‘Eastminster’ adaptations in the Westminster Model: The confusing case of Bangladesh

‘Eastminster’ adaptations in the Westminster Model:

The confusing case of Bangladesh*

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury

Published in the Dhaka Law Review Blog (11 February 2020)
Available: http://www.dhakalawreview.org/blog/2020/02/eastminster-adaptations-in-the-westminster-model-the-confusing-case-of-bangladesh-4488

Introduction

The Westminster parliamentary system is both a political heritage and a concept. Across the Commonwealth, the Westminster system as a political heritage was either ‘implanted’ by the colonial rulers or ‘transplanted’ by the settlers of British ancestry.[1] As a concept, it represents a majoritarian system that constitutionalises an institutionally marginalised opposition. This is in contrast with the consociational systems of continental Europe, where proportionate representation, greater power-sharing and coalition between the majority and opposition parties constitute the norm.[2]

Within the Commonwealth, some countries (India, for example) continue to articulate Westminster as a dominant discourse, with some institutional innovations of course. Some other countries have mixed it with other traditions (Australian federalism and customary norms in the Pacific, for example). Yet some countries have essentially converted it into something new (Pakistan’s military authoritarianism, Malaysia’s one-ethnicity dominance, or Singapore’s developmentalist one-party regime, for example).[3] Adaptations of this third category have been subtly influenced by a so-called ‘Asian Value’ jurisprudence. It seeks the injection of presidential and one-party tendencies in the Westminster system.[4] While Asian Value remains a contested concept, Harshan Kumarasingham’s coinage of ‘Eastminster’ got near-universal acceptance. Taking note of the demographic and cultural realities of British Asia, Kumarasingham argues that institutions at ‘Eastminster’ show a strong resemblance to the Westminster ones. Constitutional conventions and political norms, however, do not.[5]

Following its independence in 1971, Bangladesh’s parliamentary system started with some significant cultural, structural and procedural loopholes. It was a Westminster system in a minimal sense of adopting a single-member-constituency and first-past-the-post electoral system and a cabinet-controlled legislature. Apart from these, the other norms of the Westminster, namely, an established liberal-conservative bipartisanship, internally democratic party system and institutionalised opposition were missing. Interestingly, this brief inquiry into some of Kumarasingham’s prominent samples seems to suggest that Bangladesh may not qualify as an Eastminster one. A mere imitation of the structure, not the spirit of the Westminster, today’s Bangladesh faces a de facto one-party system that drives her into a no man’s land of constitutional studies.

Consociational adaptations in the Westminster model

Professor Arend Lijphart is known for his majoritarian vs. consociational democracy classification.[6] The Westminster majoritarianism features a bare majority government in control of both the executive and legislature and to a total exclusion of the official opposition in policymaking process.[7] Consociational or consensus system, on the other hand, looks for greater power-sharing between majority and minority parties and prefers multi-party coalition governments. In Lijphart’s analysis, presently the United Kingdom, New Zealand (until 1996) and former British colonies in the Caribbean – principally the Barbados – represent the pure or almost pure majoritarian democracies. Three countries in Europe – Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland – on the other hand, represent the pure or almost pure consociational systems. These apart, almost all other countries of the world accommodate a varying degree of mixed majoritarian and consociational characteristics.[8] Interestingly, nowadays even Lijphart’s pure or near-pure Westminster jurisdictions are seen adopting consociational traits.[9]

‘Asian Value’ adaptations of the ‘Eastminster’ systems

The Westminster majoritarian system as adopted in former British colonies in Africa, the Pacific, East and South Asian regions faces a particularly tough cultural challenge. It is a very popular idea in these regions that the British-trained political elites engrafted the Westminster model upon people ‘with very different social structures, religious texture and cultural values’.[10] Within the Southeast Asian block, an Asian Value argument is frequently advanced as a contesting concept. While the exact contours of Asian Value jurisprudence remain unspecified, the doctrine, in general, is accused of attempting ‘ideological rationalization’ of authoritarianism and one-party dominance at the cost of constitutional opposition and civil society activism.[11]

Harshan Kumarasingham of Max Planck Institute in Germany, however, has an alternative name for the Asian Value discourse – the ‘Eastminster’ system of British Asia. Kumarasingham’s coinage is used to underscore the cultural and conventional differences of this region with the Westminster model. The Eastminster is marked by interfering presidencies (opposed to the Westminster’s disinterested Monarchy), minority exclusion (opposed to institutionalized opposition), elite-controlled selective dictatorship (opposed to the Westminster’s elected dictatorship) and misuse of colonial conventions for personal gains and clipping of the opposition.[12] Malaysia, Singapore, India and Pakistan are presented as prominent examples of Eastminster jurisdictions.

In Malaysia and Singapore, the electoral system has been suitably doctored to legitimize the absolute dominance of one ethnic group (Malay)[13] or one party (PAP)[14]. While Malaysia looks like an adapted Westminster system, Singapore is better understood as a transformed Westminster system. Yet, the institutionalization of a periodic and regular electoral cycle in both countries has delivered some minimal checks.[15] The recent defeat of the Barisan Nasional (BN) Party in Malaysia serves an important example of people’s ability to enforce changes in rare occasions of democratic upheaval.

This argument holds good for India as well. It is believed that the institutionalization of universal adult suffrage and subordination of the military to the elected representatives[16] have helped the Westminster system endure the ‘structural authoritarianism’ of the Congress Party during India’s initial years of independence.[17] Even today, the sanctity of the electoral process remains the only hope for secular forces tackling the avalanche of religious hatred and division postured by Narendra Modi's BJP regime. Compared to India, the Pakistani military’s persistent, direct or indirect, involvement in politics and the absence of even the most elementary democratic practice of periodic electioneering have put Pakistan in a very awkward position.[18]

Bangladesh: A No Man’s Land in between the Eastminster and Westminster

In 1971, Bangladesh adopted the Westminster model primarily for her leaders’ familiarity and ease with the parliamentary system.[19] It was also inspired by two contrasting developments in the post-colonial Indian sub-continent. First, the erstwhile Pakistani junta’s denial of the system a chance in undivided Pakistan and second, India’s considerable success in consolidating it.

The Westminster model in Bangladesh, however, experienced several regressive developments from its initial years. Firstly, the involvement of the armed forces in the politics invited a harmful brand of ‘constitutional diarchy’[20] between presidentialism and parliamentarism. Secondly, the floor-crossing statutes, though aimed at securing political stability, came at the cost of freedom of speech and conscience of the legislators and intra-party democracy.[21] Thirdly, the majoritarian electoral system of first-past-the-post appeared as a serious roadblock to accountable governance and led to the monopolization of key constitutional institutions and total denial of constitutional opposition. Instead of several relatively fair and free voting in the 1990s that ensured alteration of powers between bipartisan regimes, Bangladesh failed to achieve any significant democratic consolidation. The post-2010 scenario is even worse. Utterly exposed and degraded, the electoral process now is reduced to a total farce and peoples’ right to franchise a mere paper entitlement.

Looking into the party-parliament interaction, Bangladesh appears neither a pure Westminster system in its colonial sense nor a modified or transformed Westminster system in the Singaporean or Malaysian senses. As noted earlier, the dangers of Congress Party’s decisive monopoly in Indian politics until 1990 and Barisan Nasional’s absolute dominance in Malaysia until 2018 could be neutralised to a certain extent by the presence of consolidated electoral institutions there. The disappointing state of electoral corruption and fraud in Bangladesh, unfortunately, offers little in this regard.[22] Nor does the Singapore People’s Action Party’s (PAP) dominance offer solace to us. PAP is internally a democratic party which tolerates significant cross-sectoral representation within the government and legislature. Awami League in Bangladesh, which is increasingly falling behind the whims of personal and dynastic elites, comes nowhere near Singapore's developmental managed democracy.

Conclusion

Bangladesh’s current ‘hybrid regime’[23] poses a very problematic case study for constitutional scientists. Bangladesh does not seem to be a Westminster system anymore. Though it resembles closely to Kumarasingham’s definition of ‘Eastminster’, it differs widely with his representative samples. It appears that even Kumarasingham could not contemplate the scale of perversion in the ‘Westminster’ system that Bangladesh is showcasing nowadays.

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chittagong, Bangladesh. Recipient of the Fulbright (U.S.) and Commonwealth (UK) Scholarships, Mr Chowdhury is currently pursuing his PhD in Legislative Studies at King's College London. He has published on constitutional issues with reputed national and international publishers including the Cambridge University Press and Routledge. Mr Chowdhury may be reached at: m.chowdhury@kcl.ac.uk.

* Author's Note: A representation of my initial thoughts on this topic was published under the title, “The Eastminster Parliament of Ours” in the Daily Star, Law and Our Rights Page on 24 September 2019. The piece may be accessed in: https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/news/the-eastminster-parliament-ours-1804540. This Blog piece, however, marks a change of view on my part. While I was ready to accept Bangladesh as a ‘Eastminster’ system then, my current understanding suggests that Bangladesh may not qualify even as an ‘Eastminster’ one. The case is therefore confusing.

End Notes

^[1] R. A.W. Rhodes and Patrick Weller, ‘Westminster transplanted and Westminster implanted: Exploring political change’ in Haig Patapan, John Wanna and Patrick Weller (eds), Westminster Legacies: Democracy and Responsible Government in Asia and the Pacific (UNSW Press 2005) 2-3.

^[2] R. A. W. Rhodes, John Wanna, and Patrick Weller, Comparing Westminster The Meanings of Westminster (OUP 2009) 66.

^[3] Patapan (n 1) 248.

^[4] Thio Li-ann, ‘The Right to Political Participation in Singapore: Tailor-Making a Westminster-modelled Constitution to Fit the Imperatives of Asian Democracy’ (2002) 6 Singapore Jounral of International & Comparative Law 181. Also see Takashi Inoguchi and Edward Newman ‘"Asian Values" and Democracy in Asia’, (First Shizuoka Asia-Pacific Forum: The Future of the Asia-Pacific Region, Hamamatsu, March 1997) <http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/asian-values.html> accessed 2 February 2020.

^[5] Harshan Kumarasingham, ‘Eastminster: the Westminster model in British Asia’ (The Constitution Unit, Department of Political Science, University College London, 22 September 2016) <https://constitution-unit.com/2016/09/22/eastminster-the-westminster-model-in-british-asia/> accessed __February 2020.

^[6] Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (Yale University Press 2012).

^[7]   Saul Rose, ‘The new constitutions in South Asia,’ The Round Table, 63:252, 439-450 at 444.

^[8]  Andrew Harding, ‘The ‘Westminster Model’ Constitution Overseas: Transplantation, Adaptation and Development in Commonwealth States’ (2004) 4 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 143-166 at 147-148.

^[9] W. Elliot Bulmer called the process the Westminster constitutionalized. See W. Elliot Bulmer, Constituting Scotland: The Scottish National Movement and the Westminster Model (Edinburgh University Press 2016); See also Julian Bernauer & Adrian Vatter, ‘Can’t get no satisfaction with the Westminster model? Winners, losers and the effects of consensual and direct democratic institutions on satisfaction with democracy’(2012) 51(4) European Journal of Political Research 435; and Akash Paun, ‘After the age of majority? Multi-party governance and the Westminster model’ (2011) 49(4) Commonwealth & Comparative Politics440.

^[10] W. Elliot Bulmer, ibid.

^[11]  Garry Rodan, ‘Westminster in Singapore: Now you see it, now you don’t’ in Patapan (n 1) 124-125.

^[12]  H. Kumarasingham, A Political Legacy of the British Empire: Power and the Parliamentary System in Post-Colonial India and Sri Lanka (London/New York: I.B. Tauris 2013).

^[13]  Deborah A. Johnson and Anthony Milner, ‘Westminster implanted: The Malaysian experience’ in Patapan (n 1) 102.

^[14]  n 11..

^[15] Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia A comparative and historical perspective (CUP 1995) 63-65.

^[16]  Robert W. Stern, ‘India’s Westminster System’ in Patapan (n 1) 22-31.

^[17]  ibid 17-20.

^[18]  Samina Ahmed, ‘The Westminster model and Pakistan: A continuing mirage’ in Patapan (n 1) 36-62.

^[19]  S. R. Sen, ‘Reforming Our System of Government’ (1991) 26 Economic and Political Weekly 485..

^[20] Harding (n 8) 154-55. On the concept of constitutional diarchy see also Donald S. Rothchild, ‘On the Application of the Westminster Model to Ghana’ (1960) 4(4) The Centennial Review of Arts & Science 465-483..

^[21] Harding (n 8) 147-148, 158-159.

^[22]  M Jashim Ali Chowdhury, ‘Elections in ‘Democratic’ Bangladesh’ in Mark Tushnet and Madhav Khosla (eds), Unstable Constitutionalism: Law and Politics in South Asia (CUP 2015) 192-229.

^[23]  Ali Riaz, Legislature As A Tool of The Hybrid Regime: Bangladesh Experience, Political Science and Politics (CUP 2019) 275-276.