Autonomous universities and their academic freedom did not get expression recognition in the Constitution of Bangladesh. While the Constitution broadly recognizes the citizens’ freedom of thought, conscience, and speech and, also that of the Press, omission of the universities needs careful reconsideration. Decline of the universities’ institutional autonomy and impairment of their faculty members’ academic freedom have shaken the morale of the university teachers and students in Bangladesh. This paper therefore argues that a constitutional reading of the institutional autonomy and academic freedom of the universities is a call of the time and it is possible. Building on the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretative recognition of the universities’ academic freedom and autonomy under the cloak of its Free Speech jurisprudence, this paper argues that Bangladesh Supreme Court’s fundamental rights and Basic Structure jurisprudences could offer similar protection to our demoralized academia. For the judiciary to do this, the legal academics in Bangladesh may need to perceive the universities as vital “fourth branch” constitutional institutions in the first place.





* M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury, PhD Candidate (Parliament Studies), King’s College London, UK, is a faculty Member at the Department of Law, University of Chittagong.

** Sakhawat Sajjat Sejan, L.L.B. and LL.M. (University of Chittagong), is a lecturer, Department of Law, Feni University.




এম জসিম আলী চৌধুরী

দৈনিক প্রথম আলো (৩০ সেপটেম্বর ২০২১) উপ-সম্পাদকীয় পাতা


প্রথম আলোর অন লাইন লিংকঃ
https://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/column/%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%80%E0%A6%AE-%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%A6%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%A6%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%95%E0%A7%80%E0%A6%95%E0%A7%87-%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%82%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%A6%E0%A7%80%E0%A7%9F-%E0%A6%95%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%9F%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%A4%E0%A7%87-%E0%A6%A4%E0%A6%B2%E0%A6%AC-%E0%A6%89%E0%A6%A6%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AC%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%97%E0%A6%9C%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%95


০৮ ফেব্রুয়ারি ২০২১ তারিখে প্রথম আলোয় প্রকাশিত অধ্যাপক তাসনীম সিদ্দিকী-র সাক্ষাৎকারটি মনোযোগ দিয়ে পড়লাম। অধ্যাপক সিদ্দিকী রেমিট্যান্স প্রবাহ বা এর প্রবৃদ্ধি সংক্রান্ত কোন পরিসংখ্যানকে সরাসরি অস্বীকার করেন নি। তিনি তাঁর নিজস্ব দৃষ্টিভঙ্গিতে প্রবসী আয় নির্ভর পরিবারগুলোর যাপিত জীবনের সাথে সরকারি পরিসংখ্যানের চোখ ধাঁধানো সংখ্যার অমিল দেখেছেন। সে সুত্রে সাক্ষাৎকারটিতে পরিসংখ্যানের গাণিতিক অংকগুলো নিয়ে উনার কিছুটা সন্দেহগ্রস্থতা প্রকাশ পেয়েছে। তিনি অবশ্য করোনাকালে প্রবাসী আয়ের এমন বিস্ময়কর ঊর্ধ্বগতিকে একেবারে উড়িয়েও দেন নি। সরকারি তথ্য নিয়ে কিছুটা সন্দেহগ্রস্থতা যে কোন গণতান্ত্রিক সমাজে এমনিতেই থাকে। একজন গবেষক ও বিশ্ববিদ্যালয় অধ্যাপকের জন্য ব্যাপারটি আরো স্বাভাবিক।
 
অধ্যাপক তাসনীম সিদ্দিকী-র সাক্ষাৎকারে কোন “সরকার বা রাষ্ট্র বিরোধী ষড়যন্ত্র” আছে এমনটি সম্ভবত খোদ সরকারও বলবেন না। উনি একটি মত প্রকাশ করেছেন। মতটি সঠিক বলে বিবেচিত না হলে সরকারের সংশ্লিষ্ট দপ্তর বা মন্ত্রণালয় একটি বিবৃতি দিতে পারেন। প্রবাসী আয় বা অর্থনীতি দেখাশুনা করেন এমন রাজনৈতিক দ্বায়িত্বশীলদের কেউ একজন আরেকটি সাক্ষাৎকার, প্রতিবাদলিপি বা মন্তব্য প্রতিবেদন পাঠিয়েও ব্যাপারটি শেষ করতে পারেন। এসব কিছু না করে অধ্যাপক তাসনীম সিদ্দিকীকে অর্থ মন্ত্রণালয় সম্পর্কিত স্থায়ী কমিটি কর্তৃক রীতিমত “ব্যাখ্যা” দিতে “তলব” করা এবং “দুঃখ প্রকাশ করা”নোর মত অবস্থা তৈরি করাটা উদ্বেগজনক।


গণতান্ত্রিক ব্যবস্থায় গবেষণা ও ভিন্ন মতের জবাব অধিকতর গবেষণা এবং আরেকটি ভিন্নমত দিয়েই দিতে হয়। চাপ সৃষ্টি করে বা জোর জবরদস্তি করে নয়। অধ্যাপক তাসনীম সিদ্দিকীর ঘটনাটি বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ের গবেষণা, চিন্তা ও মত প্রকাশের স্বাধীনতাকে সুস্পষ্টভাবে নিরুৎসাহিত করবে। সংসদীয় কমিটি-র এ পদক্ষেপ একজন সংসদ গবেষক হিসেবে আমার জন্য ব্যক্তিগতভাবেও পীড়াদায়ক।

জাতীয় সংসদের কার্যপ্রণালী বিধির ২০২(১) বিধিতে সংসদীয় কমিটিগুলোকে যে কোন ব্যক্তি, বিশেষজ্ঞ, তথ্য বা দলিল চেয়ে নোটিশ বা সমন জারি করার এখতিয়ার দেয়া আছে। ২৪৮ বিধিতে মন্ত্রণালয় সম্পর্কিত সংসদীয় স্থায়ী কমিটি গুলোকে সংশ্লিষ্ট মন্ত্রণালয় বা এ সম্পর্কিত যে কোন বিষয়ে অনুসন্ধান করার এখতিয়ার দেয়া আছে। সাধারণভাবে সংসদীয় কমিটির আমন্ত্রণে সাড়া দেয়া নাগরিকের কর্তব্য। রাষ্ট্রের প্রতিনিধত্বশীল প্রতিষ্ঠান হিসেবে শাসনযন্ত্রের জবাবদিহিতা নিশ্চিত করার গুরু দ্বায়িত্ব সংসদের এবং সংসদীয় কমিটিগুলোর। এক্ষেত্রে সরকারি আমলাদের বা পদধারীদের প্রয়োজনে তলব করে হাজির করানোর ক্ষমতা সংসদের আছে বলেই ধরে নিতে হবে।

তবে কার্যপ্রণালী বিধির ২০৩ বিধি অনুসারে কোন সমন বা তলবের প্রয়োজনীয়তা নিয়ে প্রশ্ন উঠলে সেটির ব্যাপারে সিদ্ধান্ত দেয়ার এখতিয়ার মাননীয় স্পীকারের। ২০৩ বিধিতে বলা হয়েছে এ ধরনের প্রশ্ন স্পীকারের কাছে পাঠানো হবে। ধারণা করা যেতে পারে কাজটি কমিটির সভাপতি বা সদস্য, অথবা সরকারের কোন মন্ত্রণালয় বা কর্মকর্তাকে ডাকা হলে তাঁরা কেউ করবেন। সাধারণ নাগরিকদের কাউকে ডাকা হলে তাঁর পক্ষ থেকে স্পীকারের কাছে আপত্তি জানানোর সুযোগ নেই বলেই প্রতীয়মান হয়। কারণ মাননীয় স্পীকার বিচারিক আদালত নন। সাংবিধানিক সার্বভৌমত্বে জনগণের মৌলিক অধিকার সুরক্ষিত। সংবিধান অনুসারে কাউকে জোর করে বা চাপ দিয়ে জবানবন্দী নেয়ার বা বক্তব্য আদায় করানোর সুযোগ নেই। বাংলাদেশ সুপ্রিম কোর্টের প্রতিষ্ঠিত জুরিস্প্রুডেন্স বলছে, সংসদীয় কমিটি বা এমনকি জাতীয় সংসদ নিজেও সাংবিধানিক সীমাবদ্ধতার বাইরে নন।

বাংলাদেশের মত যুক্তরাষ্ট্রও একটি সাংবিধানিক সার্বভৌমত্বের দেশ। মার্কিন কংগ্রেসের বিভিন্ন কমিটিগুলো অহরহ বিভিন্ন অনুসন্ধান, তদন্ত করেন। বিভিন্ন শ্রেণী পেশার বিশেষজ্ঞ, সাক্ষী বা এমন কি কোন কোন অভিযুক্তকেও কমিটির সামনে আসতে সমন দেয়া হয়। মার্কিন সুপ্রিম কোর্ট কাউকে সমন জারী করে কমিটির সামনে হাজির করানো অথবা কেউ সমন অবজ্ঞা করলে তাঁর ব্যাপারে সংসদ অবমাননার অভিযোগে ব্যবস্থা নেয়ার ক্ষমতাকে কংগ্রেসের অন্তর্নিহিত এখতিয়ার বলে স্বীকার করেন। তবে ১৯৫৭ সালের ওয়াটকিনস বনাম যুক্তরাষ্ট্র, ১৯৬১ সালের উইলকিনসন বনাম যুক্তরাষ্ট্র, এবং ১৯৭৫ সালের ইস্টল্যান্ড বনাম যুক্তরাষ্ট্র মামলায় মার্কিন সুপ্রিম কোর্ট এটিও প্রতিষ্ঠিত করে দিয়েছেন যে কংগ্রেসের সমন জারি করার এখতিয়ার নাগরিকের সাংবিধানিক অধিকারের বাইরে নয়। কংগ্রেসের সমনটি অবশ্যই এর এসেন্সিয়াল লেজিসলেটিভ বিজনেস এর সাথে সামঞ্জস্যপূর্ণ হতে হবে।

শুধুমাত্র কংগ্রেসের সমালোচনা বা কংগ্রেসের রাজনৈতিক ব্যক্তিবর্গের জন্য রাজনৈতিক ভাবে অস্বস্থিকর কোন কাজ, তথ্য প্রকাশ বা বক্তব্যের জন্য কোন সাধারণ নাগরিককে তলব করে কৈফিয়ত দাবী করার এখতিয়ার কংগ্রেসের বা কংগ্রেসীয় কমিটির নেই। বাস্তবতা হচ্ছে, মার্কিন কংগ্রেস গত কয়েক দশকের ইতিহাসে কোন সমন অমান্যকারীকে সংসদ অবমাননার‍ অভিযোগে অভিযুক্ত করে শাস্তি দেয়ার চেষ্টাও করেন নি।

পৃথিবীর সবচেয়ে পুরনো সংসদ ব্রিটিশ পার্লামেন্টও একই চেতনা ধারণ করেন। মার্কিন কংগ্রেস বা আমাদের জাতীয় সংসদের তুলনায় ব্রিটিশ পার্লামেন্ট অধিকতর শক্তিশালী। ওখানে সংবিধান নয়, সংসদীয় সার্বভৌমত্ব চলে। তারপরও ইতিহাস বলছে, হাউস অব কমন্স সর্বশেষ কাউকে সংসদ অবমাননার অভিযোগে শাস্তি দিয়েছেন সেই ১৬৬৬ সালে। ২০১৩ সালে হাউস অব কমন্স ও হাউস অব লর্ডস এর যৌথ উদ্যোগে গঠিত একটি সংসদীয় কমিটি (Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege) সংসদ অবমাননাকে ফৌজদারি প্রক্রিয়ায় মোকাবেলা করার চেষ্টা থেকে বিরত থাকার কথা বলেন।

আসল কথা হল, সংসদীয় কমিটির পক্ষ থেকে কোন নাগরিককে তলব করার এবং কৈফিয়ত চাওয়ার ক্ষমতা অস্বীকার করা না হলেও, এ ক্ষমতার সাংবিধানিক সীমাবদ্ধতা স্বীকৃত। এ ধরনের তলব করা ও কৈফিয়ত চাওয়ার সাথে নাগরিকের মত প্রকাশের স্বাধীনতা (সংবিধানের ৩৯ অনুচ্ছেদ), জোর পূর্বক বক্তব্য বা স্বীকৃতি আদায় হতে রক্ষা পাওয়ার স্বাধীনতা (সংবিধানের ৩৫(৪) অনুচ্ছেদ), বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়গুলোর স্বায়ত্বশাসন, গবেষণা, চিন্তা ও মত প্রকাশের একাডেমিক স্বাধীনতা, এবং ক্ষেত্রবিশেষে সাংবিধানিক আদালতের এখতিয়ারের প্রশ্ন গভীরভাবে জড়িত। তাছাড়া কোন সরকারি তথ্য ও পরিসংখ্যান নিয়ে কোন নাগরিকের দ্বিমত থাকলে তাঁর কৈফিয়ত তলব করা সংসদীয় কমিটির কাজ কিনা অথবা সেটি সংসদের এসেন্সিয়াল লেজিসলেটিভ বিজনেস কিনা সে প্রশ্নও ব্যাপকভাবে আসতে পারে।

আলোচ্য সাক্ষাৎকারে অধ্যাপক তাসনীম সিদ্দিকী সংসদ অবমাননা করেছেন বলে কোন অভিযোগ নেই। গণতন্ত্রে সংসদ নামের প্রতিষ্ঠানটিই যেখানে মত, দ্বিমত ও ভিন্নমত প্রকাশের সুযোগ অবারিত রাখার জন্য প্রতিষ্ঠিত, সেখানে এ ধরনের “তলব” খুব উদ্বেগজনক। এটি উদ্বেগজনক কারণ, রেমিট্যান্স বা প্রবাসী আয় সংক্রান্ত ইস্যুতে অধ্যাপক তাসনীম সিদ্দিকীর মন্তব্যে নির্বাহী বিভাগ বা মন্ত্রণালয় ক্ষুদ্ধ হতে পারেন। সেক্ষেত্রে সংশ্লিষ্ট মন্ত্রণালয় যদি অধ্যাপক সিদ্দিকীর উপর কোন চাপ সৃষ্টি করতে চান, তাহলে ওই মন্ত্রণালয় সংক্রান্ত সংসদীয় কমিটির দ্বায়িত্ব হবে তাঁকে বরং সুরক্ষা দেয়া। সংবিধানে সংসদ আছে নির্বাহী বিভাগের সমালোচনাকে উৎসাহিত করে নির্বাহী বিভাগের জবাবদিহিতা নিশ্চিত করতে। সংসদীয় কমিটিগুলোর দ্বায়িত্ব হচ্ছে নির্বাহী বিভাগের জবাবদিহিতা নিশ্চিত করা, নির্বাহী বিভাগের সমালোচকদের চাপে রাখা নয়।

এম জসিম আলী চৌধুরী
চট্টগ্রাম বিশ্ববিদ্যালয় আইন বিভাগের সহকারী অধ্যাপক ও
যুক্তরাজ্যের কিংস কলেজ লন্ডন এর সংসদ বিষয়ক পিএইচডি গবেষক।

Sunday, August 29, 2021


  

Parliaments during the Pandemic:

A “Dual State” explanation of Bangladesh Jatya Sangsad


M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury*

Raihan Rahman Rafid**

[Published in Bangladesh Journal of Law, Vol 18(1-2) 2020 pp 25-52; Published by - Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs (BILIA), Dhaka, Bangladesh; For full-text of the article click: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353958250_Parliaments_during_the_Pandemic_A_Dual_State_Explanation_of_Bangladesh_Parliament_Jatya_Sangsad ]





Abstract

This article seeks to theorise the Parliament of Bangladesh (JatiyaSangsad)’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic in light of the normative traits of global parliamentary responses to the public health emergency.It is argued that while the pandemic has contributed to the executive aggrandizement in established and unstable democracies alike, it has irreversibly marginalised the legislatures in countries with “pre-existing conditions” like democratic decay, elected authoritarianism etc. This article adopts the “Dual State” thesis expounded by Csaba Győry and Nyasha Weinberg in relation to Hungary and uses it as a theoretical lens to look through the Bangladesh Parliament’s performance during the pandemic. It concludes that Bangladesh’s total neglect of parliament as an institution of relevance during the pandemic is relatable to the Hungarian or Georgian style “Dual State” approach to the crisis and this might end up normalising a perpetual marginalisation of the JatyaSangadas an institution of accountability.


*PhD Candidate (Parliament Studies), King’s College London, UK, Email: m.chowdhury@kcl.ac.uk.

**Associate, The Old Baily Chambers, Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Dhaka, Email: raihanrrahman@gmail.com.


Saturday, July 31, 2021

 Trumpian assault on the U.S. Democracy:

Lessons we could learn

 

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chittagong &

Ph.D. Candidate (Legislative Studies), King’s College London.

Published in the SCLS Blog,  24 May 2021. 

Post Link: https://sclsbd.org/trumpian-assault-on-the-us-democracy-lessons-we-could-learn/ 


Donald Trump’s egregious assault on the U.S. constitutional edifice was a nerve-breaking experience for the century-old American democracy. It was unbelievable, and understandably unconsumable, for the Americans by any stretch of imagination. Yet it happened and the American constitutional pundits are yet to reel out of the nightmare. Some has seen this as a failure of “an obsolete eighteenth-century constitutional framework” and a looming threat to the future (Michel Rosenfeld, ‘The 2020 US Presidential Election: A Victory for the Democrats but a Threat to Democracy’, IACL-AIDC Blog, 14 January 2021)Now, what the Trumpian insurrection could mean for a nascent democracy like ours? Or, to put the question in a more relevant way - Could our Parliament survive such an assault?



From our side of the spectacle, the way the resilient U.S. Congress bounced back upon the cancerous Trumpism should be a very big eye-opener. While we may not overlook some of the age-related strains in America’s constitutional system, the backbone of the structure has survived the test of time. Decline of democratic norms and institutions is not an unknown phenomenon for our time. Trump, however, shows that even the U.S. is not immune from the challenge. Systems’ strength and resilience are proved only when they are tested through bad times. A resilient system should be capable to absorb shocks, cope crises, withstand threats and provide the means of its continued existence(Peter Burnell & Peter Calvert (1999), ‘The Resilience of Democracy: An Introduction, 6(1) Democratisation, 1). This “perseverance despite” of the U.S. constitutional machinery is what we should look into. It appears that four important institutions of democracy have saved the day for the Americans - a workable and solid system of separation between the legislative, judicial and executive branches, a decentralized and internally democratic party system, a generally indomitable system of electioneering and an independent and powerful media and civil society.

After all, Trump has been defeated badly. His arm twisting of the election officials has failed. His appointees in the federal judiciary did not come to his aid. State legislatures controlled by his party did not succumb to his pressure to disenfranchise the American people and replace the electoral college members for him. His lies, conspiracy theories and conservative propaganda machines have been countered by an equally forceful progressive media, civil service and civil society. The Congress has created history by impeaching him twice – the last one with bipartisan support. Almost all the Senators from his party defied his intimidation and certified Biden’s victory on the same fateful night of his insurrectionist assault.

To talk about the U.S. Congress specifically, the strength of the congressional committees, party caucuses and congressional bureaucracy proved crucial. There are three explanations behind this. First, decentralisation of parties, bottom up democracy within those and elected congressmen’s autonomy of conscience have facilitated the process. Secondly, the U.S. version of separation of power has supplied the Congress with necessary resources and tools to meet the robust presidential bureaucracy with a counter legislative bureaucracy comprising independent committees, subcommittees, their members, and staffs. Separation of power has brought with it a rule of comity whereby organs do not interfere with each other's institutional arrangements, staff, and finances. Thirdly, the American peoples' habitual suspicion of the government establishment at Washington DC have created an electoral disincentive for individual congressmen to pursue the path of raw partisanship or crude hero-worship (Malcolm Shaw, ‘Parliamentary Committees: A global perspective’ (1998) 4(1), Journal of Legislative Studies225).

Looking back to our own legislative branch, we find a very gloomy picture instead. There are three reasons here as well. First, the undemocratic and parochial party structure, the parliamentarians’ crude subjectivity to partisanship, and their hero-worshiping loyalty to persons rather than their institution have tainted the parliament’s capability in general. Secondly, the problem is more acute in the committees. Parliament lacks the financial and administrative autonomy to establish a legislative counter bureaucracy. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) once conducted a diagnostic study on the administrative arrangements of Bangladesh parliament. The Report observes that organisation of the parliament secretariat itself is "a serious barrier" to its autonomy (A.T.M. Obaidullah, ‘Standing Committees on Ministries in the Bangladesh Parliament: The Need for Reorganisation’ (2011) 18(2) South Asian Survey 317, 322).With itssecretariat sunk in the vortex of executive bureaucracy, the parliament is disproportionately weak vis-à-vis the government. Article 79 of the Constitution has mandate for a separate secretariat for parliament, which is presumed to be manned and maintained under the Parliament's own rules and regulations. Governments after governments have prevented the House from making these rules and then used the vacuum as an excuse to flood the parliament secretariat with executive bureaucrats. Secretariat staff deputed from the bureaucracy are temperamentally hostile to the notion of parliamentary oversight over the government and bureaucracy. Thirdly, the state scepticism of the American people is not a gift of party politics. It is rather groomed and nurtured by a fourth branch – whom Bruce Ackerman calls the ‘democracy branch’ (The New Separation of Powers, Harvard. Law Review, Vol 113 Issue 3 (2000) 633-725). The fourth branch institutions like civil society, mass media and accountability organisations like ombudsman, anti-corruption commission, human rights commission, information commission, etc work outside the three traditional branches of state. These institutions offer a powerful resistance to misappropriation of legislative, executive, and judicial authorities and create an alternative reservoir of public accountability which the politicians cannot simply ignore.

One of our key arguments against the erstwhile caretaker government was based on the representative quality of governance. We argued that the non-existence of parliament during the so-called caretaker government was a threat to democracy and invitation to the unconstitutional adventurists. Now, the phenomenon of Donald Trump tells that mere existence of a tamed legislature and kneeling fourth branch institutions are not the adequate guarantees either.


 Judicial Protection of Religious Neutrality:

The U.S. and European Experiences

 

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury

Doctoral Candidate, King's College London, United Kingdom

Md.Jahedul Islam

Apprentice Advocate, Judges' Court, Chittagong, Bangladesh

Published in SCLS Law Review Vol. 4. No.2 [May. 2021], pp 1-6

Article Link: https://sclsbd.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/05.-Religious-Neutrality-Jurisprudence-of-America-and-Europe-Jashim-Ali-and-Jahedul-Islam.pdf  


Page 1



Abstract

There is a rise of religious extremism and intolerance and omnipotence of dominant religion even in traditionally liberal societies. Facing such reality, the judiciary may not simply ignore the constitutional and political contexts in which the dominant and non-dominant religious groups exist and interact. Democracy being a rule of the majority, protection of the minority always remains troublesome. Some argue that the judiciary can sometimes stand between crude majoritarian politics and the helpless religious minorities by halting illiberal retrogression through itsapparently unpopular decisions. They can do this by anticipating the problems in advance and slowing the process of degradation by issuing prophylactic rulings. In the process, the courts can help prevent the problem of religious intolerance from arising at all. Some other scholarsclaim that without support from civil society and people in general, the courts are less likely to make any visible difference in this reagard.This paper briefly examines the comparative religious neutrality jurisprudences from the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights.It argues that the U.S. and European courts are taking clues from populist and majoritarian governments and societies. Hence judicial protection of the states’ religious neutrality and rights of the religious minorities are at greater risk than ever.

 

1. Introduction

Democracy, by its nature being a rule of the majority, the protection of the minority always remains troublesome. The judiciary’s role in checking the majoritarian populism has been highlighted by theories like “representation reinforcement”,[1]“counter-majoritarian representation and enlightenment”,[2] and “prophylactic judicial decision making”,[3] Scholars like Issacharoff[4] and Choudhury[5] also underscored the contribution of the judiciary in 


[1] American scholar John  Hart Ely’s famous representation reinforcement theory argues that courts may act as a representative voice for the minorities who are less likely to have their voice heard in majoritarian political discourse. A minority who is not a kingmaker or a significant voting block is less likely to be attended by the political parties and their leaders. For details see: John H. Ely, ‘Toward a Representation-reinforcing Mode of Judicial Review’ (1978) 37(3) Maryland Law Review 451.

[2] Luis R.Barrosso argues that apart from serving the interest of the unpopular minorities in a majoritarian democratic system (counter majoritarianism), courts may enlightening non-liberal societies by its liberal and progressive judgments. For details see: L R Barroso, ‘Counter majoritarian, Representative, and Enlightened: The Roles of Constitutional Courts in Democracies’ (2019) 67(1) The American Journal of Comparative Law 109.

[3]German scholar Prendergast argues that progressive and pro-minority courts may play the role of checking the growth and spread (prophylactic) of the societal disease of illiberalism, intolerance and minority repression. For details see: David Prendergast, ‘The judicial role in protecting democracy from populism’ (2019) 20 German Law Journal 245.

[4] Samuel Issacharoff, ‘Constitutional Courts and Democratic Hedging’ (2011) 99 Georgetown Law Journal 961.

[5] Sujit Choudhury, ‘“He Had a Mandate”: The South African Constitutional Court and the African National Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy’ (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 1.


Page 2

checking political monopolisation, etc. The basic argument of these theories is that judicial review can sometimes stand between crude majoritarianism and democratic decay either by halting the retrogression through an unpopular decision or by anticipating the problems in advance and slowing the process of degradation by issuing preventive or prophylactic rulings and help prevent the problem from arising at all. There are, however, doubtful views as well. Daly[6] is rather cautiously optimistic about the capability of the judiciary in protecting liberal democratic ideals. He argues that absent support from civil society and people in general, the courts are less likely to make any visible difference.

When the question comes to the state's religious neutrality, the courts' problems are multiplied. There is a global rise of religious extremism and intolerance and omnipotence dominant religion even in traditionally liberal societies. Religion, by its nature, being a matter of passion, protection of unpopular religious minority is further problematic. The task of balancing the competing religious rights and the states' secular interests is not always straightforward. It is context-specific, and the judiciary may not simply ignore constitutional and political contexts in which dominant and non-dominant religious groups exist and interact.[7]

This paper draws a brief outline of the comparative American and European jurisprudence on constitutional rights and religious neutrality. It would show how the U.S. Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have struggled to draw a fine line between religious neutrality and dominant religious traditions. To identify the “dilemma of God and Cesare”[8] there, we take the non-establishment and free exercise clauses of the U.S. First Amendment[9] and compare the U.S. Supreme Court and European courts' jurisprudence.

 

2. The United States’Dilapidated “Wall of Separation”.

The First Clause – Non-establishment clause - of the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment prohibits the state from establishing any particular religion as a favoured or official one. President Thomas Jefferson famously described this as a watertight "wall of separation"[10] between State and religion. A prominent U.S. judicial precedent on the non-establishment clause in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602(1971). In this case, a unanimous Supreme Court declared any direct government assistance to religious schools is unconstitutional. The court created what is now known as the Lemon Test or Secular PurposeTest for deciding whether a 


[6] Tom G. Daly, ‘The Alchemists: Courts as Democracy-Builders in Contemporary Thought’ (2017) 6 (1) Global Constitutionalism101.

[7]Thio Li-Ann, ‘Courting Religion: The Judge Between Caesar and God in Asian Courts’ (2009) Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 52.

[8]ibid, 55.

[9]The First Amendment of the US Constitution provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

[10]Immediately after accession to the Presidency in 1800, Thomas Jefferson wrote to a letter to a Baptist Church from Danbury, Connecticut, in which he explained his beliefs about the meaning of the Establishment Clause. Jefferson assured the congregation that the federal government could not interfere with their church or offer special favors to any particular sect. He wrote: “I contemplate with sovereign reverence that acts of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church & State.” See: Letters between Thomas Jefferson and the Danbury Baptists Association (1802), The Church congratulating the newly sworn President and the President’s reply on January 1, 1800.


Page 3

law violates the non-establishment clause. Under the rule, any policy having a secular purpose - not advancing or inhibiting any religion in its primary or principal effect and not inviting excessive government entanglement with religion - would survive the constitutional scrutiny even though such policy may indirectly benefit religious schools, communities, or institutions.[11] In line with this, several pre-and post-Lemon cases upheld indirect assistance to religious, educational institutions relying on justifications like "secular policy,""religious neutrality”,[12] and “parental choice”,[13], etc.

Lemon’s secular purpose test, however, appeared unsuitable for cases regarding public display of religious monuments, statues, sculptures, artifacts, symbols, and traditional religious prayers in state functions. In these matters, the U.S. Supreme Court rather relied on “customary and historical practice doctrine”.[14] Under the concept, while the state takes the public significance of the dominant religious practices into account, it does not convey or attempt to convey that one religion is favoured or preferred over another.[15]In this analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court upholds ritualistic prayers in state functions[16]as historical practices. It, however, invalidated mandated posting of religious symbols,[17] organized prayer[18], and even optional daily devotional scripture reading[19] in public schools. Those practices were seen establishing one religion over others.

While it is not our intention to label the "customary and historical practice doctrine" as a crude establishment of the dominant religion, the U.S. Supreme Court'sattempt to secularise these dominant religious precepts for certain public purposes[20]indicates the impossibility of erecting a watertight wall of separation between the religion and state. In this sense, the historical practice doctrine's claim that those practices do not "advance or endorse any favoured religion" is paradoxical. The U.S. Supreme Court's non-establishment jurisprudence is likely to face difficult questions if the precepts of non-dominant religions, Islam, for example, are tested against the principles already set. It is doubtful whether the U.S. Supreme 


[11]DaanBrayeman, ‘The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality (1986) 45(2) Maryland Law Review 352.

[12] In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639 (2002) where a state voucher program was allegedly used by the parents for sending their children to private religious schools. Like the Everson court, a 5-4 majority of the bench held that the voucher program offered religiously neutral benefit for public and private schools. Once the program is proved to be religiously neutral, it was a matter of parental choice where to use the voucher.

[13] In Board of Education v. Allen 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the court upheld a law requiring public schools to lend books to private schools including the religious ones. Finding the law as a religiously neutral one, it was applicable irrespective of religions and beliefs and it had not established any particular religion. In Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), the court permitted Indian tribal funds' expenditure, given to the tribe by the federal government under treaty obligations, to support religious schools chosen by the tribe. The decision held that the Indians had treaty rights to the funds. The tribe, not the federal government, decided how to use them after incorporating the 'Establishment Clause' in the U.S.A. Constitution, many other countries also adopted a similar concept in their constitutions.

[14]Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); Lynch v. Donnelly 465 U.S. 668 (1984); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).

[15]Donald L. Beschle, ‘Does the Establishment Clause Matter? Non-Establishment Principle in the Unites States and Canada’ (2002) 4(3) University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 451, 454-60.

[16]Marsh v. Chambers463 U.S. 783 (1983).

[17]Stone v. Graham 449 U.S. 39 (1980).

[18]Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).

[19]Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

[20] The dissenting judgement of Lynch tried to separate those practice from their religious roots and suggested that these religious symbols were only acceptable because they were a form of “‘ceremonial deism’, protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious content” Lynch v. Donnelly 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984).



Page 4

Court would apply the same “secular purpose”,“religious neutrality”, or “parental choice” doctrines to cases where some state funding could have gone to Islamic or other non-dominant religious schools. It also appears unlikely that public display of any sculpture or symbols associated with Islamic or any other non-dominant religious traditions would survive the “historical or customary practice” doctrine. Reasons behind this doubt get some foothold when we see the recent Muslim Ban judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court - Trump v Hawaii. The Court has controversially discarded Lemon's strict scrutiny of the “secular purpose” test and rather applied a “rational basis test” to Donald Trump's infamous Muslim Travel Ban despite overwhelming evidence of religious bigotry in Donal Trump. The court held that Donald Trump had a rational basis for forming an opinion on the necessity of the alleged immigration regulation, and the court was not in a position to judge the correctness or incorrectness of the president's views.[21]

 

2.1.The U.S. Supreme Court’s Slippery Standards of Religious Freedom

The second clause – The free exercise clause – of the U.S. First Amendment guarantees freedom of religion for all. In religious freedom cases, the U.S. Supreme Court - depending on a liberal or conservative majority in the bench - has switched back and forth between “compelling state interest” and “secular purposes” behind freedom restriction.[22] As per the “compelling state interest” test - also known as theSherberttest[23] -  the state would need to show a compelling interest in suppressing any one religious practice. While this principle has been applied to bar the customary practice of polygamy of one religious minority,[24]it was disapplied to protect a Jew employee’s right not to work on Saturday (Sabbath).[25]It was also disapplied to protect some parents' right to ensure the religious upbringing of their children even though such allowance could moderately violate compulsory public-school attendance law.[26]

The “compelling state interest” test was later substituted by a “non-discriminatory application” test in Oregon v Smith.[27] In this case, an employee was fired for sacramental use of peyote, a legally prohibited drug in Oregon. She was denied unemployment benefits later. The conservative majority in the U.S. Supreme Court held that religious denominations are not free to disregard the generally applicable law of the land on the excuse of their religious norms. The state, in such cases, would not be required to show a compelling interest in regulating the religious practice concerned. It will be enough if the state could show the existence of a religiously neutral law and if the state shows that the law is applied non-discriminatorily to all the citizens of all religions. In response to Oregon v. Smith, the Democrat-controlled U.S. Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 



[21]Trump v. Hawaii138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).

[22] Kathryn Page Camp, In God We Trust: How the Supreme Court’s First Amendment Decisions Affect Organized Religion, (2006, KP/PK Publishing, 2006) 47-64.

[23] Named after the Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) case.

[24]Reynolds v. United States98 U.S. 145 (1879) (rejecting the polygamous marriage tradition of the "old order" Mormon).

[25]Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (protecting an employee right not to work on Saturday (Sabbath) as there was not compelling state interest in forcing some employees to work on Saturday)

[26]Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) Compulsory school attendance law which required all children to attend public or private school until attaining the age of 16 was questioned in this case by parents belonging to Amish religious denomination. It was held that the burden placed on religious practices by Wisconsin's compulsory education law outweighed the general interest of the state in educating its citizens. Forgoing one to two years of compulsory education would not impair the welfare of their children or society as a whole.

[27]Oregon v. Smith 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (The Free Exercise Clause, never “relieves an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”(p 879)).


Page 5

and restored Sherbert's“compelling state interest” criteria. The RFRA would require the states to show that there was a compelling interest behind the restriction imposed. States will also need to show that the action taken was the least restrictive means possible to serve the interest. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, struck down the RFRA in Boerne v. Flores.[28]

 

3. Religious Neutrality and Religious Freedom Jurisprudence of ECtHR

Compared to the U.S. Supreme Court’s subtle predicament to an unpopular religion, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)’s antipathy towards the region’s most unpopular religion expressed in the Islamic veil judgments discussed later - is rather crude. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the ECtHR has upheld the states' direct subsidy for religious instruction[29] and institutions.[30] Like the U.S. Supreme Court, the ECtHR agreed that symbols of the dominant religion might have become sufficiently secularised and historical to justify their state-sponsored expression and displays. But where the U.S. Supreme Court would not justify the mandated display of those in school setups, the ECtHR would.[31]

In relation to the protection of religious freedom, particularly that of the minority Muslims, the ECtHR is notoriously illiberal. While some European nations have shown enhanced interest in protecting the rights of unpopular minorities over the reservation of dominant groups,[32] some other nations, including the ECtHR, have refused to be generous. The French and Belgian courts and the ECtHR’s reservation on Islamic Veil or Burka appear comparable to the U.S. Supreme Court's anti-RFRA position. In this scenario, an unpopular religious minority's practice is likely to be suppressed if it contradicts the subjective perception of the majority. In S.A.S. v. France, the ECtHR upheld France's ban on the full-face veil, holding that though wearing the veil was a valid exercise of religion, it prevented people of France from “living together in the space of socialization”.[33] A similar decision was made in two Belgian cases, Dakir v. Belgium and Belcacemi and Oussarv. Belgium.[34] While the ECtHR 


[28]City of Boerne v. Flores 521 U.S. 507 (1997); For a discussion of the Boerne case, see: David M Ackerman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Its Rise, Fall, and Current Status, Report, June 25, 1998 (Washington D.C: University of North Texas Libraries)<https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs570/> accessed April 17, 2021.

[29] In 1996, the ECtHR held that a nonbeliever may be required to pay the proportion of taxes to a state church. It argued that the church used that money for carrying out “secular functions” (Kustannus Oy VapaaAjattelua Ab and Others v. Finland, App. No. 2047/92 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996). See also - X v. The United Kingdom App. No. 7782/77 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978).

[30]Darby v. Sweden App. No. 15581/85 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990).

[31] In Classroom Crucifix II Case, Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, 93 BVerfGE 1 (1995) held that “the cross cannot be divested of its specific reference to the beliefs of Christianity and be reduced to a general token of the Western cultural tradition” (para 3(a)). The ECtHR, however, did not accept the German reasoning. It instead endorsed an Italian one Lautsi v. Italy, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011). In Lautsi, the ECtHR agreed that “beyond its religious meaning, the crucifix symbolised the principles and values which formed the foundation of democracy and western civilisation, and that its presence in classrooms was justifiable” (para 67). See: Justin Collings, Democracy's Guardians A History of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 1951-2001(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). See also: Jeroen Temperman (ed), The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom (Brill Nijhoff 2012) 81.

[32] In McFarlane v. Relate Avon Industries the UK Court of Appeal denounce a claimant who refused to offer sexual counseling to same-sex couples because of his Christian beliefs.In Ladele v. London Borough of Islington, the Court of Appeal similarly denounced a registrar of births, deaths, and marriages who refused to officiate at civil partnerships between same-sex couples on the ground her religious conviction.

[33]SAS v France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341 para 122, 125–27, 142. See also: ECHR Press Release, French ban on the wearing in public of clothing designed to conceal one’s face does not breach the Convention, (1st July 2014); available at:https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-4809142-5861661&filename=003-4809142-5861661.pdf, accessed on 17 April 2021.

[34]Dakir, App. No. 4619/12, Eur. Ct. H.R.; Belcacemi, App. No. 37798/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. Also: Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June, 29 2004), affirmed in App. No. 44774/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov, 10, 2005).


Page 6

did not adequately explain how and why “living together in the space of socialization” could be affected by Muslim women wearing face covers,[35] the judgment is criticized for being discriminatory to the minority Muslims.[36] Also, the ECtHR's perception of the Islamic veil as a symbol of women suppression subjective and based on a presumption that all Muslim women are invariably “forced” to wear those.[37] It is also argued that the ECHR's concern about the “risk that results from allowing veils in public spaces” is not substantiated by any empirical evidence and is based on the subjective perception of the majority. Hence the restriction imposed is disproportionate to the purpose sought to be achieved.[38]


4. Concluding Note

This brief discussion on the religious neutrality and religious freedom jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court and European Court of Human Rights shows that a watertight separation between religion and state has been rhetoric in the West rather than reality. The West’s jurisprudence of secularism is not fully convergent to its theoretical commitment to religious freedom and neutrality.[39]With the wall of separation blurring, the protection of unpopular religious minorities is not very smooth, particularly when the courts have shown a controversial level of deference to the tides of religious populism. Protection of religious neutrality and freedom is context-specific. “Judicial populism”[40] and “abusive judicial reviews”[41] are particularly prone to develop in this area. It is particularly problematic when dominant religious groups take a suppressive posture. Once it starts to take its root, religious populism spreads quickly and wide. It is not unlikely that the judiciary also starts taking clues from the populist movements, parties, and governments. Doing this, the judiciary ventures a path of judicial populism and/or abusive exercise of judicial powers. The overall trend of the U.S. and European jurisprudence – as shown by the American Trump v. Hawaii Muslim Ban and European Burqa Ban cases – is in this direction.


[35]JasoerDoomen, ‘A Veiled Threat: Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium’ (2018) 20(2) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 190.

[36] Kati Nieminen, ‘Eroding the protection against discrimination: The procedural and de-contextualised approach to S.A.S. v France’, (2019) 19(2) International Journal of Discrimination and the Law69; See also: Eva Brems, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and Face Veil Bans’ (2018) E-International Relations; available at: https://www.e-ir.info/2018/02/21/the-european-court-of-human-rights-and-face-veil-bans/accessed on April 17, 2021.

[37]Eva Brems, Face veil bans in the European Court of Human Rights: The Importance of Empirical Findings’ (2014) 22(2) Journal of Law and Policy 517.

[38]ShairaNanwani, The Burqa Ban: An Unreasonable Limitation on Religious Freedom or a Justifiable Restriction? (2011) 25(3) Emory International Law Review 1431.

[39] Brett G Scharffs, ‘The (not so) Exceptional Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution’ (2018) 33(2) Journal of Law and Religion 137.

[40] Anya Bernstein and Glen Staszewski, ‘Judicial Populism’ (2020) University at Buffalo School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-005; available at:<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3694132> accessed 17 April 2021. 

[41] David Landau and Rosalind Dixon, ‘Abusive Judicial Review: Courts Against Democracy’ (2020) 53(3) University of California, Davis Law Review 1313.

অতিরিক্ত বিচারপতিদের স্থায়ীকরণ প্রসঙ্গে মহামান্য আপিল বিভাগের সাম্প্রতিক রায়: একটি প্রাথমিক মূল্যায়ন ল'ইয়ার্স ক্লাব বাংলাদেশ সাক্ষাৎকার ...