Parliamentary Questions in Bangladesh

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chittagong &

PhD Candidate (Parliament Studies), King’s College London

Published in the Daily Observer, Law and Justice, July 20, 2019

Link: https://www.observerbd.com/details.php?id=208381 

Collective activities of law making, budget and committee inquiries in Westminster parliaments are dominated by government and parties. Individual MPs have tools like adjournment motions, private member resolutions, points of order, call attention notices, half-an-hour discussion and parliamentary questions. Being the most frequent part of parliamentary calendar, members’ access to the question-answer session is relatively open. Despite its theatrical tune, question constitutes the most visible accountability ritual for parliament. Bangladeshi question time unfortunately is stressed by some significant procedural, attitudinal and structural hurdles.

Parliamentary Questions are asked and answered during the first hour of every sitting day except the day of presidential speech and budget (Rule 41, Rules of Procedure). At the beginning of each session, rotation of question time for different ministries are decided by the Speaker in consultation with ministers (Rule 47). MPs submit notice of their questions at least fifteen days prior to the day assigned for the ministry concerned (Rule 42). Urgent or short notice questions are not easily entertained. The Speaker may allow it only if the minister concerned agrees. Even if the minister agrees, it would take around five sitting days to be answered (Rule 59). 

Questions are categorised either as starred questions requiring oral answer in the floor and as unstarred questions sufficing with written answers (Rule 44). Interestingly, answer to the starred questions are also printed in advance and the minister read it out orally. Once answered, the Speaker would usually allow supplementary questions by the member asking the original question and any other member Speaker chooses (Rule 56). In cases of unstarred questions printed answers are laid before the floor and there is no scope of supplementary question (Rule 51). Marked starred or unstarred at the speaker’s satisfaction, ultimate fate of a question depends greatly on the Speaker’s proactivity and the government’s willingness to face it (State of Governance in Bangladesh 2008, Institute of Governance Studies, BRAC University, p 42). 

Accountability may be suppressed by spin doctoring the process in two ways. First, tabling of an oral answer, instead of reading it out, would mean that it will in effect be turned into a unstarred question. Members would be denied supplementary questions. Rate of tabling in Bangladesh is unfortunately as high as 90 percent in the third parliament. Second, ministers may effectively kill a question by requesting the Speaker in advance to defer a question to another day (Rule 52). Absent the members’ power to compel an answer, it may never be answered, and the question would lapse (Nizam Ahmed, The Parliament of Bangladesh: A Data Handbook, 2013, p 219-20). 

As a follow-up to an answer given, a member may issue a three days’ notice requesting a half-an-hour discussion. Half-an-hour discussion is attempted to seek further clarification of any points made by the minister in his answer. It comprises a short statement from the member and a reply from the minister concerned. A maximum of two other members may participate by asking questions (Rule 60). Here again the Speaker holds a wide discretion to accept or reject such notice. S/he may even reject if it ‘seeks to revise the policy of the Government’. This being a very protectionist threshold, statistics show that until the Ninth Parliament only 2.9 percent of half-an-hour discussion notice were entertained. 81.4 percent of them got rejected straight and others stood lapsed or withdrawn (Nizam Ahmed, Data Hand Book. p 223). 

Talking from an attitudinal perspective, the MPs, government and Speakers alike have failed to treat the question time from its accountability point of view. Members of parliament have traditionally prioritised their constituency concerns over the accountability aspect. A study over 130 sample questions from the Eighth Parliament indicated that around 40.77 percent of the questions involved constituency issues. Some 39 percent were mere would-you-tell-type questions that sought exploratory statements on national and contentious political issues. Another 29.23 percent were what-is-your-plan type explanatory questions. To our utter disgrace, no critical why-questions were asked during this period (Mustafizur Rahman, Parliament and Good Governance: A Bangladesh Perspective, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 2008, p 48). Even an earlier study covering the First to Fourth Parliaments confirms that not more than 10.05 percent questions had why-type accountability tunes (Aminuzzaman, Institutional Processes and Practices of Administrative Accountability: Role of the Jatya Sangsad, South Asian Studies, 1993, p 55).

Speakers’ neutrality is extremely important for a fruitful question time. Our Speaker has a wide discretion in relation to approval or denial of questions. S/he may disallow questions even on very vague grounds like ‘obstructing or prejudicially affecting the procedure of the House’ (Rule 55) and addressing ‘policy too large to be dealt within the time limits’ (Rule 53). Successive Speakers have rejected questions on mere technical grounds and failed to raise above partisan tendencies in conducting the sessions. Speakers also took a deferential approach to ministerial disinterest in questions and deliberate avoidance of answering. Statistics until the Ninth Parliament suggests that around 45 percent of the accepted questions were answered. While around 15-20 percent questions are rejected on procedural grounds, around 40 percent of the accepted questions became tamadi or lapsed (The Parliament of Bangladesh: Representation and Accountability, CPD-CMI Working Paper 2, 2012, p 54). Again, that no half-an-hour discussion took place in the seventh, eighth and ninth parliaments would perhaps evidence the successive speakers’ unwillingness to expose their party leaderships.

On a structural analysis, the question time in Bangladesh is not conducted on a partisan fashion. Hallmark of the British system is the Speaker’s wide discretion and conventional bi-partisanship of the session. The speaker makes sure that enough supplementary questions are asked, the floor alternates between the government and opposition and the shadow minister from opposition party is called upon at certain stage. Compared to the UK, the Australian House of Representatives is even more gladiatorial. Parliamentary questions are asked there without notice. Party whips would provide a list of members and the Speaker would alternate the floor between the government and opposition. Canadian House of Commons has taken yet another step ahead by reserving the question time exclusively for opposition members. While an Australia styled partisan listing of participants may yield a retrogressive constraint on our individual MPs, priority for opposition members, partisan alteration of floor and non-partisan attitude from the Speaker could contribute significantly for us.

The Parliament of Bangladesh: A Critique*

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chittagong

PhD Candidate, King’s College London

Published in: SCLS Law Review, Vol 2. Issue 2, pp 13-20

Online: http://sclsbd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/8.-A-Critique-of-the-Parliament-of-Bangladesh-M-Jashim-Ali-Chy.pdf 

1. Introduction

The ‘majoritarian’[1] system of Westminster parliamentary government is based on unwritten conventions and written institutional and procedural rules. The Head of State (the Crown) is placed above politics and administration and attributed a symbolic role of statesmanship. The Legislature, Executive and Judiciary are formally placed under the authority of the Head of the State. Apart from this formal tie with the Head of the State, the organs possess significant ‘inward and outward organisational aspects’[2] that connect those with the people.

Inwardly, the Head of the Government and the Cabinet is drawn from the legislature. Legislative process in the floor and parliamentary committees, parliament’s power over the purse of the state and the Cabinet’s individual and collective ministerial responsibility to the parliament constitute the line of control and restrain between the two organs. The basic pillar of the relationship is simple – the government once losing the confidence of parliament must fall. Officialization of the opposition is another hallmark of the Westminster system.[3] Opposition’s right to participate in the legislative and oversight process and oppose the governmental policies is strictly protected and guarded against suppression. The Speaker, though elected in a party nomination, would represent and conduct the parliament in a non-partisan way.

Outwardly, the elected legislature has supremacy over other organs of the state including the executive and judiciary. Parliamentary Sovereignty explained in its crude form also means the legislature’s absolute control over its law-making authority, freedom from its predecessor’s wishes, power to regulate its own procedure and freedom from external constraints like judicial review of laws made by it, etc.[4] The breadth and extent of Parliamentary Sovereignty within the Westminster parliamentary system is however debatable. Factors like emergence of political parties, interest groups, popular participation through referendum and the media, etc have put substantial limits on the parliament’s ways and means to exercise its sovereignty.[5]

Particularly, the Judiciary’s relation vis-à-vis the parliament has not be that of absolute subordination and acquiescence as is popularly narrated. It has been argued that judiciary has historically been engaged in a ‘collaborative enterprise’[6] with the parliament. Here the sovereignty of parliament was limited by the common law principle of legality. Adoption of the Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 and the Constitutional Reform Act (CRA) 2005 in the UK has redefined the judiciary’s relationship with the Westminster parliament drastically. Under the HRA 1998, the court is now placed within the tripartite process of human rights protection – the “executive-based rights review before legislation is introduced, followed by legislative rights review, and then [the possibility of] judicial review.”[7] The CRA 2005 has institutionally separated the judiciary from Lord Chancellor and the House of Lords and established an American styled Supreme Court for the UK. It has been radically argued by some that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty has thereby ‘effectively been replaced by [that] of separation of powers.’[8] While such a radical claim would be contested, it may safely be claimed that the Westminster parliamentary system marked by parliamentary sovereignty and fusion of executive-legislative-judicial powers is now going through a sort of ‘divided sovereignty’ akin to a formal separation of powers.[9] Understandably, the place and role of parliament in the Westminster remains subject to continuous assessment and reassessment. The call is no less acute in other jurisdictions modelled in a Westminster fashion.

2. Parliament of Bangladesh as An Accountability Institution

Typical of a Westminster parliament, the Parliament of Bangladesh is dominated by the executive branch i.e., the Cabinet.  It is called into session by the President[10] upon written advice of the Prime Minister.[11] President has the right to address the parliament at the first session following a general election as well the first session of every year.[12] He may also to send messages or address parliament on any other occasion as well. [13] Parliament must discuss the address and messages sent by the President.[14] By convention and constitutional provision, the address and messages of the president are drafted by the government of the day. The Prime Minister and other ministers also have a “right” to speak in and take part in the parliamentary business. An unelected technocrat minister however is not entitled to vote or take part in discussion not concerning his/her ministry.[15] Maximum one tenth of the ministers in the cabinet may be chosen by the Prime Minister as technocrats.[16]

In an ideal Westminster setup, the legislative procedure and different devices therein should constitute an important restraint on the government and its policies and a huge stock of opportunities parliamentary opposition and government backbenchers.[17] Apart from ensuring accountability of the executive branch, parliament itself remains accountable to the people who sent the representatives there and are in constant judgement of their representatives’ performances.  Parliament as an institution of restraint ensures governmental accountability through the following devices:

1)      Legislative and Financial Procedure

2)      Ministerial Responsibility and Parliamentary Debate

3)      Committee System

4)      Party System

2.1. Legislative and Financial Procedure

Like the UK Parliament, legislative process in Bangladesh is shaped in two broader aisles – an prioritized track for the governmental legislative proposals (Government Bills) and a less prioritized one for the individual legislative proposals initiated by individual members of parliament (Private Member Bills). Financial proposals including the Budget (always a government bill) draws special requirements and treatments in both the tracks.

Unlike the UK, Bangladesh does not have any system of Statement of Purpose or Explanatory Note or White Paper presenting the governmental legislative proposal and the reasons behind. Like that of Her Majesty the Queen, the annual speech of the President before the parliament might include some hints over the legislative program of the government for the year. That however is very scanty. Apart from boosting the government’s political and administrative policies, presidential speech rarely contains a comprehensive legislative proposal on behalf of the government of the day. Public awareness and debate at the formulative stage of laws is therefore limited.[18] Government usually initiates legislations on an as-the-idea-comes-in basis. Of course, laws might be initiated as a response to public demand or out of electoral manifestoes. In formulating its legislative proposal, government utilizes the Legislative Drafting Wing at the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Finance Ministry (if the Bill involves expenditure from public fund) and the specific ministry to which the proposed law is directly related.[19] A draft Bill is presented before the Cabinet and is placed in the table of the House once approved by the Cabinet. Individual members, on the other hand, act on their own in drafting the law s/he proposes. Different stages of legislative process in the floor of the parliament and in the committees as well, unfortunately pass through mere acquiescence and approval by the members. Deliberation and scrutiny over the-law making process are too scanty and effectively kept at bay.

2.2. Ministerial Responsibility and Parliamentary Debate[20]

Principle of collective ministerial responsibility is reflected in article 55(3) and 57(2) of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Prime Minister and Cabinet would fall if it loses the confidence of the parliament.[21] Though the party discipline in Westminster system prevents fall of the Cabinet as whole through a motion of no confidence, history of the UK is not scarce in party backbenchers revolting and posing leadership challenge to the premier. In comparison, the floor crossing bar and polarised party system of ours would effectively preclude a leadership challenge from the backbench.

We don’t have any express constitutional provision on individual ministerial responsibility either. Nor do we have any Ministerial Code of Conduct in the way the UK and other Westminster democracies have. Article 58(2) of the Constitution scantily talks about individual ministerial responsibility of a Minister to the Prime Minister. Parliament cannot enforce his resignation until and unless the Prime Minister him/herself so wishes or it passes a motion of non-confidence which shall mean the fall of the whole cabinet.

Parliamentary involvement in the individual responsibility process is seriously weakened by procedural technicalities as well. Ministerial accountability tools at the disposal of parliament include parliamentary questions, scheduled and unscheduled debate and motion of no confidence. Of all these, parliamentary questions and call attention notices are more frequent. Unfortunately, the lion’s share of questions asked by members omits accountability issue. MPs frequently seek benefits for their constituency and remedial actions over administrative complexities. Questions are followed by call attention notices and adjournment motions. With the Speaker’s partisan tendencies, most of the adjournment and call attention motion raised by the opposition members are most likely not to be allowed.[22]

Added to the procedural weaknesses is the emergence of the so-called ministers beyond the cabinet.[23] Known as Advisers to the Prime Minister, these ministers-in-fact do not sit in parliament nor do they answer the parliamentary committees. While even the technocrat ministers are offered seats in parliament and committees to ensure their accountability, the advisers in Bangladesh may simply ignore the parliament.

While the Westminster parliament is concerned with its individual ministers’ responsibility, Bangladesh’s concerns appear more fundamental. Leadership challenge or no confidence in the Cabinet kept at bay, the burning question here is whether our parliament could enforce ministerial responsibility in its absolute minimum at least. May the parliament ask and enforce the publication of whole truth by the ministers in the floor? The answer is perhaps NO.

2.3. Committee System[24]

Parliamentary committees in Bangladesh are formed under the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure (RoP). Standing committees are constituted permanently for the whole tenure of a parliament, while special and select committees are constituted on temporary and ad hoc basis. Standing Committees on particular Ministries (SMCs) are special type of committees that constitute a shadow government by parliament. Number of SMCs to be established in each parliament is determined by respective leadership.[25]

Theoretically the SMCs have been vastly powerful. Apart from the power to examine draft bills and other legislative proposals - public or private - in relation to the ministry concerned, committees also have the authority to review and recommend necessary measure for due enforcement of laws passed by parliament. Committees have plenary power of subpoena, investigation and inquiry into the activities or administration of relevant ministry. They can enforce attendance of witnesses, examination on oath, production of documents.[26]

Though the parliamentary committee system in Bangladesh has been consolidated to some extent since the 7^th parliament, it grew asymmetrically vis-à-vis the executive and bureaucratic branch. Speaking in its broader terms, weaknesses of our committee system are threefold – structural, political and behavioural.[27]

Committees have been structurally weakened by factors like ministers’ presence in the committee as ex officio members, nominal logistic support for the committees, negative attitude of the bureaucracy and government’s tendency to effectively by-pass the committee stage in legislative process. On a political level, party influence over committee agenda and hard lined party stances of the members on key issues hampers autonomous functioning of the committees. On a behavioural analysis, political clog over psychic independence of party members and inexperience of the members contributed substantially towards below-the-bench performance of the committees. Most importantly, until recently there was an apparent lack of political will in changing the status quo and allowing the committee system to stand on its foot. Three particular developments in the current parliament however give us some hope.

First, prior to the seventh parliament (1996), parliamentary committees took years to be constituted in the first place. Seventh parliament amended the RoP to make sure that committees are constituted within the first session of each parliament. The current 11^th parliament has created a record of fastest possible formation of all the standing committees only within the first 10 sittings of its very first session.

Second, a revision of RoP in June 1997 also made sure that ministers do not chair the parliamentary committee on his/her ministry. This was an extremely welcome development in terms of effectiveness of the committee system. Ministers now remain in the committee concerned as ex officio members. It has been argued that even this presence of a minister is bound to have an impact on the way the SCMs set their agenda, deliberate and decide. Ministers being the influential front bench leaders of the ruling party, chairmen of the SCMs were unlikely to be too assertive to embarrass the minister present. Therefore, it has long been argued that ministers go to committee only when they are called therein. Seen in that light, the newly constituted committees in the eleventh parliament (2019) constitute a milestone development no doubt. This time, almost all of the former ministers who are the front bench leaders of the ruling party and obviously more influential than the ministers concerned are allocated chair in various committees. The committees would definitely be benefitted by their expertise over the ministry as well as from the political superiority of the Chair over the minister. It has yet another crucial thing to offer and that is big. It would be a very wise practice to be followed by later parliaments and thereby establish a parliamentary convention of assigning senior leaders with expertise to the committee chairs. Such a convention if so established would go miles in institutionalizing our parliamentary committee system.

Third, membership and chair in the committees are usually distributed among parliamentary parties in proportion to their representation in the floor. Until recently, the ruling parties exclusively claimed chairmanship of the different committees. The Ninth Parliament (2009) allocated some committee chairmanship to the opposition party. Though there were repeated calls for appointing the Chair of Public Accounts, Public Undertaking and Estimate Committee from the opposition parties, it has not been paid heed to until the current parliament (2019). A lawmaker from the main opposition Jatiya Party, Mr Rustam Ali Farazi is made Chair of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), for the first time in the country's history.

With these three structural developments in the committee system, fundamental challenge for the current system would be in opening up more towards the citizens’ access to committee proceedings. Transparent and open-door committees are more likely to overcome the two other political and behavioral constraints clogging the system. The process will no doubt be slow yet these three developments provide the scope we were looking for so long.

2.4. Party System

Marred by successive military interventions into politics, development of bipartisan parliamentary democracy has been severely affected in Bangladesh. Though the government and opposition benches has been exchanged between the two major political parties several times since 1990, bipartisanship suffered severely due to the personal animosity between the major political leaders and their parties.[28] Opposition parties in general preferred outright opposition over strategic and principled opposition.[29] Boycott of parliamentary sessions,[30] en masse resignation in demand of passage of a law and even boycott of parliamentary elections frequently feature the government-opposition relationship in Bangladesh.[31] Governments also have shown maximum intolerance to opposition views and demands through parliamentary process.[32] Parliamentary channel of opposition being disfavored, street agitation and politics of violence took the stage.[33]

State of intra-party democracy and individual members’ decisional autonomy is also greatly compromised due to the floor crossing bar in the constitution.[34] Backbench vigilance in the parliament is also compromised for the same reason.[35]

3. Parliament of Bangladesh as An Accountable Institution

A Westminster parliament remains vertically accountable to the constituent in two-dimensional way. Members of parliament emphasise their constituency work side by side their legislative work within the parliament. Citizens also get access to the parliamentarians, parliamentary committees and process and supply important input to the legislature’s work.

3.1. MPs’ Constituency Roles

According to article 59(1) of the constitution of Bangladesh, the local government bodies in every administrative unit of the state are entrusted with local development works. Parliament “shall, by law, confer powers on the local government bodies, including power to impose taxes for local purposes, to prepare their budgets and to maintain funds”.[36] Parliament is therefore constitutionally bound to allow the local government bodies a full autonomy.  However, in reality, the MPs dominate the local government policy making and governance. Relationship of the MPs with local government bodies in their constituencies are that of conflict, collusion and subordination.[37]

Involvement of the MPs in the local government institution has been the root cause of over politicization of local governance as well as mis-governance at central level. It has affected the quality of law making as well. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh caught the issue in two cases namely - Barrister Ziaur Rahman Khan v. Bangladesh 20 BLD (HCD) 120 and Anwar Hossain Monju v. Bangladesh 16 BLT (HCD) 86.

Problem of Barrister Ziaur Rahman and Anwar Hossain Monju is that the cases take a completely opposite view to a common problem. While former accepts a sweeping power of “supervision” in the MPs hand, the later denies it all together. Therefore, someone would need to argue for a middle ground between the two and attempt a principled analysis of the separation of power and check and balances between legislative branch and executive branch on the one hand and the MPs constituency role on the other hand.

3.2. Citizen Access to Parliament

The Rules of Procedure of Bangladesh Parliament provides too little opportunities for the people to engage with parliament either through petitioning it, or through supplying to the parliamentary oversight by public participation in committee deliberation or inquiries. There is a scope of petitioning parliament on any bill or matter of importance under consideration of the parliament.[38] A petition must be counter signed by a MP and that again must be scrutinized by a Petition Committee (PC).[39] Petition Committee is usually headed by the Speaker and other senior members of the treasury except the ministers and the opposition bench. Petition Committee would circulate the petition and suggest remedial measure for consideration of the House. Problem however is that public are rarely informed of the opportunity and the device remains grossly underutilized. The Petition Committee also have taken a lackluster approach the petitions referred to it. Petitions submitted so far are mainly personal rather than on legislative or policy issues. The Committee also rarely sits in meeting. Committee have referred the petitions to the ministers concerned rather than to the House. The rules of procedure also do not provide any follow up process or time limit for responding or acting on the petitions submitted.

4. Concluding Remarks

On a broader scale, the way the Westminster Parliamentary System adopted in Bangladesh is inherently problematic. Apart from Institutional and Structural weaknesses, the parliament of Bangladesh is marred by its illiberal politics and party system. Our Parliament therefore needs substantial institutional reform. Arguments for reform being our prime focus, four important hypotheses must be kept in mind in the journey.

Firstly, the institutional stature of parliament in Bangladesh’s overall body politic is minimal and it falls much shorter in terms of institutional maturity and resilience expected of a Westminster style Parliament.[40]

Secondly, Bangladesh parliament is adversely affected by procedural loopholes and below the bench performances of MPs participating in parliamentary debate and committee works. Apart from procedural and structural flaws, presence of an undemocratic and illiberal party system drains away much of its potential as an accountability institution.[41]

Thirdly, seen from a public relations and citizens’ access perspective, Bangladesh parliament could hardly be termed as an accountable institution.[42]

Fourthly, reform initiatives undertaken in the past were theoretically flawed and procedurally misguided. Meaningful reform in future would require a sound doctrinal approach suitable to a Westminster style parliament. In this regard, institutional approach might prevail over the traditional evolutionary v. revolutionary approach to parliamentary reform.[43]

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*This short essay constitutes part of a greater chapter in the author’s PhD thesis at King’s College London with an intent to expand the ideas further and develop a full pledges journal article based on this.

[1] Arend Lipjhart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries, Yale University Press, 2012.

[2]Alan Trench, Wales and the Westminster Model, Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 63 No. 1, 2010, 117–133 at p 118.

[3] Philip Norton, Making Sense of Opposition, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 14:1-2, 2008, pp 236-250.

[4] Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy, Oxford, 1999 pp 9-21

[5] Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp 106-141

[6] Philip A. Joseph, ‘Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise’ King’s College Law Journal 15 (2004) 321 at p 333

[7] J. Hiebert, ‘Interpreting a bill of rights: Th e importance of legislative rights review (2005) 35 British Journal of Political Science 235, 245

[8] V. Bogdanor, The New British Constitution, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009, p. 285.

[9] Roger M Asterman, The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution, Judicial Competence and Independence in the United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press, 2011 At Pp 245-253

[10] The Constitution of Bangladesh, Article 72(1)

[11] Ibid, Article 72(1) further proviso

[12] Ibid, Article 73(2)

[13] Ibid, Article 73(1)

[14] Ibid, Article 73(3)

[15] Ibid, Article 73A(1)

[16] Ibid, Article 56(2) proviso

[17] Robert Blackburn, The Politics of Parliamentary Procedure at Westminster, 4 J. Int'l & Comp. L. (2017), 279.

[18] Rounaq Jahan, I Amundsen, The Parliament of Bangladesh: Representation and Accountability, Dhaka and Bergen: Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), 2012.

[19] Md. Abu Saleh, Law Making Process in Bangladesh Parliament, Jahangirnagar Journal of Administrative Studies, Department of Public Administration, No. 06, June 2013 (pp. 143-151) p 7-9

[20] Discussion in this part of the article constituted part of - M Jashim Ali Chowdhury, Ministerial ‘Non-Responsibility’ , The Daily New Age, Editorial, May 31, 2019; Link: http://www.newagebd.net/article/74004/ministerial-non-responsibility?fbclid=IwAR2gb4G-Ifz3ei2lVac0siBF3I94CWyMn0s4lrj57IuZQdoQtuZqlKIQWwk

[21] Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh, Article 58(4)

[22] Nizam Ahmed, Development and working of parliaments in South Asia, Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol 9 (1), 2001, pp. 18-48 at p 29

[23] M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury, 'Ministers' beyond the Cabinet: Accountability concerns, The Daily Star, Law and Our Rights, May 1, 2010

[24] This part of the paper appeared earlier in – M Jashim Ali Chowdhury, 11th Parliament: Rays of Hope for the Committee System, the Daily Star Law and Our Rights, 06 March, 2019, Link: https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/11th-parliament-rays-hope-the-committee-system-1710775

^[25] Rule 225, Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Bangladesh

[26] Article 76 (2) and (3), Constitution of Bangladesh

[27] Nizam Ahmed, Parliamentary committees and parliamentary government in Bangladesh, Contemporary South Asia, Vol. 10:1, 2001, 11-36

[28] Elora Shehabuddin (2000), Bangladesh in 1999: Desperately Seeking a Responsible Opposition, Asian Survey, Vol. 40, No. 1, A Survey of Asia in 1999 (Jan. - Feb., 2000), pp. 181- 188, at p 185; University of California Press, Available online: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3021232 (Accessed on 15 October 2017)

[29] Boycotted by Awami League and other major political parties, the Sixth Parliamentary election didn’t receive public endorsement. The Sixth Parliament was dissolved within months.

[30] Jahan, R and Amundsen, I. (2012). The Parliament of Bangladesh: Representation and Accountability,Dhaka and Bergen: Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) and Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI).

[31] Rounaq Jahan and Inge Amundsen, The Parliament of Bangladesh: Representation and Accountability CPD­CMI Working Paper 2 at p 21-27, https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4422-the-parliament-of-bangladesh.pdf (Accessed on: October 15, 2017)

[32] Nizam Ahmed (1997), ‘Parliament–Executive Relations in Bangladesh’, The Journal of Legislative Studies,

3(4): 70–91 at 90, Mohammad Mohabbat Khan & Syed Anwar Husain (1996) Process of democratization in Bangladesh, Contemporary South Asia, 5:3, 319-334 at p 331, DOI: 10.1080/09584939608719799

[33] Nizam Ahmed (2003), From Monopoly to Competition: Party Politics in the Bangladesh Parliament (1973-2001), Pacific Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1 (Spring, 2003), pp. 55-77 University of British Columbia Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40023989, M. Moniruzzaman (2009) Parliamentary Democracy in Bangladesh: An Evaluation of the Parliament during 1991–2006, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 47:1, 100-126, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/14662040802659017 (Accessed on: 15 October 2017)

[34] Muhammad Mustafizur Rahman (2008), Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol 9 (1), pp. 39–62 at p 47-48, Cambridge University Press. Available: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109907002812 (Accessed on: October 15, 2017).

[35] Salahuddin Aminuzzaman (1993), Institutional Processes and Practices of Administrative Accountability: the role of Jatiyo Sangsad of Bangladesh, South Asian Studies; Jul 1, 1993; 10, 2; pp. 44-61 at p 55.

[36] Constitution of the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh, Article 60

[37] N Ahmed, T Ahmed & M Faizullah (2011) Working of Upazila Parishad in Bangladesh: A study of twelve Upazilas, UNDP Dhaka.

[38] Rules of Procedure, Parliament of Bangladesh, Rule 100

[39] Rules of Procedure, Rules 231-32 of

[40] M Jashim Ali Chowdhury, What ails our Parliament? Law and Justice, The Observer 06 April 2019.; Link: https://www.observerbd.com/details.php?id=191886&fbclid=IwAR0Bu-AOg6Q0yrfD5pXy2BZRNbqnpwkJIU7BNuH2q26omsXd0URphsCjYwM; See also - M Jashim Ali Chowdhury, Giving the Parliament its due: A Pluralist-Institutional View, The Daily Star Law and Our Rights (April 9, 2019). Url: https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/giving-the-parliament-its-due-1726915 

[41] M Jashim Ali Chwodhury, Our Problematic law-making process The Daily Star, Law and Our Rights, May 28, 2019, Link: https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/our-problematic-law-making-process-1750039

[42] M Jashim Ali Chowdhury, A substantive parliamentary public petition system: Advocating the introduction of e-Petition, The Daily Observer, Law and Justice, May 18, 2019

Link: https://www.observerbd.com/details.php?id=198308

[43] M Jashim Ali Chowdhury, Parliamentary Reform: Making Sense of Our Successes and Failures, The Daily Star, law and Our Rights, April 30, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/parliamentary-reform-making-sense-our-successes-and-failures-1736635?fbclid=IwAR20kEi0zR5XOgw9KSw-E_gcCCr9ZjaWyjJaVxwID8RTNV8H-DxGhT4LtXw