What ails our Parliament?

What ails our Parliament?

M Jashim Ali Chowdhury

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chittagong & PhD Researcher (Parliament Studies), King’s College London.

Published in Law and Justice, The Observer 06 April 2019. 

Link: https://www.observerbd.com/details.php?id=191886&fbclid=IwAR0Bu-AOg6Q0yrfD5pXy2BZRNbqnpwkJIU7BNuH2q26omsXd0URphsCjYwM

Prospects of our Parliament are many. Problems are no less either. Some of the problems are structurally ingrained within a typical Westminster parliament. Some others are the unfortunate additions of our own political ecology. A brief survey of issues would reveal the following issues contributing to the below-the-bench performance of our parliament:

A Minimal Accountability Institution

Professor Anthony King’s seminal work on different party modes of behavior within a parliamentary set up may be utilized to assess the performance of Bangladesh parliament. Professor King tested the patterns of executive-legislator relations in Britain, France and West Germany. He set forth several modes of parliamentary interaction that occur within the political parties – intra-party, inter-party, opposition, non-party, and cross-party modes. Seen in this light, our parliament presents a total disarray. Intra-party, inter-party and cross-party modes of parliamentary activism have been halted by political, constitutional and institutional factors. Opposition mode is miserably misguided and hence unconstructive. Non-party party mode is totally unknown.

Intra-party mode of parliamentary scrutiny is affected by article 70 mostly. This clause has effectively tightened the tongue of the ruling and opposition party back benchers. Successive parliaments therefore invariably failed in criticizing the governmental policies and action, let alone making it accountable.

Like a Westminster parliament, the Parliament of Bangladesh is dominated by the executive branch i.e., the Cabinet. Legislative proposals are conceived, intuited and sponsored through the parliament at the sole discretion of the government. Ascendancy of the executive in the process here is however accompanied by a near abdication of meaningful debate in the floor and committee stages which is not a Westminster tradition by any means. This is a peculiar imprint of our own - article 70 and the clientelist party system. Government backbenchers take a strict party line in the floor and committees alike. Only 7 private member bills passed so far stands for the scarcity of individual initiatives and limited role of the MPs in discussing government proposals. Parliament totally lacks in mechanisms to review subordinate legislations passed by the executive branch. Also, unlike the UK, the executive enjoys a conditional law-making authority under article 93 of the constitution. Though the frequency of ordinances has been reduced in recent times, those placed for parliamentary approval usually escapes scrutiny in the floor and committee. Parliament has rarely travelled beyond simple approval of what is placed in the table.

Principle of collective ministerial responsibility is reflected in article 55(3) and 57(2) of the Constitution of Bangladesh. Prime Minister and his Cabinet would fall if it loses the confidence of the parliament. Though fall of the Cabinet as whole in house through a motion of no confidence is scarce in Westminster, backbencher revolt and leadership challenge to the prime minister is rather frequent. Except a few occasional symptoms in the early years of fifth parliament (1991-1995), backbench revolt is unheard of in our system. Leadership challenge is of course a day dream thanks again to article 70 and other politico-cultural issues.

On an individual ministerial level, there is no express provision in the Constitution nor is there any Ministerial Code of Conduct in the way the UK and other Westminster democracies have. Parliament cannot enforce a minister’s resignation until and unless the Prime Minister him/herself so wishes under article 58(2). Parliamentary contribution in individual responsibility process is severely hampered by procedural technicalities. True that parliamentary questions and call attention notices are moved. The lion’s share of questions asked by members however lacks accountability concern. MPs frequently seek benefits for their constituency and remedial actions over petty administrative concerns.

Inter-party and opposition mode of parliamentary opposition has been affected by traditional neglect and irresponsibility of political oppositions. Though the government and opposition benches has been exchanged between the two major political parties several times since 1990, the historical distrust and animosity between the leadership has haunted the development of bi-partisan parliamentary norms in Bangladesh. Oppositions in Bangladesh traditionally preferred the streets over the house of parliament as a stage of political agitation. Though the opposition parties in recent times have not boycotted sessions, they would rather take ministerial positions and “cooperate” the government.

Institutional weaknesses in a so far toothless committee system has affected the cross-party interaction largely. Though the parliamentary committee system has been consolidated to some extent recently, it has grown asymmetrically vis-à-vis the executive and bureaucratic apparatus of the state. Political governments have been invariably seen to hasten their legislative proposals through the floor and thereby effectively by-pass the committee stage. Research, secretarial and political support for the parliamentary committees remain a mirage till date.

Non-party mode of parliamentary behavior could have been symbolized by the office of the Speaker and other independent members. Unfortunately, Speakers of successive parliaments remained strictly loyal to their parties and showed reluctance to assert discretion beyond the party line. Independent members or political groups rarely got entrance in the parliament. A few of the “rebel candidates” winning election as independent members joined the ruling party almost immediately or even before the commencement of parliament. Again, an autonomous parliamentary officer known as Ombudsman could have been another source of inspiration for non-party aptitude in parliamentary works. Unfortunately, this also has not been activated by any of the parliaments so far.

A Non-Accountable Institution

In Westminster system, vertical accountability of parliament to the citizens is ensured through a two-track process - first, parliament members’ constant tie with and responsibility to their constituents and second, citizens’ access to and input in the parliamentary process. An evaluation of Bangladesh parliament in this regard shows a curiously asymmetrical dimension.

On the one hand, MPs excessive entanglement in the local governments, under the cloak of peoples’ representatives, has caused a serious set-back in the system of local governance and the quality of MPs’ legislative performances. On the other hand, citizens’ severely restricted access to the institutional process of parliament has substantially eroded the representative morale of parliament. The Rules of Procedure of Parliament (ROP) in Bangladesh allow it to meet mostly in public and occasionally in secret. Public can witness the house proceeding as visitors but not the committee sittings. Committees may invite public submission or public hearing on any issue under consideration. Committees can also seek expert opinion. Unfortunately, most committees don’t use, nor do they seem to be aware of their power of inviting submission from the public. There is a scope of petitioning parliament on any bill or matter of importance under consideration of the parliament. A petition must be counter signed by a MP and that again must be scrutinised by a Petition Committee. MPs show little or no interest in this public petitioning approach to parliamentary business. Public also are rarely informed of the opportunity. Hence the device remains grossly under utilized.

Concluding Note

Considering the issues raised above, parliamentary scholars in Bangladesh have categorised our parliament as an arena type parliament with little or no policy impact in the governance and policies of state. There is however a feeling that such a wholesale generalisation, though appealing, may be counter-productive for parliamentary studies in Bangladesh. Research and advocacy for parliamentary reform in Bangladesh would rather require a constructive pursuit exploring deeper institutional potentials that belie the structure and procedures of parliament and its organs.