Fifty Years of Bangladesh Parliament A Critical Evaluation
Dr M Jashim Ali Chowdhury
Brill Asian Law Series Volume 14Brill Nijhoff (2025)
DOI: 10.1163/9789004720831
ISBN: 978-90-04-72083-1
Publisher Link: https://brill.com/display/title/71649
Abstract
This book critically examines the constitutional position and contribution of the Bangladesh Parliament during the fifty years of its existence. Examining the institution through a “Westminster” lens, the book unearths how and why it behaves in an (un)Westminster, rather say the "Eastminster”, way. This book is the first of its kind attempting a separation of powers and checks and balances inspired analysis of the Parliament vis-à-vis Bangladesh's government, judiciary, and the people. It explains how its internal democracy deficit arising from the country's undemocratic political parties denies the Bangladesh Parliament, its rightful place within the country's constitutional design.
The introductory chapter dealing with the Parliament's constitutional design, Chapter 1, is followed by an introduction to the organisation, powers, and processes of the Bangladesh Parliament, Chapter 2. The next three chapters examine the Parliament's horizontal relationship with the Executive, Chapter 3, and Judicial branches, Chapter 4, and its vertical relationship with its electorate, the People, Chapter 5. Chapter 3, Parliament and the Government, assesses the Bangladesh Parliament's capability to enforce the collective and individual ministerial responsibilities, the potentials and hurdles of parliamentary procedure in influencing and shaping the government's legislative proposals, the strengths and weaknesses of the parliamentary committees in scrutinising the government, and the nature and quality of opposition and backbench participation in the parliamentary processes. Initially, the Chapter considers the modern developments in the Ministerial Responsibility Convention and its contemporary critiques in the UK. It then tests the doctrine's utility in Bangladesh's parliamentary practices. Next, the Chapter evaluates the legislative procedure of the Bangladesh Parliament and examines how the parliamentary opposition could use the parliamentary procedures in politics sensitive ways, the Politics of Procedure, to influence the government's legislative programs. The Chapter then deals with the role of parliamentary committees in enforcing executive accountability. This part evaluates whether Bangladesh's parliamentary committees distribute or trade constituency benefits for the MPs or supply quality information, scrutiny, and expertise to the House. This part also considers whether the multi party or coalition governments significantly empower the committees and how partisan cartelisation of the committees impacts their scrutiny power. The next section of the chapter examines how Bangladesh's political party system fares within Anthony King's party modes of executive legislature relation and Edmund Burke's delegate and trustee modes of representation. King's theory is applied to evaluate Bangladesh's inter party and intra party parliamentary behaviour, and Burke's theory is utilised to examine the nature of Bangladeshi MPs representative functions. Chapter 4 considers the Parliament's relationship with the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, SCB. Bangladesh is a constitutional supremacy where the written rules and principles of the Constitution limit the legislative and judicial branches. Under the Constitution, the legislature and judiciary are locked in a chain of mutual deference, comity, and accountability. However, the lived reality of Bangladesh's parliament-judiciary relationship suggests that the Parliament's role in ensuring judicial accountability and the judiciary's role in keeping the Parliament within its constitutional boundaries are shaped by the antagonistic tune of the country's Strong Form of Judicial Review. In this context, the two constitutional branches often transgress each other's boundaries. The last part of the Chapter then considers whether a Democratic Dialogue Model of Judicial Review could be an alternative route to explore. Chapter 5 evaluates the Parliament and its members' vertical and political accountability to their electorate, the people. Chapter 6 identifies the political and attitudinal problems that resist the Bangladesh Parliament's institutionalisation. This chapter offers a history, attitude and institution-sensitive explanation of why major reform initiatives attempted in distinct phases of Bangladesh's political history have failed to uplift the institutional stature of the Parliament. Chapter 7 revisits the issues identified in chapters 1 to 6 and tries to make an overall argument as to how Bangladesh's three distinctive Eastminster Traits, selective dictatorship within the government, patriarchal, dynastic and clientelist political selection within the political parties, and an illiberal antagonistic two-party system, control the Parliament's performance and contribution within the country's constitutional system.
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