Accountability Role of the Parliament:

Do the Individual MPs Matter?

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury

Doctoral Candidate (Legislative Studies), King’s College London

(Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chittagong &

Former Lecturer, Department of Law and Justice, Metropolitan University, Sylhet)

Published in Ain Darpon, Metropolitan University, Sylhet, Bangladesh, December 2019 at pp 16-19  

Introduction

The Westminster parliament is admittedly a cabinet controlled one. Government’s grip over the Order Paper – the daily schedule of parliamentary business - is a rule. Non-governmental private members from government and opposition parties alike have very limited control over parliamentary agenda. Legislation, budget and scrutiny functions of parliament are primarily government controlled and party dominated. However, the post-World War II modernisation process within the UK House of Commons has yielded some innovative devices that empower individual MPs to question an otherwise reluctant executive. Parliament of Bangladesh, however, presents a rather gloomy and non-progressive trend in this regard.

Private Member Tools in the House of Commons

Standing Order 14 of the UK House of Commons reserves 20 opposition days and 35 backbench days in every session. Out of 20 Opposition Days, the leader of the main opposition party decides the agenda for 17 days. Leader of the second largest opposition and other parties, if there be any, combined would fix agenda for rest of the 3 days. Government, however, has the power to allot the date on which the opposition days will be scheduled. Once a date is scheduled, the government traditionally would allow the motion - usually critical of government actions or policies - to be discussed and put to voting and then proposes its amendment to the motion that are usually passed by majority. There are however precedents of passing consensual motions. Once a motion is passed, the government responds, through a Ministerial Statement before the House usually within 12 weeks. Such statement may explain any corrective action that may be taken by the government.  Further debate or discussion may ensure from such statement.

The House of Commons Backbench Business Committee oversees the agenda for 35 Backbench Business Days. Debate on at least 27 of those days will be held in the House and the rest might be held in the Westminster Hall. Private Member Bills selected by the Backbench Business Committee would dominate most of those 27 days. Backbench day debates may also include general debate on a substantive motion in the main Chamber or the Westminster Hall for 90 minutes, 180 minutes or even for the whole day. Parliamentary Select Committee reports on various issues are launched during those days. On occasions, the Backbench Business Committee itself may decide upon topics that may be discussed in the Chamber or Westminster Hall.  Doing this, the Backbench Committee ensures that important issues are not ‘kept off the agenda because they were uncomfortable for the government’.[1]

Westminster Hall Debate is an innovation of the British Parliament where the Deputy Speaker chairs. Members may raise issues and ask questions. A responsible minister of the government would reply to the concerns. Any MP interested in the topic may participate the debate. Debates take place on Monday through Thursday. Monday is reserved for debate on public petition to the parliament which are selected by the Petition Committee. Thursday debates are requested either by individual MPs or the Backbench Business Committee. Part of Thursday debate is allocated to select committee reports sponsored by the Liaison Committee. Individual MPs wishing to initiate debate would serve notice to the Speaker’s office and topics will be chosen through ballot. Until 2010, Westminster Hall debate would take place after adjournment of the main chamber. Since 2010, the Westminster Hall debates are rather considered an extension of the Chamber. As an extension of the House, it considers motions 'That the House has considered [a specific matter]'. If vote upon or amendment to the motion is required, the matter goes back to the main Chamber and a full-scale formal debate may ensue. Usually, the members and ministers settle the matter in an amiable way within the Westminster Hall.

Apart from these collective tools, individual members may submit non-binding internal petitions to the House of Commons. Members’ petitions are known as Early Day Motions (EDM). EDMs are scarcely debated in the floor. Its purpose is rather symbolic. Members or group of members express their independent opinion over pertinent issues which may signal their dissent from overall party standing. MPs also try to generate debate on issues of interest to them and their constituencies.[2] MPs submit the early day motions to enhance their visibility, expertise and career prospect as well.[3]

Individual MPs also have the option to raise issues of concern in the Half-an-hour Adjournment Debate at the end of each day’s session. Standing Order 24 of the UK House of Commons permits individual MPs to request Emergency Debate on any matter of urgent importance. Notice for such a debate may be given anytime during the sitting and it is the Speaker’s discretion to allow or disallow the notice. If allowed, the concerned member would make a short statement after question time, urgent question or ministerial statement, if there is any, each day. The application then would be submitted to the House. If the House agrees a full debate usually follows the next day.

Like the Emergency Debate, Urgent Question is an important individual tool. Urgent Questions, once accepted by the Speaker, obliges a concerned minister to come to the Parliament within the day and answer to the House’s satisfaction. The last Speaker of the House of Commons John Bercow extensively permitted Urgent Questions and thereby took the parliament’s power of scrutiny to a new height.

Private Member Tools in Jatya Sangsad

Ours is avowedly a Westminster parliament. Legislative and budgetary process are government controlled. Scrutiny function of parliament is confined within routinised committee works, committee reports and discussion of governmental policies during general discussion on the President’s Annual Address and Financial Statement i.e., the Budget. Apart from these executive-held devices, the individual government and opposition party members may ask parliamentary questions, move motions for adjournment, half-an-hour discussion, motion for short discussion call-attention motion and private member resolutions. While parliamentary questions and adjournment motions are rooted in the Westminster, call attention motion, short discussion and Half-an-hour discussion, are the innovations of the Indian parliament.[4]

Parliamentary Question session, including the Prime Minister’s question has failed to generate substantial accountability for different procedural and attitudinal issues surrounding our parliamentary practice. Though there is a scope of asking short notice and supplementary questions, government have faced little difficulties in tackling the toothless bite of the MPs. Speakers have shown a traditional inertia to admit short notice questions. Requirement of longer notice and ability of the ministers to avoid answering uneasy questions or even answer in very vague or general terms frustrates the very purpose of accountability.[5] As per the Rules of Procedure (RoP), regular Parliamentary Questions require at least 15 days’ notice. Short Notice Questions require at least five days of such notice. That again is subject to the consent of a minister concerned to take and answer the question at such a short notice.[6] Compared to the UK House of Common’s device of Urgent Question, ours is hardly an urgent one. MPs’ scope to address the pressing need of the day through parliamentary questioning is therefore farfetched.

There is however a back-up device in Bangladesh. MPs may demand a Half-an-hour Discussion arising from a recent past parliamentary question answered by a minister. If a Member of Parliament feels that the question and answer to it involves a matter of public importance, which needs further factual clarification, s/he may move a motion for Half-an-Hour discussion on the issue.[7] Unfortunately, Half-an-hour discussions are rarely allowed.[8]

Lacking the power to inject something in parliamentary agenda in any other way, the opposition parties have traditionally tried with Motion for Adjournment of parliamentary business to discuss matters of recent and urgent public importance.[9] Such motions, however, scarcely got admitted or passed in the House.[10] Moved two hours before every days’ business, the government usually considers the adjournment motions as wilful disruption of parliamentary agenda.

Individual MPs have a scope to move a Call Attention Motion. Once admitted, the sponsoring MP would be given a fixed time, usually two to three minutes, to discuss and bring to attention of a minister, any matter of urgent public importance. There are however numerical limits of three on total Call Attention Motions that may be raised and discussed in a single sitting day. Also, one member is not allowed more than one call attention motion in a given sitting day. Most importantly, there cannot be any instant debate on the statement of minister made in reply to such motion.[11] While the role of Call Attention Motion in the First Jatya Sangsad (1973-1975) is lauded as being successful in examining the conduct of the government,[12] it is not clear how far the assurances given or explanation offered by the ministers were actually acted upon later.[13]

Individual MPs may also request Short Discussion on such matters of urgent public importance.[14] Also, the members may move Private Member Resolutions[15] to address and discuss important issues of public policy and government accountability. Such a resolution, requiring ten days of advance notice,[16] may demand government actions or/and support in appropriate cases to address the concern raised. The responsible minister of the government is by rules required to inform the parliament of any government action that may have been taken in furtherance of a private member resolution passed by it.[17]

All of the individual tools discussed above are constrained by numerous procedural, technical and attitudinal hurdles. Requirement of advance notice for moving most of these motions are inordinately long. While questions and call-attention motions are allocated time in each sitting day except on during general discussion over the budget, half-an-hour discussion and short discussion on matters of urgent public importance are allotted twice a week.[18] One particularly hard qualification of the Short Discussion is a requirement of the Speaker consulting the Leader of the House, i.e., the Prime Minister.[19] MPs are usually not habituated to ask questions critical of the party and government. Most of the parliamentary questions and call attention motions usually highlight issues of local or constituency concerns. There are also evidence of the opposition parties abusing the adjournment motions and short discussion motions for the purpose of mere political point scoring.[20]

Concluding Remark

Admittedly the politics and political process in Bangladesh is highly personalised, centralised and patrimonial. The obnoxious culture of clientelism and illiberal approach to governance have resulted in handicapped accountability role of a seriously incapacitated parliament. While the vice of the controversial article 70 prevents conscious dissent of individual MPs during the government businesses of parliament, private member tools to initiate debate and scrutiny in parliament, if given a chance, could have contributed in making up some of the injuries resulting from the assault of article 70. Individual tools that evolved in the UK Parliament during its post-World War II era of modernisation could constitute a persuasive jurisprudence of reform for our parliament. Specially when we call ours a Westminster parliament.

---

[1] David H. Foster, “Going ‘Where Angels Fear to Tread’: How Effective was the Backbench Business Committee in the 2010−2012 Parliamentary Session?”, Parliamentary Affairs (2013), pp. 116-134.

[2] Guy P. Nason, “Early Day Motions: exploring Backbench opinion during 1997–2000”, (2001), Available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.8.3930&rep=rep1&type=pdf (Last Accessed on 22/11/2019).

[3] Michael Kellermann, “Sponsoring Early Day Motions in the British House of Commons as a Response to Electoral Vulnerability” Political Science Research and Methods, Vol 1, No. 2, (2013) pp. 263-280.

[4] M.N. Kaul, Parliamentary Institutions and Procedures, National Publishing House, New Delhi (1979).

[5] For brief idea on Parliamentary Questions and Prime Minister’s Question please see – M Jashim Ali Chowdhury, Parliamentary Questions in Bangladesh, The Daily Observer, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Page 18 (Law and Justice), July 20, 2019 Link: https://www.observerbd.com/details.php?id=208381 & M. Jashim Ali Chowdhury, Procedural modernisation of Prime Minister’s Question Time in Parliament, The Daily Observer, Page 18 (Law and Justice), Dhaka, Bangladesh, 09 November 2019, Link: https://www.observerbd.com/details.php?id=227294.

[6] The Rules of Procedure, Bangladesh Jatya Sangsad, Rule 59.

[7] Ibid, Rule 60.

[8] Nizam Ahmed and Aftab Ahmed, “The Quest for Accountability: Parliament and Public Administration in Bangladesh”, Asian Journal of Public Administration Vol. 18, No. 1 (JUNE 1996): 70-95 at p 79

[9] Supra note 6, Rule 61.

[10] Supra note 8.

[11] Supra note 6, Rule 71.

[12] See in general - M.M. Huq, "Call Attention Motions and Accountability of Public Corporations in the Bangladesh First Parliament," Dhaka University Studies Part-C, Vol 12 No 1 (1991), pp. 101-13.

[13] Supra note 8 at p 91.

[14] Supra note 6, Rule 68.

[15] Ibid, Rule 130.

[16] Ibid, Rule 131.

[17] Ibid, Rule 143.

[18] Ibid, Rules 68-69.

[19] ATM Obiadullah, “Institutionalisation of the Parliament in Bangladesh: A Study of Donor Intervention for reorganisation and Development”, Palgrove Macmillan, Singapore, (2019) at p 150.

[20] Nizam Ahmed, “Parliament‐executive relations in Bangladesh,” The Journal of Legislative Studies, Volume 3 No 4 (1997), pp. 70-91 at p 80.

‘Eastminster’ adaptations in the Westminster Model:

The confusing case of Bangladesh*

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury

Published in the Dhaka Law Review Blog (11 February 2020)
Available: http://www.dhakalawreview.org/blog/2020/02/eastminster-adaptations-in-the-westminster-model-the-confusing-case-of-bangladesh-4488

Introduction

The Westminster parliamentary system is both a political heritage and a concept. Across the Commonwealth, the Westminster system as a political heritage was either ‘implanted’ by the colonial rulers or ‘transplanted’ by the settlers of British ancestry.[1] As a concept, it represents a majoritarian system that constitutionalises an institutionally marginalised opposition. This is in contrast with the consociational systems of continental Europe, where proportionate representation, greater power-sharing and coalition between the majority and opposition parties constitute the norm.[2]

Within the Commonwealth, some countries (India, for example) continue to articulate Westminster as a dominant discourse, with some institutional innovations of course. Some other countries have mixed it with other traditions (Australian federalism and customary norms in the Pacific, for example). Yet some countries have essentially converted it into something new (Pakistan’s military authoritarianism, Malaysia’s one-ethnicity dominance, or Singapore’s developmentalist one-party regime, for example).[3] Adaptations of this third category have been subtly influenced by a so-called ‘Asian Value’ jurisprudence. It seeks the injection of presidential and one-party tendencies in the Westminster system.[4] While Asian Value remains a contested concept, Harshan Kumarasingham’s coinage of ‘Eastminster’ got near-universal acceptance. Taking note of the demographic and cultural realities of British Asia, Kumarasingham argues that institutions at ‘Eastminster’ show a strong resemblance to the Westminster ones. Constitutional conventions and political norms, however, do not.[5]

Following its independence in 1971, Bangladesh’s parliamentary system started with some significant cultural, structural and procedural loopholes. It was a Westminster system in a minimal sense of adopting a single-member-constituency and first-past-the-post electoral system and a cabinet-controlled legislature. Apart from these, the other norms of the Westminster, namely, an established liberal-conservative bipartisanship, internally democratic party system and institutionalised opposition were missing. Interestingly, this brief inquiry into some of Kumarasingham’s prominent samples seems to suggest that Bangladesh may not qualify as an Eastminster one. A mere imitation of the structure, not the spirit of the Westminster, today’s Bangladesh faces a de facto one-party system that drives her into a no man’s land of constitutional studies.

Consociational adaptations in the Westminster model

Professor Arend Lijphart is known for his majoritarian vs. consociational democracy classification.[6] The Westminster majoritarianism features a bare majority government in control of both the executive and legislature and to a total exclusion of the official opposition in policymaking process.[7] Consociational or consensus system, on the other hand, looks for greater power-sharing between majority and minority parties and prefers multi-party coalition governments. In Lijphart’s analysis, presently the United Kingdom, New Zealand (until 1996) and former British colonies in the Caribbean – principally the Barbados – represent the pure or almost pure majoritarian democracies. Three countries in Europe – Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland – on the other hand, represent the pure or almost pure consociational systems. These apart, almost all other countries of the world accommodate a varying degree of mixed majoritarian and consociational characteristics.[8] Interestingly, nowadays even Lijphart’s pure or near-pure Westminster jurisdictions are seen adopting consociational traits.[9]

‘Asian Value’ adaptations of the ‘Eastminster’ systems

The Westminster majoritarian system as adopted in former British colonies in Africa, the Pacific, East and South Asian regions faces a particularly tough cultural challenge. It is a very popular idea in these regions that the British-trained political elites engrafted the Westminster model upon people ‘with very different social structures, religious texture and cultural values’.[10] Within the Southeast Asian block, an Asian Value argument is frequently advanced as a contesting concept. While the exact contours of Asian Value jurisprudence remain unspecified, the doctrine, in general, is accused of attempting ‘ideological rationalization’ of authoritarianism and one-party dominance at the cost of constitutional opposition and civil society activism.[11]

Harshan Kumarasingham of Max Planck Institute in Germany, however, has an alternative name for the Asian Value discourse – the ‘Eastminster’ system of British Asia. Kumarasingham’s coinage is used to underscore the cultural and conventional differences of this region with the Westminster model. The Eastminster is marked by interfering presidencies (opposed to the Westminster’s disinterested Monarchy), minority exclusion (opposed to institutionalized opposition), elite-controlled selective dictatorship (opposed to the Westminster’s elected dictatorship) and misuse of colonial conventions for personal gains and clipping of the opposition.[12] Malaysia, Singapore, India and Pakistan are presented as prominent examples of Eastminster jurisdictions.

In Malaysia and Singapore, the electoral system has been suitably doctored to legitimize the absolute dominance of one ethnic group (Malay)[13] or one party (PAP)[14]. While Malaysia looks like an adapted Westminster system, Singapore is better understood as a transformed Westminster system. Yet, the institutionalization of a periodic and regular electoral cycle in both countries has delivered some minimal checks.[15] The recent defeat of the Barisan Nasional (BN) Party in Malaysia serves an important example of people’s ability to enforce changes in rare occasions of democratic upheaval.

This argument holds good for India as well. It is believed that the institutionalization of universal adult suffrage and subordination of the military to the elected representatives[16] have helped the Westminster system endure the ‘structural authoritarianism’ of the Congress Party during India’s initial years of independence.[17] Even today, the sanctity of the electoral process remains the only hope for secular forces tackling the avalanche of religious hatred and division postured by Narendra Modi's BJP regime. Compared to India, the Pakistani military’s persistent, direct or indirect, involvement in politics and the absence of even the most elementary democratic practice of periodic electioneering have put Pakistan in a very awkward position.[18]

Bangladesh: A No Man’s Land in between the Eastminster and Westminster

In 1971, Bangladesh adopted the Westminster model primarily for her leaders’ familiarity and ease with the parliamentary system.[19] It was also inspired by two contrasting developments in the post-colonial Indian sub-continent. First, the erstwhile Pakistani junta’s denial of the system a chance in undivided Pakistan and second, India’s considerable success in consolidating it.

The Westminster model in Bangladesh, however, experienced several regressive developments from its initial years. Firstly, the involvement of the armed forces in the politics invited a harmful brand of ‘constitutional diarchy’[20] between presidentialism and parliamentarism. Secondly, the floor-crossing statutes, though aimed at securing political stability, came at the cost of freedom of speech and conscience of the legislators and intra-party democracy.[21] Thirdly, the majoritarian electoral system of first-past-the-post appeared as a serious roadblock to accountable governance and led to the monopolization of key constitutional institutions and total denial of constitutional opposition. Instead of several relatively fair and free voting in the 1990s that ensured alteration of powers between bipartisan regimes, Bangladesh failed to achieve any significant democratic consolidation. The post-2010 scenario is even worse. Utterly exposed and degraded, the electoral process now is reduced to a total farce and peoples’ right to franchise a mere paper entitlement.

Looking into the party-parliament interaction, Bangladesh appears neither a pure Westminster system in its colonial sense nor a modified or transformed Westminster system in the Singaporean or Malaysian senses. As noted earlier, the dangers of Congress Party’s decisive monopoly in Indian politics until 1990 and Barisan Nasional’s absolute dominance in Malaysia until 2018 could be neutralised to a certain extent by the presence of consolidated electoral institutions there. The disappointing state of electoral corruption and fraud in Bangladesh, unfortunately, offers little in this regard.[22] Nor does the Singapore People’s Action Party’s (PAP) dominance offer solace to us. PAP is internally a democratic party which tolerates significant cross-sectoral representation within the government and legislature. Awami League in Bangladesh, which is increasingly falling behind the whims of personal and dynastic elites, comes nowhere near Singapore's developmental managed democracy.

Conclusion

Bangladesh’s current ‘hybrid regime’[23] poses a very problematic case study for constitutional scientists. Bangladesh does not seem to be a Westminster system anymore. Though it resembles closely to Kumarasingham’s definition of ‘Eastminster’, it differs widely with his representative samples. It appears that even Kumarasingham could not contemplate the scale of perversion in the ‘Westminster’ system that Bangladesh is showcasing nowadays.

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chittagong, Bangladesh. Recipient of the Fulbright (U.S.) and Commonwealth (UK) Scholarships, Mr Chowdhury is currently pursuing his PhD in Legislative Studies at King's College London. He has published on constitutional issues with reputed national and international publishers including the Cambridge University Press and Routledge. Mr Chowdhury may be reached at: m.chowdhury@kcl.ac.uk.

* Author's Note: A representation of my initial thoughts on this topic was published under the title, “The Eastminster Parliament of Ours” in the Daily Star, Law and Our Rights Page on 24 September 2019. The piece may be accessed in: https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/the-eastminster-parliament-ours-1804540. This Blog piece, however, marks a change of view on my part. While I was ready to accept Bangladesh as a ‘Eastminster’ system then, my current understanding suggests that Bangladesh may not qualify even as an ‘Eastminster’ one. The case is therefore confusing.

End Notes

^[1] R. A.W. Rhodes and Patrick Weller, ‘Westminster transplanted and Westminster implanted: Exploring political change’ in Haig Patapan, John Wanna and Patrick Weller (eds), Westminster Legacies: Democracy and Responsible Government in Asia and the Pacific (UNSW Press 2005) 2-3.

^[2] R. A. W. Rhodes, John Wanna, and Patrick Weller, Comparing Westminster The Meanings of Westminster (OUP 2009) 66.

^[3] Patapan (n 1) 248.

^[4] Thio Li-ann, ‘The Right to Political Participation in Singapore: Tailor-Making a Westminster-modelled Constitution to Fit the Imperatives of Asian Democracy’ (2002) 6 Singapore Jounral of International & Comparative Law 181. Also see Takashi Inoguchi and Edward Newman ‘"Asian Values" and Democracy in Asia’, (First Shizuoka Asia-Pacific Forum: The Future of the Asia-Pacific Region, Hamamatsu, March 1997) <http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/asian-values.html> accessed 2 February 2020.

^[5] Harshan Kumarasingham, ‘Eastminster: the Westminster model in British Asia’ (The Constitution Unit, Department of Political Science, University College London, 22 September 2016) <https://constitution-unit.com/2016/09/22/eastminster-the-westminster-model-in-british-asia/> accessed __February 2020.

^[6] Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (Yale University Press 2012).

^[7]   Saul Rose, ‘The new constitutions in South Asia,’ The Round Table, 63:252, 439-450 at 444.

^[8]  Andrew Harding, ‘The ‘Westminster Model’ Constitution Overseas: Transplantation, Adaptation and Development in Commonwealth States’ (2004) 4 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 143-166 at 147-148.

^[9] W. Elliot Bulmer called the process the Westminster constitutionalized. See W. Elliot Bulmer, Constituting Scotland: The Scottish National Movement and the Westminster Model (Edinburgh University Press 2016); See also Julian Bernauer & Adrian Vatter, ‘Can’t get no satisfaction with the Westminster model? Winners, losers and the effects of consensual and direct democratic institutions on satisfaction with democracy’(2012) 51(4) European Journal of Political Research 435; and Akash Paun, ‘After the age of majority? Multi-party governance and the Westminster model’ (2011) 49(4) Commonwealth & Comparative Politics440.

^[10] W. Elliot Bulmer, ibid.

^[11]  Garry Rodan, ‘Westminster in Singapore: Now you see it, now you don’t’ in Patapan (n 1) 124-125.

^[12]  H. Kumarasingham, A Political Legacy of the British Empire: Power and the Parliamentary System in Post-Colonial India and Sri Lanka (London/New York: I.B. Tauris 2013).

^[13]  Deborah A. Johnson and Anthony Milner, ‘Westminster implanted: The Malaysian experience’ in Patapan (n 1) 102.

^[14]  n 11..

^[15] Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia A comparative and historical perspective (CUP 1995) 63-65.

^[16]  Robert W. Stern, ‘India’s Westminster System’ in Patapan (n 1) 22-31.

^[17]  ibid 17-20.

^[18]  Samina Ahmed, ‘The Westminster model and Pakistan: A continuing mirage’ in Patapan (n 1) 36-62.

^[19]  S. R. Sen, ‘Reforming Our System of Government’ (1991) 26 Economic and Political Weekly 485..

^[20] Harding (n 8) 154-55. On the concept of constitutional diarchy see also Donald S. Rothchild, ‘On the Application of the Westminster Model to Ghana’ (1960) 4(4) The Centennial Review of Arts & Science 465-483..

^[21] Harding (n 8) 147-148, 158-159.

^[22]  M Jashim Ali Chowdhury, ‘Elections in ‘Democratic’ Bangladesh’ in Mark Tushnet and Madhav Khosla (eds), Unstable Constitutionalism: Law and Politics in South Asia (CUP 2015) 192-229.

^[23]  Ali Riaz, Legislature As A Tool of The Hybrid Regime: Bangladesh Experience, Political Science and Politics (CUP 2019) 275-276.

Digital Parliament:

Problems of engagement and accountability

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury

PhD Candidate (Legislative Studies) King’s College London

Published in the Daily Star, Law and Our Rights, 4 February 2020 

https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/digital-parliament-problems-engagement-and-accountability-1863334

Parliament’s relation with the executive is a matter of continuous attention. It holds the executive accountable on behalf of the people. Yet, its relation to the public is surprisingly remote. Peoples’ reception of the mass and social media as the primary accountability tool of democracy has relegated the parliament to a second or even tertiary position in accountability system. A primary explanation for this, in our context, might be the existence of an authoritarian, clientelist and conflict-prone party system that disempowers the parliament and dries up the public confidence in it. This, however, is not the only explanation behind this. Citizens around the world are losing faith in politics and its process (Colin Hay, Why We Hate Politics, Cambridge: Polity, 2007). So far, the parliaments also remained ‘closed’ institutions unconcerned about engaging the people. Things are however changing. Public engagement is increasingly perceived as the most significant trust building and legitimizing tool.

Traditional avenues of parliament-citizen interactions are well known - parliamentary publications, news media coverage, public visit to, and observance of, parliament in action and individual members’ physical contact with their constituents. Some of the more recent tools are radio and tele broadcast of parliament, parliamentary clerk and internship for graduates, youth parliament movement, parliamentary outreach programs and education initiatives, public petition to, and public participation in, parliamentary investigation and hearings. The most recent addition to the process, however, is the use of digital media like websites (institutional and individual), weblogs, social media outlets (institutional and individual) and e-petition to the parliament.

Ideally, a parliamentary public engagement strategy would consist a five-step process of - Information sharing, enhancing public appraisal of parliamentary institutions and processes, enhancing peoples’ sense of identification with parliament, enhancing public participation in parliamentary process and lastly, inciting public intervention into the process by guiding parliamentary agenda. (Cristina Leston-Bandeira, The Pursuit of Legitimacy as a Key Driver for Public Engagement: The European Parliament Case, Parliamentary Affairs (2014) 67, 415–436).

Despite accessibility barriers, internet has a role in opening the parliaments up. Parliamentary websites constitute a stepping-stone in the engagement process. Official sites of parliaments, its officers, committees and MPs share information on their work and pave the way for the subsequent steps. Greater flow of the information helps raise public understanding of the institution (Philip Norton, Parliament and Citizens in the United Kingdom, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 18:3-4 (2012), 403-418).

Compared to that, weblogs and social media outlets interact rather than disseminate. These two-way communication channels allow comments, debates and replies that shape dialogue in public domain. The interactive nature of social media and blogs strengthen the vertical tie between representatives and citizens and horizontal tie between the commenters from the public. This again would develop ideas, set agendas and make people understand the parliament and feel associated with it. Peoples’ participation in parliamentary deliberation and agenda setting by improving the quality of consultation between the legislators and constituents. Parliaments are increasingly using tools like e-petition and online publication of draft laws for opinions. Parliamentary committees also hold online consultations on current topics of their enquiries.

The ultimate potential of an online parliament, however, lies in the chain of transparency and vertical accountability it brings to the system. Digitalisation of parliament should improve general behaviour among MPs, by making them feel incentivised to meet citizens’ expectations. Jurisdictions like ours however have some contextual barriers to this.

Firstly, websites of parliaments are developed in a purely archaic mode of information sharing. MPs’ websites and social media outlets are also invariably used to sensitise political strife, greasing the party leadership and propagating pure partisan agendas. These online outlets are maintained in a bureaucratic fashion that prefers cheap acclamation over meaningful dialogue and hence fails to address the policies and laws that really matter to the people.

Secondly, the clientelist and dynastic nature of our politics help temper the actual ‘expectation’ the people should have on their representatives. A 2010 study of Ghana found that public expectation was primarily personalised, like payment or remission of bills, fees, taxes, etc for individual constituent. Claims for localised or constituency interests - like roads and schools stood the second in line. People would next like to see their MPs being vocal in parliament. Then came the expectations that MPs are meant to fulfil - legislation and executive oversight (Lindberg, S. (2010). What Accountability Pressures Do MPs in Africa Face and How Do They Respond? Evidence from Ghana, Journal of Modern African Studies 48(1): 117-142).

Increased presence of MPs in the social media and worldwide web in such jurisdictions would therefore not necessarily produce a direct chain of accountability between the people and their representatives. Our experience in Bangladesh shows that even an explosive level of online and social media revolution here is inadequate to generate an extended culture of accountability. The accountability chain being constrained within the authoritarian leadership and potential opposition, representatives can afford paying simply no-heed to the public pulse.

Thirdly, and to the most unfortunately, online vigilance here is affecting the parliament so negatively and damagingly as to turn people away from the political process (Arkhede Olsson, S. Corruption and Political Participation. A multilevel analysis. Gothenburg: University of Gothenburg, 2014). Peoples’ resignation, withdrawal and distancing themselves from the system is evidenced by the alarmingly low voter turn-out in our recent local and national elections.

The parliament-citizen nexus has historically been territorial. Recent virtualisation of political sphere and emergence of an extra-territorial “e-constituency” have created new challenges for the parliament and MPs. The challenge is one of chalking out a state-of-the-art public engagement strategy. Internet empowers the people to bypass traditional media gatekeepers and lower some of the barriers to participation, but it is not expected to raise public interest in participation unless a robust public engagement strategy and a congenial political environment is in place.