Un-relating the Parliament and the Judiciary: Judges’ Appointment and Removal Cases in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh

Published in JULS Law Review Vol 1 (2020) pp 1-10

Full text available at:

https://www.academia.edu/73586549/Un_relating_the_Parliament_and_the_Judiciary_Judges_Appointment_and_Removal_Cases_in_India_Pakistan_and_Bangladesh 

Abstract

Parliament’s participation in the judicial accountability process needs re-appraisal in the Indian subcontinent. Parliaments’ institutional interaction with the judiciary is very far and few here, and there seems to be no serious conversation on why these two institutions would not relate to each other more robustly. Despite some very strong theoretical and institutional arguments for encouraging a legislature-judiciary partnership in their mutual accountability process, the courts in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have shown a general distrust of the legislative branch. This short article argues that this trend of parliament and judiciary’s un-relating each other stems from the judiciary’s institutional chauvinism reflected in its hypersensitivity to the doctrine of judicial accountability and preference for what may be called judicial protectionism.